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Abstract

THE LINKAGE BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND NURSING HOMES:
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MINIMIZING TRANSACTION COSTS
By Hemg-Chia Chiu, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University
Medical College of Virginia Campus, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1995
Major Director: Robert E. Hurley, Ph.D., Associate Professor

Finding more efficient ways to organize and deliver medical care is a major policy
and management concern in the United States. High levels of expenditures for
administrative and coordinating functions are attributed to the fact that health care systems
are not "seamless" and that excessive transaction or friction costs are incurred in the
exchanges between providers and purchasers and among providers. Renewed interest in
vertical integration as a means to addressed these problems is being explored in the
empirical literature, but rigorous theory-based investigations are rare. This study is a
theory-based exploration of how hospitals address the "make-or-buy" decision of acquiring
nursing home services for patients requiring post-acute stay placement.

The purpose of the study is to investigate under what circumstances hospitals chose
to undertake formal arrangements to acquire nursing home services for patients to be
discharged, rather than simply arranging for each discharge in the "spot market."

In some

instances this may be long-term contracting or leasing of beds, while in other instances it
may mean the hospital acquires or develops its own skill nursing facility--a form of vertical
integration.

The study adopts Oliver Williamson's transaction cost economics theory as the

theoretical basis for the study. This framework argues that the most efficient mode of
transacting is determined by analyzing three dimensions of the transaction: uncertainty,
frequency, and asset specificity (supplier identity). At higher levels of each of these
dimensions, organizations are more likely to observe that "markets fail" and that formal
arrangements between buyers and sellers are preferable, with vertical integration
representing the "make" versus "buy" option.
The study uses data from the American Hospital Association Survey and other
sources to identifY if and how hospitals have made formal arrangements for nursing home
services. It tests ten hypotheses derived from the theory that focus on the three dimensions
of transactions and interactions among them. The methodology uses several analytical
approaches to establish the validity of the measures of the dimensions, and then tests the
hypotheses using multivariate logistic regression to contrast various modes of transaction.
The importance of transaction uncertainty and specificity are strongly supported in the
findings, while transaction frequency is weakly correlated to higher degrees of integration.
The results are consistent with both the theoretical arguments advanced by transaction cost

xii

economics and with prior research, which is only available from non-health care
applications.
The study makes an important, and perhaps unique, contribution to empirically
operationalizing and testing a transaction cost economics-based interpretation of the
decision to vertically integrate in health care. It also provides useful insight into the need
for vertical integration to be selectively adopted

as

it may not be the most efficient mode of

organization in all "make or buy" decision opportunities.

Xlll

Chapter 1
Introduction

Acute care hospitals are facing a fundamental challenge - to reconstruct their
boundaries by providing a variety of related services to their consumers. New
reimbursement policies, the growth of managed care networks, and the development of
medical technology and disease epidemiology all are changing hospitals' delivery
patterns. Traditionally, hospitals provided care only to patients who needed acute care.
They now have to provide an integrated care delivery system that includes preventive
medicine, and services from acute care to long-term care.
The integrated hospital care delivery system will require hospitals to expand
services either forward to ambulatory care or backward to subacute care, such as long
term care services for nursing home and home care. It has been the trend in the past
decade for hospitals to vertically integrate various hospital-related services (Conrad,
Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Robinson, 1994) in response to the pressure of
environmental change. The trend raises several significant que�ons. Why have some
hospitals recognized the trend and vertically integrated different technological services,
while others have not? What are the major determinants that explain the differences?
Most importantly, what degree of vertical integration have hospitals employed?
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All these questions fit into the framework of transaction cost economics.
Transaction cost economics proposes that the emergence of organizations is due to the
failure of markets. The present study investigates hospitals' decisions to "make or buy"
nursing home services, by using the approach of transaction cost economics. The study
seeks to identify the most efficient design that a hospital may choose under certain
circumstances, such as specific levels of environmental uncertainty, transaction
frequency, and transaction specificity.
Background
The development of "seamless" or " boundaryless" delivery health care systems
has become the expressed goal of health care reformers or strategists in the United States
in recent years (Conrad & Jeppson, 1993; Gauthier, Rogal, Barrand, & Cohen, 1992;
Hurley, 1993; Johnsson, 1992), after the efforts in the 1980s to control costs were
unsuccessful. The failure of the efforts by the public and private sectors to contain health
care costs is shown by the continuous growth of health care costs during the last decade at
an annual rate of 8 to 16% (Levit & Cowan, 1991). National health expenditures in 1991
amounted to $751.8 billion (Letsch, 1993), equal to 13.2% of the nation's gross domestic
product (GDP). This was a big jump from health care expenditures in the 1980s, which
amounted to $250.1 billion. The expenditure's growth rate from 1980 to 1991 was over
300%. Much of that expenditure could be saved if health care could be successfully
vertically integrated (Conrad & Jeppson, 1993).
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A large portion of health care expenditures has been for transaction-related costs.
Administrative cost is a typical example. The administrative costs of ids-integrated
transactions accounted for 5.8%, or $38.6 billion, of U.S. health expenditures in 1990
(Gauthier, Rogal, Barrand, & Cohen, 1992). The interest in seamlessness arises from the
likelihood that inattention to reducing the friction from imperfect linkages along the care
continuum has impeded the efficiency of the system. Savings associated with the change
to a single-payor system, for example, are estimated to exceed $100 billion (Gauthier,
Rogal, Barrand, & Cohen, 1992). The ultimate goal of health care reform is to provide a
full continuum of health services and maintenance to defined population groups within
limited budgets. The goal is impossible to realize until all sectors providing health care
are successfully vertically integrated (Conrad & Jeppson, 1993).
When considering the fast growth of health expenditures and the large amount of
transaction-related costs, it is worth noting that substantial portions of these are for care
of the elderly. The health care system for the elderly has been criticized as "fractionated"
(Kane & Kane, 1987). Fractional care means that the different types of care for the
elderly's various needs are provided independently of each other. The artificial
distinction between acute and long-term care, for example, is actually causing
dysfunction and raising costs (Kane & Kane, 1987). The situation of fractional care was
made worse by the implementation of the prospective payment system (PPS). Since PPS
began, the implications of exchanges between providers and between levels of care have
been sharpened by purchasers' adoption of risk-based payment methods (Coburn,
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Fortinsky, McGuire, & McDonald, 1993; Federal Register, 1984; Hu, Sullivan, &
Scheffler, 1992; Weissert & Musliner, 1992). Methods such as prepayment per person or
per case make care providers bear the financial consequences of inadequately managed
transactions or patient dispositions. Delayed diagnostic tests, slippage in referral
consultations, and poorly planned hospital discharges all contribute to potentially
avoidable expenses that a prepaid provider would clearly not wish to incur.
The transfer of hospital patients to nursing homes is a particularly noteworthy
transaction. It is relatively common (Kane, Matthias, & Sampson, 1983; U.S.
Department of Health, 1994) especially among the elderly, who constitute the largest
volume of patients in most community hospitals. The frequency of transactions is
increasing (Gianfrancesco, 1990; Lewis, Leake, Leai-Sotelo, & Clark, 1987; Morrisey,
Sloan, & Valvona, 1988b) because of the complicated consequences of the Medicare
PPS. The PPS pays a hospital for each Medicare patient on a predetermined, diagnosis
specific basis. Before the implementation of PPS, hospitals were able to obtain third
party reimbursement for administratively necessary days (ANDs), the days of continued
hospitalization while a patient waits for an available nursing home bed. Previously,
Medicare reimbursed hospitals for ANDs of care at below-acute rates. Since PPS,
prolonged stays have become costly to hospitals, since no revenue beyond the fixed
Diagnosis Related Group (DRGs) payment is available. This motivates hospitals to
discharge patients earlier to either the community or post-care agencies, for nursing home
service. Yet, post-acute care services in the U.S. are widely acknowledged to be in short
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supply. This fact makes it difficult for hospitals to discharge patients expeditiously when
acute care services are no longer medically necessary. The situation is especially difficult
for those hospitals located in areas with relatively fewer nursing home beds (Kenney &
Holahan, 1991 ).
For both hospitals and nursing homes, the elderly are one of the most important
consumer groups. It is critical for both sectors, facing similar financial constraints, to
consider reshaping their linkage or boundaries. The linkage should take forms that best
match provider organizational structures, and should benefit not only the elderly patients
and the care providers, but also the entire health care system. However, under the
pressures of third party payors, it is very difficult to have boundaries that meet the interest
of all the providers. Hospitals have to search for the particular governance structure that
will enable each institution to provide effective care and operate efficiently. A hospital's
behavior may conflict with the interest of the nursing homes in the same area. This study
will analyze how a hospital makes a decision in this conflict.
The balance of this chapter first examines the transactions between hospitals and
nursing homes in the cost-containment era of the 1980s, discusses the factors that
reshaped the relationship, and explores the changes in hospital utilization patterns. It then
examines hospitals' use of vertical integration as a management strategy to overcome
nursing homes' hold-up behaviors. The chapter concludes by presenting the significance
of the study, and research questions that are formulated to guide the study then follow.
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The Era of Transitional Care
This section focuses on the linkage between hospitals and nursing homes before
and after the cost-containment era. The two-way channel distributing patients between
acute care hospitals and nursing homes as well as the factors that affect the relationship
are examined. Understanding how Medicare PPS and managed care networks have
affected hospital behavior and hospital utilization patterns is critical to understanding the
conflicts between hospitals and nursing homes and the consequent actions of both.
Transactions between Hospitals and Nursin� Homes
The linkage between hospitals and nursing homes is a two-way traffic: the
discharge of hospital patients to nursing homes and the hospitalization of nursing home
patients. A close relationship between these two care sectors can create several
advantages, including reducing hospitalizations (Zimmer, Eggert, Treat, & Brodows,
1988), improving quality of care, and reducing costs and the inappropriate use of health
care resources (Kane & Kane, 1987; Shapiro & Roos, 1981 ). However, in the current
system the linkage is not well-managed (Kane & Kane, 1987). With the advances in
medical technology, changes in financial mechanisms, and regulations, the separation
between these two sectors has grown wider, worsening the quality of care and increasing
the costs of care.
The two-way patient flow can be referred to as upstream and downstream
transfers. In this study, which views the flow from the hospital's standpoint, upstream
transfer is from nursing homes to hospitals, and downstream is from hospitals to nursing
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homes. Using marketing terms, in the process of discharging patients to post-care
services, hospitals are buyers and nursing homes are sellers.

Hospitals depend on

discharging their patients to nursing homes, to reduce the risks of delayed discharges and
maintain profitability. Nursing homes, on the other hand, depend on hospitals as their
main source of patients. This heavily interdependent relationship and its transactions
have been described by various concepts: "core technology" (Thompson, 1967),
"reciprocal dependencies" (Powell, 1987), "asset specificity" (Williamson, 1975, 1991),
or "countertrade relationship" (Hennart & Anderson, 1993).
The importance of each health care sector can be measured by the dollar amounts
that individuals spend on it. Among all health care sectors, hospitals and nursing homes
are ranked as the first and fourth, respectively, in terms of personal health expenditures.
Of $660.2 billion in personal health spending in 1991, $288.6 billion (44%) was spent on
hospitals and $59.9 billion (9%) on nursing homes. This distribution has been stable over
the years. Because the two sectors together comprise a significantly large portion of
health care expenditure, the establishment of a closer linkage may bring about favorable
results in cost containment.
The strength and magnitude of each stream of the two-way patient flow can be
measured by two elements. The first is the percentage of a facility's total number of
patients transferred between the two sectors, i.e., the frequency of transactions. The
second is the characteristics of these patients compared to all characteristics of the
facility's patients. Upstream (a hospital admitting patients from a nursing home), the
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percentage of hospitalization of nursing home residents ranges from
(California Center for Health Statistics,
Cretin,

24.8% to 54%

1985; Lewis, Cretin, & Kane, 1985; Lewis, Kane,

& Clark, 1985; Meiners, 1984; Van Nostrand, 1986; Weissert & Scanlon, 1985).

Lewis and associates

(1985) reported that 54% of their study sample frequently

transferred between nursing homes and hospitals. The trend of declining hospital
occupancy makes the transfers from nursing homes to hospitals especially critical to
hospital operation, since nursing home residents are an important source of patients.
In downstream transfers (a hospital discharging patients to a nursing home),
hospitals become the buyers and nursing homes the sellers of nursing home services.
Gorden

(1973) reported that 3.7% of patients in New York hospitals stayed at extended

care facilities three months after discharge. The proportion of individuals admitted to
hospitals from the community and then discharged to nursing homes ranged from

5% to

37% (Davis, Shapiro, & Kane, 1984; Kane & Matthias, 1984; Kane, Matthias, &
Sampson,

1983; Lamont, Sampson, Matthias, & Kane, 1983). In Massachusetts,

Maryland, and South Carolina,

4.5% to 9.4% of hospital patients were estimated to be

discharged to nursing homes (Densen,

1987). Analyzed in terms of admission source,

70.4% of nursing home admissions in Massachusetts and 74% in Maryland came from
acute hospitals (Densen,

1987). The risk factors associated with discharge from hospitals

to nursing homes varied among studies. Possible risk factors include activities of daily
living (ADL) dependency, mental disorders, and age.
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Several factors have changed the relationship between hospitals and nursing
homes. These include the implementation of Medicare PPS, the growth of managed care
organizations and the number of their enrollees, changes in medical technology and
disease epidemiology, and providers' loss of bargaining power due to the increasing
proportion of patients covered by third parties. Providers began to compete for those
patients who could bring in the most profit. Providers also became reluctant to accept
patients who could bring in only little revenue. The conflict of interest between hospitals
and nursing homes became intensive in the cost containment era of the 1980s; the
following paragraphs illustrate the effects caused by the above four factors.
Effective October I, 1983, the Medicare program changed its method of paying
for hospital care from a retrospectively determined, cost-based payment system to a
prospective payment system (Federal Register, 1984; Hu, Sullivan, & Scheffler, 1992).
The PPS pays hospitals a fixed, predetermined price for each patient's admission, based
on one of the 474 DRGs into which the patient's conditions and treatment are classified.
The payment is largely determined by the average expected cost of resources consumed
by persons in a specific DRG, including an expected duration of inpatient stay. Because
the DRG payment is fixed (except for extreme outliers), hospitals can anticipate the
amount of payment and the standard length of stay for patients in each DRG category.
During the first years of its implementation, reimbursement rates were weighted for
hospital- and region-specific costs, with little weight given to cost nationally.
Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey were exempted at first from the
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DRG system, because they already had similar systems in place consistent with the intent
of the legislation. Later on, New York and Massachusetts joined the Medicare PPS, in
1985 and 1986, respectively.
The objective of the Medicare PPS is to change patterns of hospital management
as well as to change physicians' behaviors indirectly through financial incentives (Muller,
1993). If a patient is not discharged when the expected period ends, no further revenue is
forthcoming, and the costs of the continued stay are borne fully by the hospital, i.e., the
hospital loses money. Thus, hospitals have become particularly intense about early and
aggressive discharge planning since the implementation of the PPS (Morrisey, Sloan, &
Valvona, 1988a; Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 1988b). Hospitals now act oppositely to
how they acted in the pre-PPS period (Hochstein, 1985; Jonsson & Lindgren, 1980;
Markson, Steel, & Kane, 1983), because hospitals, especially those with lower occupancy
rates, then had little incentive to discharge patients on ANDs. The goal of reducing
inpatient days seems to have been achieved.
The 1986 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act requires the Department of Health
and Human Services to investigate whether the PPS adversely affected hospitals located
in areas with limited access to nursing homes, as compared to other hospitals. Congress
was concerned that hospitals might bear the costs of unavoidable added days of care, or
that quality of care might be deteriorating as hospitals discharge patients earlier (Holahan,
1990). Under the PPS, the frequency of transfers, the changes in utilization patterns of

II

hospitals and nursing homes, and the behavioral changes owing to reimbursement all
have affected the relationship between hospitals and nursing homes.
Managed care networks are innovative organizations for health care financing and
delivery. They are distinct from the traditional fee-for-service providers in that they
deliver health care by selecting and packaging provider arrangements for covered benefits
based on utilization and associated costs. HMOs (health maintenance organizations) and
PPOs (preferred provider organizations) are the most important managed care networks in
the 1990s. HMO-affiliated providers often receive a predetermined and prepaid fee
regardless of how often beneficiaries use medical services; therefore, they accept the
financial risk of providing a certain level of services. On the other hand, PPOs contract
with providers to cover a range of services on a discounted fee-for-service basis.
The adoption of managed care, with risk-sharing, has changed utilization patterns
and the linkage among health services. A randomized study comparing HMOs with fee
for-service sectors between 1950 and 1980 found that HMO patients used 30% fewer
hospital days (Luft, 1980). Two studies reported a similar result, with fee-for-service
plans having around 40% more hospitalization than HMOs did (Greenfield, 1992;
Newhouse, 1985).
The third factor that changes utilization patterns is the development of medical
technology and changes in disease epidemiology. Advances in diagnostic and therapeutic
technologies permit more procedures to be performed noninvasively and thus reduce
postoperative days in acute care beds. With the advances, the length of stay in an acute
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care unit can be reduced by moving patients to a subacute care unit; subacute care is still
reimbursed by third party payors. The instances of such care are increasing
(Gianfrancesco, 1990). The interest in using subacute care is augmented by recent
changes in disease epidemiology, which continues to shift from acute care episodes
toward chronic conditions.
Another influence on the hospital-nursing home relationship is health care
providers' loss of bargaining power. The health care system has changed from being a
market dominated by providers to one dominated by third-party purchasers. Medicare
and Medicaid demonstrate monopsony power, since one is the major acute-care
purchaser, while the other is the major long-term care purchaser. Rather than pay the
market price, the government establishes a rate schedule to reimburse eligible institutions.
In this situation, health care providers tend to accept the stipulated rates and have to
compete for those patients who can bring in higher revenues.
The proportion of health care paid by third parties was 51% in 1960, 66% in 1970,
76% in 1980, and 81% (37% private and 44% public) in 1991. Governmental insurance,
Medicare, covers health services for almost all persons age 65 and older and for certain
disabled individuals under age 65. The market domination by Medicare has given the
government strong bargaining power. The coverage includes most acute care, mainly
hospital and physician services. Medicare paid $102 billion in 1991 for benefits to 34.9
million enrollees. For 13% of Medicare enrollees, Medicare is their only third-payor
source for health services. The state-based government program, Medicaid, is the

13

primary purchaser of nursing home services. In
nursing home expenditures
for Medicaid incurred
by Medicare (Letsch,

1991, Medicaid paid 47.4% of total

($59.9 billion). The 14% of Medicare enrollees who qualified

6.6% of nursing home cost, i.e., almost $4 billion is paid directly

1993). The states' Medicaid policies on eligibility for nursing

home care and on reimbursement rates heavily affect the transactions between hospitals
and nursing homes (Bishop

& Dubay, 1991; Dubay, 1990). Policy changes in either

Medicare or Medicaid can also greatly influence the linkage between acute care and
subacute care. In short, because of purchaser pooling, health care providers have
gradually lost bargaining power. The transactions between hospitals and nursing homes
then become intensified, as an increasing proportion of health care dollars is controlled by
major purchasers.
The environmental changes such as reimbursement policy, new technology, the
growth of managed care systems, and the increasing percentage of hospital and nursing
home revenue coming from third parties all reshape the relationship between the two
sectors. Knowledge of these significant changes is essential to understanding the
conflicts that face the two kinds of organizations.
Conflicts between Hospitals and Nursing Homes
The changes in financing mechanisms, especially the Medicare PPS and the
prepayment system adopted by HMO/PPOs in recent years, have changed hospital
behaviors in many ways, which in turn have altered nursing homes' behaviors and the
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linkage between the two providers. Hospitals are motivated to reduce the length of stay
(LOS) of patients whose needs can be met by long-term care (Kenney, 1991; Lewis,
Leake, Leal-Sotelo, & Clark, 1987; Meiners & Coffey, 1985; Morrisey, Sloan, &
Valvona, 1988b). As a result of hospitals' determination to discharge patients quickly, a
portion of hospital LOS days is transferred to the nursing home stay (Morrisey, Sloan, &
Valvona, 1988b; Neu & Harrison, 1988), and consequently nursing home use increases
(Hing, 1989; Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 1988a). Because inpatient services are
replaced by nursing home care (Gianfrancesco, 1990; Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona,
1988b), hospitals become more dependent on nursing homes when discharging patients.
Hospitals try to discharge patients quickly to avoid the cost of delayed discharge.
The average LOS in 46 states for Medicare patients was 9.33 days before the PPS, and
dropped to 7.89 in 1984, the lowest LOS since PPS began, possibly because 1984 was
the transition year of the PPS implementation. However, the hospital LOS days actually
were transferred to subacute care, sometimes as many as 4 or 5 days per patient (Neu &
Harrison, 1988): The Rand Corporation found that during 1981, 1984, and 1985, skilled
nursing care was used by 2.5% to 3.2% of Medicare patients discharged from hospitals,
and LOS declined from 9.9 to 7.8 days (Neu & Harrison, 1988). An issue associated with
this situation is that the risk of malpractice liability is bound to occur if hospitals
discharge patients prematurely under the pressure of the PPS. To avoid accusation of
malpractice, hospitals tend to transfer patients to nursing homes or to home care agencies
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rather than discharge them to the community, i.e., simply send them home (Long,
Chesney, & Ament, 1987).
This change in hospital behavior has a great impact on the next level of care:
earlier hospital discharges force nursing homes to accept sicker patients needing greater
post-acute care (Kosecoff, Kahn, Rogers, et a!., 1990; Morrisey, Sloan, & Yalvona,
1988b). Such patients usually need only short-term, post-operative care rather than long
term custodial care (Pfeiffer & Christian, 1987; Tellis-Nayak & Tellis-Nayak, 1986).
Nursing homes, reacting as hospitals shift the burden to them, are reluctant to accept such
patients, since post-operative care requires higher levels of skill than nursing homes
traditionally provide. The nursing homes certainly prefer admitting either private-pay
patients (to gain more revenue) or light-care public-payment patients (to contain costs).
This conflict of interests between hospitals and nursing homes should be alleviated,
especially if hospitals suffer from "information asymmetry," that is, if nursing homes are
likely to take advantage of information to maximize their profits by price discrimination.
In addition, each state's financial condition and reimbursement policy for nursing
homes also affect nursing home behavior. The number of states that pay their Medicaid
providers prospectively instead of per service cost is increasing. The change in
reimbursement method has shifted the burden of controlling costs to the nursing homes.
Consequently, nursing homes now prefer to admit those patients who are more profitable
(Shapiro & Roos, 1981).
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The reimbursement policy together with the short supply of nursing home beds
accrues advantage to nursing homes in selecting patients. If there is a shortage of nursing
home beds, hospitals become more dependent on nursing homes to take their patients,
and so nursing homes are in a superior position. They are free to select the patients they
consider able to bring higher profits. Furthermore, nursing homes may take advantage of
hospitals' Jack of information about the availability of nursing home beds. Hospitals try
to combat price discrimination in nursing home behavior by delaying their discharge of
patients, which increases the hospitals' operational costs. Some hospitals successfully
use nursing homes or home health services for patients when all their own beds are
occupied (Conner & Greene, 1983; Feder & Scanlon, 1985). However, the nursing home
market still fails to provide prompt care for patients who are medically ready for
discharge, which increases hospital operational costs through delayed discharges (Welch
& Dubay, 1989).
The situation described above is reflected in two studies. Weissert and Cready
(1988) examined the effect of delayed discharge to nursing homes and found that within
twelve months 3,500 unnecessary patient days cost the hospital about half a million
dollars that could have been taken in if the beds had been filled by new patients. Welch
and Dubay (1989) investigated the impact that administratively necessary days had on
hospital costs. Their results show that as the nursing home market loosens up, hospital
costs fall, presumably because discharging patients to nursing homes becomes easier.
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About 50% of the studied hospitals' ANDs appeared to increase costs, from 1.9% to
4.5%.
Vertical Integration as A Management Strategy

(

The impact of the external environment on the behaviors of health care
organizations is unquestionable (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Philips, 1967; Provan, 1987;
Thompson, 1967). As the government becomes more actively involved in financing and
regulating health services and more intent on accountability and cost containment, health
care providers become more affected by the environment (Fottler, Schermerhorn, Wong,
& Money, 1982; Gay, Kronenfeld, Baker, & Amidon, 1989).
Vertical integration has been asserted to be a sensible strategic reaction to
environmental forces that restrict reimbursement (Brown & McCool, 1986; Coddington
& Moore, 1987; Murphy, 1985). Over the past decade, hospitals have made attempts to
integrate activities at various stages of production (Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare,
1988; Robinson, 1994). For two reasons, vertical integration is considered an appropriate
management strategy for hospitals. First, due to the nature of transactions of care in the
downstream-upstream relationship, a hospital can cross that boundary with relatively low
risk of failure. Second, hospitals have found they can reduce costs by acquiring skilled
nursing facility (SNF) beds or home health agencies; the reduced LOS resulting from
such acquisitions will eventually either produce more revenues or reduce costs (Newald,
1986a; Newald, 1986b; Moore, 1985)-f.JAlthough empirical assessments are lacking,
vertical integration has occurred frequently (Mick & Conrad, 1988; Robinson, 1994).
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Perspective
Transaction cost economics provides a plausible theoretical framework within

(

which to explore the topic of vertical integration. The transaction cost economics theory,
developed by Williamson, represents organizational economics (Williamson, 1975,

1985). The theory incorporates concepts of economic and contract law into a broader
mode to explain how organizations respond to "market failure" and to provide the most
efficient model of exchange (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991). Williamson has proposed
that measurement in TCE should focus on the performance or attribute ambiguities
associated with the supply of a good or service. The theory focuses on the transaction -the exchange between buyer and supplier-- as the unit of importance, and suggests that
the dimensions and attributes of transactions determine the preferred transacting
framework.

(

)

These frameworks may include 1) "spot market" exchanges, in which buyers and

sellers may have no prior established relationships;

2) contracting of mid- or long-term

duration (via contract or joint venture arrangement) where a transacting setting has been
developed to guide exchanges, called a "hybrid" mode of governance; and 3) vertical
integration, wherein the buyer ultimately gains permanent control over the supplier.
Vertical integration is termed as "hierarchy." Overall, transaction cost theory suggests
that the design of organizations may be the result of the continuing calculation of "make

--�� _l?gY�' decisions by exchange partners.

l
/
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( That hospitals can consider Rro�_ �d.ingE����<l.<:��e-��re either -��ug��facilities they
own or through formal long-term contracting (including joint ventures) reflects
imperfection in the nursing home market. The situation is better explained by
Williamson's transaction cost economics concept that the failure of market function gives
rise to the emergence of organizations. Market failure in this context refers to the
situation where long-term care providers are few, and information is impacted.
"Impacted" information arises from uncertainty about the supply of long-term care, and

nursing home opportunistic behaviors that keep hospitals from having perfect information
about the availability of nursing home beds. Nursing homes, out of self-interest, tend to
select patients who can provide the most possible profits. Consequently, hospitals
encounter difficulty in placing their readily dischargeable patients in nursing homes. In
market terms, to overcome the imperfections of the nursing home market, hospitals
should adopt different modes of governance, according toJ_b_e__three dimensions suggested
by Williamson-- transaction uncertainty, transaction frequency, and t:ansaction asset

__specificity (Williamson, 1975, 1985).

)

Research Questions
In evaluating the reasons for and conditions under which a hospital vertically
integrates into nursing home care, this study addresses the following research questions:
I.

To what degree do hospitals choose vertical integration to solve the delayed discharge
problem that may be caused by environmental uncertainty and other conditions?
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2.

What are the major determinants that affect hospitals' different modes of control
(ranging from market, to hybrid, and to vertical integration) over nursing home care
services, i.e., what fac�ors deter01ir1e hospitals' 01ake-or.��l1y d��i�i��s_?
_
_

3.

Can Williamson's transaction cost economics be applied in the health care sector,
especially to acute care hospitals and nursing homes? More specifically, can
transaction uncertainty, transaction specificity, and transaction frequency explain
hospital behavior in choosing an efficient governance form?
Significance of the Present Study
As competition in the health care market becomes increasingly intensive and the

scarcity of related resources becomes more severe, operational efficiency of health care
organizations has become a major concern of management. The efforts of health care
reform to restructure the current health care system reflect the society's concerns about
the system's deficiencies. With the population rapidly aging and with the change in
reimbursement policy, more and more patients are expected to be transferred from acute
care to extended care sites (i.e., from higher-cost to lower-cost sites). Providers of acute
care, under such pressures, may strive to reduce costs by adopting such strategies as
vertical integration with up- or down-stream providers. This study may provide
information about the relative benefits of different degrees of vertical integration.
Despite the widespread recognition that transaction cost economics is potentially
applicable to a number of health service research questions (Conrad & Dowling, 1990;
Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Hurley & Fennel, 1990; Mick & Conrad, 1988),
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little empirical evidence has been gathered in this area. The growing interest in
promoting vertically integrated delivery systems in health care, either implicitly or
explicitly, to reduce transaction-related friction suggests that this model should be
revisited and operationalized. This study reviews literature on hospital management
strategies for remedying market failure and examines whether transaction cost economics
is applicable to health care.
The assumption of this study is that hospitals can use vertical integration to

�

expand hospital boundaries and thus minimize deficiencies in the nursing home market.

(

In seeking the most efficient governance form, a hospital should select the one that is the

\
I

I

\

\

best for its own situation. The transaction cost economics framework will provide
hospitals with a theoretical foundation for such "make or buy" decisions.

'

Outlines of Remaining Chapters
Chapter 2 first reviews the demand for and supply of nursing home beds and the
factors associated with delayed discharges from hospitals. Particular attention is directed
toward nursing homes' behaviors related to the short supply of beds. The definition of
vertical integration, and different approaches to interpreting vertical integration are
presented. The motivations and risks for hospitals employing vertical integration as a
management strategy are examined. Some examples of vertical integration in the health
care industry are described.
Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical framework that guides the study. The core
concept and the three dimensions of transaction cost economics are presented. The
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chapter reviews articles in the health care field that use TCE to interpret the emergence of
health care organizations due to market failure. Empirical studies in other disciplines that
test or explain the transaction cost economic theory are reviewed as well. Finally,
hypotheses based upon the three-dimensional conceptual model are derived.
Chapter 4 begins with a statement of the study design and description of the
sample. This is followed by descriptions of the data sources, model specification and
measurement variables. The section on the analytic plan includes a discussion of model
building analyses and multivariate logistic regression analysis.
Chapter 5 presents the results of data management and statistical analysis,
including descriptive statistics, model building, and multivariate logistic regression
analysis.
Chapter 6 presents the results of individual hypothesis testing of the three
constructs. A discussion of whether the study has successfully answered the research
questions follows. Then the application of the transaction cost theory to the health care
field is assessed by using Bacharach's (1989) criteria. This chapter concludes with a
discussion of the limitations of the study.
Finally, Chapter 7 presents several important implications of the findings from
this study that are useful for hospital administrators, policy makers, and researchers in the
areas of health service organizations and long-term care. Suggestions for future research
are also presented.

Chapter 2
Literature Review

Several areas that are important to the study are reviewed in this chapter. The first
section is about the demand for and supply of nursing home beds; the second section
covers factors associated with delayed hospital discharges. The third section presents the
definition and different interpretations of vertical integration given by researchers from
both health care and non-health-care fields. The last section presents the motivation,
risks, and determinants of success that are associated with vertical integration, and offers
some examples of vertical integration in health care industry.
Demand and Supply of Nursing Home Beds
The basic economic concept, the contrast of demand and supply, is used to review
the nursing home market, since this study is concerned with organizations' behaviors
related to demand and supply. On the demand side, factors that increase the demand for
nursing home beds, such as changes in population and technology, are explored first. On
the supply side, the oligopoly features of the nursing home market, such as certificate-of
need (CON), price regulation, and bed supply associated with delays and costs for
hospital patients are discussed.
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Demand for Nursing Home Beds
Several factors have increased the demand for nursing home care. The aging of
the population, the changes in the most prevalent types of illness, and the advancement of
medical technology are the main reasons.
The over thirty million older persons (age 65 or older) as of 1990 (U.S. Census
Bureau, 1990) represent the largest consumer group for nursing home services. Total
annual population growth was 1% between 1965 and 1990, and a 0.6% growth rate is
projected for the years 1990 to 2030, along with dramatic changes in the population's
composition. Currently, persons age 65 and over comprise 12.4% of the entire
population, and persons age 75 and over comprise 5.3%. By 2015, these two groups will
increase to 14.6% and 6.0%, respectively, of the total population. The aging trend will
continue as the baby boomers enter their seventies and eighties, and these proportions
will increase to 20.1% and 9.0% by 2030.
The population age 65 and older faces higher risks of institutionalization, and that
is especially true of the group age 75 and over, even though only 5% of them reside in
nursing homes. It is estimated that 25-35% (Ingram & Barry, 1977; Liang & Tu, 1986;
Palmore, 1976) or an even higher percentage (Cohen, Tell, & Wallack, 1986; McConnell,
1984; Vicente, Wiley, & Carrington, 1979) of the current cohorts of older adults will

become institutionalized at some point in their lives. Provided the current pattern
continues, the number of elderly who need nursing home care will increase from 1.8
million in 1990 to 3-3.4 million in 2010, and to as high as 4.3-5.3 million, tripling today's
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demand, in 2030. Health care providers, hospitals and nursing homes must stay alert to
the demographic trend, because it will bring about changes in the utilization patterns for
different levels of care (Zedlewski & McBride, 1992).
In addition to the aging population, the changing morbidity pattern is another
factor increasing the demand for post-acute care. Despite declining mortality rates since
1957 (Tellis-Nayak & Tellis-Nayak, 1986), chronic diseases that increase with longevity
are becoming more prevalent. Cerebrovascular disorders, hip and femur procedures,
pneumonia and pleurisy, heart failure and shock, and major joint replacement are the five
most frequent DRGs among the hospitalized Medicare patients discharged to post-acute
care (Kenney & Holahan, 1990). The elderly are more vulnerable to chronic diseases and
more likely to require nursing home care for them.
Advances in treatment also have fueled the growth of post-acute care. Between
1980 and 1987, the number of hip replacements, one of the most common procedures of
modern medicine, increased by over 90%, while total hospital discharges decreased by
I 0% (Friedman & Elixhauser, 1993). Hospitals that have more patients with hip

replacements are likely to need more nursing care beds, since nursing home care is
typically transitional care for patients with joint replacement (Morrisey, Sloan, &
Valvona, 1988b).
Supply of Nursing Home Beds
The growth of nursing home beds, unfortunately, has not responded to the
increased demand. The supply of nursing home beds grew quickly after the
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implementation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, but in the 1980s it did not match the
growth rate of the aged population. During the 11 years from 1978 to 1989, the total
nwnber of nursing home beds increased by 24%. However, in 1989 the ratio of nursing
home beds to the elderly population had dropped 2% below that of 1978. The average
nursing home occupancy rate was 89.54% in 1978, 91.18% in 1989 (Harrington, Preston,
Grant,

&

Swan, 1992), and as high as 95.4% in 1992 (Marion Merrel Dow, 1993).

Among the many reasons that the growth of nursing home beds has not responded to
market demand are certificate-of-need (CON), control mechanisms to limit access, and
reimbursement policies.
The nursing home industry is quite complex, because its development is heavily
influenced by changes in regulations and policies. By 1970, several states had
implemented CON regulations requiring state approval of the establishment or expansion
of health facilities, usually including nursing homes. By 1979, almost all states had
enacted CON, differing only in the degree of stringency. The 1982 Social Security Act
was intended to reduce the variation by requiring all nursing homes with capital
expenditure over $100,000, located in over 30 states, to undergo review by the state CON
administrator (Feder & Scanlon, 1980). It has been argued that the CON laws and
construction moratoria limited the growth of nursing home beds (Ettner, 1993; Feder &
Scanlon, 1980; Nyman, 1993; Zinn, Aaronson, & Rosko, 1992), w h ich led to an

excess demand (Nyman, 1993). CON stringency is also used by regulators to control
Medicaid health expenditures: Feder and Scanlon (1980) studied CON in eight states and
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speculated that the government may have restricted the growth of nursing home capacity
in order to cut the costs of providing nursing home services for Medicaid recipients.
State Medicaid reimbursement policies certainly have considerable impact on the
supply of nursing homes. Medicaid pays for about half of all nursing home patient days,
representing its near-monopsony power. Of nursing home expenditures ($59.9 billion) in
1991, Medicaid paid 47.4%, private or out-of-pocket payments paid 43.1%, Medicare
paid only 6.6%, and the rest was paid by private insurance, philanthropy, and others
(Letsch, 1993). Should reimbursement rates be increased, more firms are likely to enter
the market, assuming that CON permits expansion of existing services and that incentives
to admit and care for Medicaid patients are in place. The impact of Medicaid
reimbursement on nursing home supply will be further discussed in the next section.
Another factor constraining the increase in nursing home beds is preadmission
screening. In the 1980s, at least thirty states adopted more stringent eligibility and
preadmission screening policies for Medicaid SNFs, as a strategy to reduce demand. In
1987, moreover, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) made preadmission
screening mandatory as a part of legislation on nursing home reform. This regulation
managed only to curb the growth in the number of Medicaid's nursing home care
recipients, but not to reduce Medicaid's share of costs, which rose from 45.1% in 1990 to
47.4% in 1991 (Zedlewski & Melnick, 1988).
The extent of the supply shortage can be measured by hospitals' delayed
discharges. Patients in this situation are generally referred to as "hold-over patients" or
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"long-stay patients," and the situation as "blocked bed" or "back-up." The "blocked bed"
problems had been noted as early as in the 1950s (Philips, 1967). The principal patient
group associated with "blocked beds" are the geriatric patients who no longer need acute
care, yet are not immediately discharged to nursing homes or rehabilitation/chronic care
institutions (Shapiro & Roos, 1981). Hospital utilization review teams often put such
patients on "administrative necessary days," since the patients, though still needing care,
have recovered from the acute stage of illness.
In order to use resources efficiently, a method has been developed to assess the
misutilization of hospital resources and detect unnecessary hospital stays (Gertman &
Restuccia, 1981; Selker, Beshansky, Pauker, & Kassirer, 1989). Many studies have
identified the days waiting for discharge to nursing homes, along with the nursing home
bed supply (Gruenberg & Willemain, 1982; Hing, 1989; Kenney & Holahan, 1990;
Restuccia & Holloway, 1976; Shapiro & Roos, 1980). In general, hospitals located in
areas of proportionately more SNF bed supply tend to have fewer discharge delays,
because high numbers of hospital transfers may be offset by fewer transfers from
intermediate care facilities (ICFs) (Kenney & Holahan, 1990). Hospitals in areas with
lower nursing home bed supply have fewer transfers to nursing homes and slower
discharges (Hing, 1989).
To summarize this section, the growing elderly population, changing disease
patterns, and advances in treatments have spurred an escalating demand for post-acute
care. However, the constrained supply of nursing home beds due to CON stringency and
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reimbursement policies has intensified the delayed discharge problem, to varying degrees
in different states.
Factors for Hospital Delayed Discharges
The medical process involves not only patients but also their families, the support
system, the physicians, the care provider, and the entire environment (Donabedian, 1973).
Discharge delays happen through a complex process. Several factors may be involved,
including hospital characteristics (Falcone, Bolda, & Leak, 1991; Markson, Steel, &
Kane, 1983; Weissert & Cready, 1988), patient and family characteristics (Shaughnessy,
Kramer, Schlenker, & Polesovsky, 1985), poor coordination of acute and long-term care
sectors (Baker, Williams, Zimmer, Van Buren, Vincent, & Pickrel, 1985; Restuccia &
Holloway, 1976), the nursing home market (Hing, 1989; Holahan, 1990; Kenney &
Holahan, 1990), and nursing home behaviors (Payne, 1987; Selker, Beshansky, Pauker,
& Kassirer, 1989). This section examines the impacts of hospital characteristics and

nursing home behaviors.
Hospital Characteristics
In the past, under the retrospective payment system, hospitals tended to keep
patients (Hochstein, 1985; Holahan, 1990). In the pre-DRG era, the main concern was
the backup of geriatric patients in acute hospitals who had recovered from acute illness
but were not immediately transferred to extended care facilities (Shapiro & Roos, 1981 ).
Third party payors still covered the hospital's costs. The implementation of the PPS
motivated hospitals to discharge patients sooner (Holahan, 1990; Kenney & Holahan,
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1990; Weissert & Cready, 1988). Given the competition for nursing home beds, it is
difficult for most hospitals to avoid discharged delays. Those hospitals with long-termcare units or swing beds, or with close affiliations with nursing homes are the winners in
a tight nursing home market. They usually have more transfers to nursing homes (Hing,
1989), fewer discharge delays (Hing, 1989; Kenney & Holahan, 1990), and lower acute
care costs (Welch & Dubay, 1989). On the other hand, hospitals with higher occupancies
(Falcone, Bolda, & Leak, 1991; Gruenberg & Willemain, 1982; Markson, Steel, & Kane,
1983 ), larger proportions of patients aged 60 and over (Markson, Steel, & Kane, 1983 ),
larger size (Falcone, Bolda, & Leak, 1991), and inadequate discharge planning (Baker,
Williams, Zimmer, Van Buren, Vincent, & Pickrel, 1985; Restuccia & Holloway, 1976)
are found to have more delayed discharges.

\
)

Hospital-based long-term-care units or swing beds make it possible for patients
who need long-term care to be transferred promptly, avoiding delayed discharges.
Providing two levels of care in one facility makes patient transitions smoother and more
natural. Most importantly, the integrated arrangements can fill the gap between the
relatively intense medical needs of post-acute patients and the limited capacity of the

\

'-

current nursing home system to meet those needs (Shaughnessy & Schlenker, 1986).
Another important factor affect the hospital delayed discharge is nursing homes' price
discrimination behavior. This regard will be discussed next.
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Price Discrimination by Nursing Homes
Price discrimination does not observe first-come-first-served as a guide to
admissions policy. Rather, to maximize profit, nursing homes give preference to private
patients over Medicaid or Medicare patients. Nursing homes' price discrimination
supports the assumption that people are self-interested, and that this applies to
organizational behavior, because an organization is a collective of people. Such
opportunism is more likely when suppliers are few. Hospitals need nursing home beds to
discharge their patients to, while nursing homes, the suppliers, if left free to pursue self
interest and opportunism, will prefer self-pay patients or those with relatively less severe
conditions. This preference introduces so-called hold-up behavior.
Since Medicaid or Medicare reimbursement rates and the marginal revenue from
caring for Medicaid patients are lower than those from private payors (Dor, 1989),
nursing homes tend to first calculate the optimal number of private or light-care
admissions, then limit the beds for public-pay patients to the number remaining.
Therefore, Medicare and Medicaid patient access largely depends on private patients'
demand and nursing home bed supply. The existence of price discrimination behavior
by nursing homes is demonstrated in several studies (Dubay & Cohen, 1990;
Massachusetts Hospital Association, 1979; Scanlon, 1980; Shapiro & Roos, 1981).
Medicaid reimbursement and nursing home hold-up behavior.

Medicaid

reimbursement policies are an important influence on the operation of nursing homes,
since Medicaid pays almost half of all nursing home costs. Medicaid reimbursement for
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SNFs varies among states. Researchers have found a pattern in the interaction between
rate setting systems and the supply of SNF care for Medicaid patients. When nursing
homes are located in states where Medicaid reimbursement policies and private nursing
home markets support high-intensity care, nursing homes are motivated to admit more
Medicaid patients. With higher levels of Medicaid reimbursement, nursing homes can
afford staffing for patients with greater needs and put Medicaid patients into the
appropriate patient mix under Medicaid full-cost reimbursement. Facilities in states that
have flat rates (a fixed rate per diem for each resident) or strong prospective
reimbursement are less willing to serve Medicaid patients (Bishop & Dubay, 1991). In
other words, the willingness of nursing homes to take Medicaid patients becomes less
when public payment for them is comparatively low and they are relatively sicker
(Bishop & Dubay, 1991; Dor, 1989; Dubay & Cohen, 1990; Shaughnessy, Kramer,
Schlenker, & Polesovsky, 1985).
The nursing home market is dominated by prospective payment, which gives
nursing homes an incentive to admit lighter-care patients, since their care costs are below
average. The number of Medicaid beneficiaries' admissions increased the most in states
where Medicaid fee-for-service reimbursement was used (Dubay, 1990). As a result,
hospital discharges of heavy-care patients in those states were delayed, particularly in
areas with low bed supply or excess demand for nursing home care.
Several studies have revealed unmet demand for nursing home beds for Medicaid
patients, but not for private patients. With all else held constant, being a Medicaid
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beneficiary has been found to be the most restrictive factor for access to long-term care
beds, especially in areas where beds are relatively limited and demand is relatively
higher (Coburn, Fortinsky, McGuire, & McDonald, 1993; Ettner, 1993; Nyman, 1989;
Nyman, 1993; Weissert & Musliner, 1992).
Medicare reimbursement and nursing home hold-up behavior.

Most of Medicare

beneficiaries are either aged or disabled and therefore are more likely to use medical
services. Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for nursing home admissions within 30 days
of hospital discharge after at least three consecutive days of hospitalization. The benefits
cover up to I 00 days of nursing care, including daily skilled nursing or rehabilitation
services. Beneficiaries do not have to pay for the first 20 days, but some amount of
copayment for the 21st to I OOth days is required. As of 1992, Medicare paid all but
$81.50 per day from the 21st day to I OOth day (Government Printing Office, 1992).
Significant differences exist between Medicare and non-Medicare SNF patients
(Shaughnessy, Kramer, Schlenker, & Polesovsky, 1985). Medicare patients are by
definition at a post-acute care stage and consequently tend to need more medical and
nursing care than non-Medicare patients do. Non-Medicare patients, for example, have
more incontinence problems; they receive more traditional, custodial nursing home care.
In short, Medicare enrollees have greater than average needs for care, yet certified
nursing homes are more reluctant to admit them because their care has higher marginal
and average costs as well as lower reimbursement (Bishop & Dubay, 1991; Coburn,
Fortinsky, McGuire, & McDonald, 1993; Dor, 1989; Shaughnessy, Kramer, Schlenker, &
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Polesovsky, 1985). Dor (1989) studied the costs and behaviors of SNFs and found that
the average cost per Medicare patient day is $122, compared with $53 for Medicaid and

$66 for private patients. These figures explain why nursing homes resist admitting
Medicare patients.
One of the indicators of nursing homes' unwillingness to admit Medicare patients
is the small proportion of Medicare patient days in SNFs. While approximately two
thirds of all SNFs are certified by Medicare, the vast majority of SNFs provide very few
Medicare days. In a recent GAO survey of hospital discharge planners, 97 % of those
sampled reported that they had difficulty placing Medicare patients in nursing homes
(GAO, 1987). Unless Medicare reimbursement policy is based on actual costs of
Medicare inpatients, the vast majority of nursing homes will continue to prefer non
Medicare patients, thus restricting the access of Medicare beneficiaries to nursing home
care.
Factors associated with hospital delayed discharges can be briefly summarized.
The hospital characteristics of hospital occupancy, affiliation with long-term-care
facilities, and proportion of elderly patients are associated with delayed discharges. The
incidence of nursing homes' hold-up behaviors depends on Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement policies.
Vertical Integration
Since this study examines how hospitals choose different degrees of vertical
integration to manage discharges to nursing homes, a clear definition of vertical
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integration is essential. For that purpose, examining the term's meaning across different
disciplines will be useful.
Definitions of Vertical Integration
Vertical integration can be defined in terms of organizational boundaries, types,
and production stages. Thompson

(1967) defined vertical integration as an "expansion of

the organization's domain that incorporates functions on which the core technology
depends (backward integration) or for which the core technology is an input (forward
integration)." The central notion underlying vertical integration control is the value chain
(Porter, 1980), which describes the flow of inputs and outputs involved in producing a
particular good or service. The value chain suggests a vertical ordering from "upstream"
stages of production (inputs) to "downstream" (final outputs) stages.
Williamson

(1985) proposes two broad types of integration, mundane integration

and vertical integration. He specifies that the mundane integrates successive

stages

within the core technology, whereas the vertical integration involves integrating
peripheral or off-site activities
components, and

I) backward into basic material, 2) laterally into

3) forward into distribution. Williamson ( 1985, 1991) argues that,

regardless of stage, vertical integration is a continuum anchored by the options of market
and hierarchy. Movement along the continuum from market, to long-term contracting
(hybrid), to vertical integration (hierarchy) is accompanied by higher levels of resource
commitment (capital, labor, land) and risk.
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Among definitions and interpretations of vertical integration of health care
organizations, Harrigan's interpretation (1984) is the most frequently cited by health care
researchers (Conrad & Dowling, 1990; Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Mick &
Conrad, 1988). Harrigan proposes four dimensions: 1) the successive stages of
integration in the production process;

2)

the degree of internal transfers at a given stage of

production; 3) the breadth of integrated activities undertaken at any one productive stage;
and 4) the form of ownership. Among these four dimensions, the concept of successive
stages of integration in the production process is most frequently adopted by health care
researchers in developing frameworks of vertical integration (Clement, 1988; Conrad,
1993; Conrad & Dowling, 1990; Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Gillies,
Shortell, & Anderson, 1993).
Clement (1988) argues that the production process involves four stages: raw
materials, intermediate products, production chain, and distribution. Conrad and
colleagues (1988), combining Hornbrook's and Harrigan's concepts, suggest a six-part
vertical ordering in their Health Service Value Chain model. The six stages are raw
material input, intermediate inputs/outputs to services, service outputs, episodic-patient
care service lines, chronic-patient-care service lines, and payment for health services.
According to Clement (1988), vertical integration refers to "owning more than
one link in a linear chain extending from insurance through ambulatory care, secondary
inpatient care, and tertiary care to nursing home care and home care." As Conrad and
Dowling (1990) put it, vertical integration is the coordination or linkage of businesses
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(service lines) that are at different stages in the production process of health care. An
example is when an acute-care provider owns facilities providing various other types of
care such as long-term care. Mick and Conrad (1988) also have taken the hospital
inpatient as a strategic business unit for which backward integration (upstream) can range
from urgent to primary care, to wellness programs; and forward integration (downstream)
can take the forms of skilled nursing facilities or rehabilitation units.
Conrad (1993) argues that vertical integration in health care requires integration
of both the clinical and the administrative dimensions intra- and inter-organizationally,
and that the clinical integration of patient care is central to achieving vertically integrated
regional systems of health care. Clinical integration refers to the "coordination of
services across the continuum of various forms of acute inpatient care to secondary
specialty care, tertiary subspecialty care, long-term care, rehabilitation services, primary
care to health promotion and disease prevention" (Conrad, 1993).
Recognizing that there are several approaches to interpreting vertical integration,
this study focuses on the definition proposed by Williamson's transaction cost economics
perspective. Comparison of Harrigan's (1984) concept with Williamson's (1985) reveals
that Harrigan's breadth and stage of vertical integration is conceptually the same as
Williamson's "efficient boundary," and Harrigan's ownership of vertical integration is
Williamson's "efficient governance."
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Different Interpretations of Vertical Inte�ration
Each discipline interprets vertical integration according to its own perspective and
purposes. Management, marketing analysts, and organization theorists all interpret
vertical integration differently. Rangan et a!.

(1993) proposed that, assuming two

dimensions of integration: production/distribution economics and governance, vertical
integration can be classified into four models. The managerial model lays out productmarket factors relevant to various levels of vertical integration, but identifies no
underlying causes (Miracle,
Moorthy,

1965). Monopoly models (Coughlan & Wernerfelt, 1989;

1988) focus on production and distribution economies. The third model, a

market power model that considers governance costs, theoretically explains how vertical
integration is affected by product-market competition and firm profitability. The
transaction cost model accommodates both production/distribution economies and
governance considerations (

';Villiamson, 1975,

1985).

Organizational theorists who have interpreted the concept of vertical integration
fall into three general groups: institutional theorists, resource dependency theorists, and
transaction cost theorists. Institutional theorists argue that structural change is driven
more by imitation pressures for organizations to resemble each other than by market
forces (DiMaggio

& Powell, 1983) . Another line of reasoning maintains that the early

adopters of vertical integration mainly seek efficiency and market advantages, but the late
adopters seek legitimacy (Arndt

& Bigelow, 1992).
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Resource dependency theory offers insight into interorganizational relationships.

Interdependency can be controlled by joining or participating in industry associations and

1

I

coordinating councils, or establishing favorable linkages with external entities through
boundary spanning, or forming joint ventures or coalitions with other organizations

(jo
\

\

(Fottler, Schermerhorn, Wong, & Money, 1982). According to resource dependency

/ .

I

:

,_

theorists, interdependency can also be managed through organizational design, by adding
sep��� full_c_ti.<>!l�_tJQ.its for each major source of external dependency, by centralizing or

(;(!�--·

decentralizing production, or by performing activities of either horizontal or vertical
integration (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967).
In recent years, the transaction cost economics perspective of Williamson
(Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991) has been adopted by organization theorists as one way of
explaining vertical relations between organizations (Barney & Ouchi, 1986; Hill, 1990;
Hurley & Fennel, 1990). Their argument is that vertical integration can overcome market
imperfection and suppliers' opportunism.
Non-market governance is viewed similarly by resource dependency theorists and
transaction cost theorists, as a strategic response to dependency and environmental
uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).Jh� ll}_ajQr differenc<: between these two theories
__

is thaqe�ource dependency theory limits its treatment of performance to effectiveness
-

.-

.

��- .

consid�ratj_Qn�__,__wbile transaction cost theory explicitly spells out.efficiency jr.npJL�ations
I

---·

'

·

of organizational n:!lationships (Heide.,_ 1994). Dependency results from asset specificity,

I

f.''! J
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which makes it difficult to substitute a partner in the exchange at similar cost (Barney &
-

�--

Ouchi, 1986).
Vertical Integration in Health Care
Vertical integration has been put forward as a sensible strategic reaction to
environmental forces in health care. The following section explains the motivation, risks,
and determinants of success for vertical integration in the health care industry. Some
examples of vertical integration are provided.
Motivation for Vertical Integration
Health care providers may be motivated to vertically integrate for various reasons,
but most often for the following: to reduce transaction costs (Conrad & Dowling, 1990;
Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Mick & Conrad, 1988; Williamson, 1975, 1985),
to reduce production costs (Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Mick & Conrad,
1988; Williamson, 1975, 1985), to maintain viability (Wheller, Wickizer, & Shortell,
1986), to increase market share (Brown & McCool, 1986; Starkweather & Carman, 1987;
Wheller, Wickizer, & Shortell, 1986), and to enhance market forces (Conrad, Mick,
Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Harrigan, 1984; Williamson, 1975). These reasons correspond
to the premise of economic theories that "firms react to changes in their economic
environment in ways that maximize their position in the new setting" (Conrad, Mick,
Madden, & Hoare, 1988). The following discussion explains the motivation of vertical
integration in terms of efficiency, market share, and effectiveness.
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The concept of transaction cost emphasizes efficiency (Arnould, Pollard, &
VanVorst, 1988; Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988). Several researchers even
identify efficiency as the major motive driving health care organizations to adopt vertical
integration (Conrad & Dowling, 1990; Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Hurley &
Fennel, 1990; Williamson, 1975, 1985). When one investigates the possible advantage
(efficiency) of vertical integration for hospital operation, a major financial benefit is seen
to be economies of scale, that is, achieving operating economies and improving
utilization of existing resources. With an expanded scale of operation, a hospital can
spread fixed costs over more patient days or services, thus immediately reducing the
average unit cost with little impact on its revenue (Giardina, Fottler, Shewchuk, & Hill,
1990; Whitman, DeAngelis, & Knapp, 1986).

Several studies suggest that organizations should work on finding synergy
between different levels of the care process, by fully using the resources available in one
part of a facility. Relatively short inpatient stays at acute-care hospitals are thought to be
attributable to the hospitals' close affiliations with extended-care facilities (Tresch,
Simpson, & Burton, 1985). Patients discharged to a hospital-affiliated nursing home
usually have fewer delayed discharges than do those discharged elsewhere (Weissert &
Cready, 1988). In this sense, vertical integration of nursing homes into hospitals may
lead to financial or economic success, either increasing revenue through expanded market
share or decreasing expense by fully using the existing personnel, equipment and beds
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(i.e., economies of scale). This analysis indicates that hospitals with certain degrees of
vertical integration could hasten discharges.
It is not appropriate to attain efficiency unless effectiveness is also safeguarded.
As with the situation of hospitals and nursing home care, the advantages of hospital
based SNFs cannot be evaluated only on how much cost is contained; how well patient
care is coordinated is equally essential. Hospital-based SNFs allow hospitals to
coordinate the care provided beyond the acute-care phase, thereby improving overall
continuity. Cost savings are justified only if the process also improves quality, for
example by giving physicians better access to facilities and to patients' medical records,
and by allowing patients better access to physicians and nursing personnel (Whitman,
DeAngelis, & Knapp, 1986).
Risks of Vertical Integration
It is important to note that vertical integration does not guarantee improved
financial performance (Clement, 1987; Smith, Piland, & Phillipp, 1991). Many of the
new service lines (such as wellness programs and emergency services) in some system
hospitals are not profitable (Shortell, Morrison, & Hughes, 1989). How much hospitals
should be involved in directly providing long-term care is controversial. Several studies
have found that costs are higher at hospital-based SNFs than at freestanding SNFs
(Shaughnessy, Kramer, Schlenker, & Polesovsky, 1985; Sulvetta & Holahan, 1986;
Wiener, Liu, & Schieber, 1986). Another study found that expanded services, such as
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swing bed, long-term care, and home care, in rural New Mexico hospitals are not
positively related with hospitals' overall gross revenue (Smith, Piland, & Phillipp, 1991).
Theoretically, firms prefer producing ("making") key supplies and services over
buying those key supplies and services, because "making" maintains autonomy over
certain resources critical to survival. Therefore, managers may sometimes operate on the
fallacious premise that more integration is always preferable. In fact, vertical integration
does not guarantee success, especially when adopted inappropriately for the
circumstances (Harrigan, 1984). According to some practitioners, it is difficult for
vertically integrated organizations to operate in areas where management is shared by
different owners (Ross, Williams, & Schafer, 1984).

Some multi-system organizations

in health care have been reported as pursuing "de-integration," divesting themselves of
subsidiaries that have not met expectations or that are difficult to run (Graham, 1982;
Shahoda, 1986). Managers need to understand the key dimensions of vertical integration
better in order to avoid errors and gain the most benefit from joining dissimilar entities.
Determinants of Vertical Integration
Successfully designed vertical integration can help a hospital in several ways,
including firming up the referral channels from providers of primary and secondary care,
forestalling competitive physician activities, attracting more ambulatory business, and
feeding more patients into the inpatient unit. The next question to be asked, then, is
"what determines the success of vertical integration?"
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The success of vertical integration is determined by complex factors:
environmental conditions, competition, bargaining power, organization goals and culture,
and managerial factors (Conrad

& Dowling, 1990; Harrigan, 1984 ). Among all these,

environmental conditions are the most extensive factors. They include demand or supply
uncertainty, regulatory or technological change, and the relationships among different
stages of a product.
As an example, the Medicare PPS, probably the single most significant
environmental force in recent years, has dramatically changed the interdependencies
among economic units at many levels in health care systems, and the interdependencies
among informational intermediaries and payor parties. Reimbursement has shifted from
specialists toward primary care physicians and so has motivated specialists to adopt risk
and gain-sharing arrangements with primary care physicians (Christensen, 1992; Fahey,
1992). The key to success for health care providers who adopt vertical integration is the
ability to coordinate different levels of care efficiently.
Several articles have examined the factors that affect whether health care
organizations can achieve the goal of vertical integration. Conrad ( 1990, 1993) argued
that the success of vertically linked strategies is influenced by integrative
instrumentalities. The instrumentalities can be categorized as

I) inter-organizational

administrative coordination mechanisms; and 2) intra-organizational administrative
coordination and patient care coordination. To fully coordinate units within a health care
organization, patient care has to be managed first, through such mechanisms as case
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management and discharge planning. Intra-organizational coordination closely links
different units or stages in the production of health services, for example, through the use
of a program coordinator. Inter-organizational coordination ranges from tapping the
benefits of single ownership to utilizing the advantages of proximity among different
organizational units (Conrad & Dowling, 1990).
Shortell, Morrison, and Hughes ( 1989) identified four factors leading to
successful operation in eight hospital systems. The factors included strategies for
working effectively with physicians, learning to combine centralized and decentralized
strategic planning approaches, understanding diversification, and applying an early
adopters' experience curve. Because hospitals rely on physicians to bring in patients,
strong hospital-physician relationships are a crucial factor for hospitals implementing
integration strategies or responding to various diversification requirements.
In sum, the success of vertical integration is determined by complex factors:
environmental conditions, integrative instrumentalities, organizational experience, and
managerial factors. The time, place, type of service or good, and a hospital's ability
should all be evaluated when considering vertical integration.
Examples of Vertical Integration
Health care organizations today are adopting vertical integration in "a tidal wave"
(Bisbee, 1986; Robinson, 1994). Vertical integration is emerging among them in
different forms, degrees, breadths, and stages. Managed care networks, regional health
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systems, local health care systems, and hospital-based integrated systems are some
examples.
The experiences of vertical integration in health-care delivery systems range from
macro levels (multi-stage, inter-organizational) to micro levels (single stage or intra
organizational). The macro levels include regional hospital systems, HMOs, PPOs,
physician-hospital organizations (PHOs), and local health-care organizations (Brown,
Clement, Hill, Retchin,

& Bergeron, 1993; Gillies, Shortell, & Anderson, 1993; Luft,

1981; Shortell, Morrison,

& Hughes, 1989; Thorpe, 1992). The micro level includes

hospital or organization intra-structures such as case management programs, and hospital
based services such as primary care groups, hospital-based skilled nursing facilities, and
hospital-based home care (Robinson, 1994; Sullivan

& Flynn, 1992; Wheller, Wickizer,

& Shortell, 1986).
At the macro level, is a typical integrated health care system is the managed care
network. The integration of risk-based capitation payments with the provision of services
seems to be a key factor in describing the various organizational forms of a capitated
system (Rossiter, 1987). According to the extent to which the capitation payment is risk
based, there are four types of HMO models:

I) staff HMO, 2) group HMO, 3) network

independent practice association (network IPA), and 4) Traditional independent practice
association (traditional IPA) (Luft, 1981). Another organizational form of risk-based
capitation payment is PPO. Compared to the four types of HMO models, PPO is the least
integrated.
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The continued growth ofHMOs and PPOs indicates the acceptance of these
structures by the general public. The growth of vertically integrated firms, particularly
HMOs, also reveals how health care organizations respond to high transaction costs
(Thorpe, 1992). In order to promote cost containment by health-care providers, Medicare
has aggressively encouraged its beneficiaries to enroll inHMOs (Wilensky & Rossiter,
1991). In addition to the federal trend, state governments have also adopted managed
care as an instrument to achieve cost-effective medical care for the poor (Freund &
Hurley, 1987). This has quickly increased the number ofHMOs and the number of
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in them, even though patients' satisfaction withHMOs
varies among groups, and the quality and cost of care are not necessarily better than from
fee-for-service providers (Brown, Clement, Hill, Retchin, & Bergeron, 1993).
HMO growth is reflected in the increase in their members from only 12.5 million
in 1983 to almost 42 million by the end of 1992 (GroupHealth Association of America,
1993). Total membership in the 546HMOs in 1992 represented 16% of the nation's
population and almost 19% of those insured. The same trend was present in another type
of managed care network, PPOs; by the end of 1991, the 584 corporate entities operating
978 individual PPO plans had established networks of various providers caring for
approximately 85.4 million eligible employees and their family members in every state of
the U. S. (Marion Merrel Dow, 1992).
Significant total cost savings have been demonstrated in managed care plans.
Luft (1980) reported up to 40% saving amongHMOs as compared to fee-for-service
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plans, and somewhat more hospital utilization savings in staff and group models than in
individual practice associations (IPAs). Wolinsky (1980) also suggested that service use
and costs are generally lower among staff models as compared to group models. The
literature implies that the most integrated models may maximize cost savings.
At the micro level, on the other hand, many hospital-based integrated delivery
systems have proven to be powerful and successful (Hurley, 1993; Sullivan & Flynn,
1992). The hospital-based services can take different forms and be at different levels.
The most frequently used include ambulatory primary care groups, hospital-based SNFs,
and home health care services.
An analysis conducted by Wheeler, Wickizer and Shortell (1986) provides an
example of hospital-based primary care group practices. Wheeler and colleagues
concluded that among the selected set of hospitals participating in a national
demonstration program, the average hospital's inpatient days and admissions increased,
by 9.0 % and 8.2 %, respectively. The increase was accompanied by an increase in the
hospitals' patient days (3.6%) and in the market share of admissions (4.9%) after the
development of hospital-based primary care group practice. Patients in the hospital
based nursing homes were found to need more medical and highly skilled nursing
services than did patients in freestanding nursing homes. This indicates that hospital
based nursing homes have the capacity to care for more severe patients (Shaughnessy,
Kramer, Schlenker, & Polesovsky, 1985).

49

The literature makes clear that organizational researchers have advocated vertical
integration as a management strategy. They suggest that the advantages of a hospital's
taking more control over critical resources are efficiency, increased market share, and
improved quality of care. However, vertical integration in itself does not guarantee
success. The success of vertical integration depends on reimbursement policies,
competition, organizational experience, and managerial ability to coordinate various
activities in an organization (Conrad & Dowling, 1990; Harrigan, 1984).
Summary
The literature review comprised four sections. The first section reviewed demand
and supply in the nursing home market. The growing elderly population, the change in
disease patterns, and treatment advances have stimulated demand for post-acute care.
The demand has not been met, however, because of regulations and nursing home
responses to reimbursement policies. The consequence has been difficulties for hospitals
in discharging patients to nursing home care, as described in the second section.
The third section presented the varying definitions and interpretations of vertical
integration offered by different disciplines. In this study, vertical integration is defined as
efficient governance that is not restricted to dichotomous decisions, but based on a
spectrum of choices, as proposed by Williamson's transaction cost economics.
The last section of this chapter examined the motivation and risks for health care
organizations in vertically integrating different levels of services. The success of vertical
integration is not always guaranteed. The time, place, type of service or good, and the
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hospital's ability should all be evaluated when considering vertical integration. Finally,
examples of macro-level and micro-level vertical integration were discussed.

Chapter 3
Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, the theory of organizational economics is outlined first. The
definition of transaction cost economics, assumptions of market failure, and three
dimensions of efficient governance of transactions are presented.

This is followed by

illustrations of how health care researchers have adopted TCE to interpret health care
phenomena. In order to determine which indicators truly represent the three dimensions
of transactions, a comprehensive literature review is conducted of empirical studies that
have tested TCE in fields other than health care. After the literature review, a set of
hypotheses is derived for each construct.
Organizational Economics
In recent years economists have considerably expanded their scope by adding to
the phenomena they examine. In doing so they have developed a body of theoretical
work labeled organizational economics (OE), or new institutional economics, (Barney,
1990; Perrow, 1986; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Organizational economics has made an
important, even revolutionary, contribution to organization theory, providing an answer
to the most fundamental question in organizational research, "Why do organizations
exist?" (Hesterly, Liebeskind, & Zenger, 1990).
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Previous theories of organizations have studied their evolution, but have not
explained why organizations are necessary in the first place. From the perspective of
organizational economics, organizations are neither collectivities oriented to the pursuit
of relatively specific goals nor coalitions of shifting interest groups that develop goals by
negotiation, as Scott (1987) defined them. Rather, to scholars of organizational
economics, organizations are the sets of arrangements that govern the collectivities and
permit efficient exchange among interest groups.
The new organizational economics is preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and
ramifications of transaction cost economics theory. Fundamentally, transaction cost
theory is a new economic model based on individual competitive self-interest.
An early statement about the role of costs of using market organizations in
governing market exchange in given circumstances was that provided by Coase (1937).
However, it was not until the 1970s that Oliver Williamson made a significant
contribution to refining transaction cost economics as a systematic framework for
organizational economics. Williamson initial statement in his book Markets and
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication (1975), not only provides insight into
how economic and other organizations differ in their behaviors from the pure market
model, but also synthesizes some earlier applications of transaction cost economics to
internal labor markets, vertical integration, and the economics of internal organizations,
to name a few. Another work,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms. Markets.
Relational Contracting (Williamson, 1985), further extends the boundaries ofTCE. His
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more recent work (Williamson, 1991) has emphasized the importance of the hybrid form
to organizations.

;y/ Transaction Cost Economics
(

Transaction cost economics is a theory that incorporates concepts from economic

and contract law into a broader model explaining how organizations respond to market
"failure" to provide the most efficient model of exchange (Williamson, 1975, 1985,

1991). The theory focuses on the transaction -- the exchange between buyer and supplier
-- as the primary unit of importance and suggests that the dimensions and attributes of
transactions determine the preferred transacting form.

The form may be "spot market"

exchanges, in which buyers and sellers may have no prior established relationships;
contracting of a mid- or long-term duration (via contract or joint venture arrangement),
where a transaction setting has been developed to guide exchanges (called a "hybrid
arrangement"); or vertical integration, where the buyer ultimately gains permanent

)

control over the supplier. Vertical integration is also characterized as "hierarchy."
Transaction cost theory suggests that the design of organizations may be interpreted as
the result of the exchange partners' continuing calculation of "make or buy" decisions.

....\..

Definition of Transaction Costs
Formal definitions of transaction costs are remarkably rare in the literature
(Robins, 1987). Defined by Arrow (1969), transaction costs are the "costs of running the
economic system." They are different from production costs, on which neoclassical
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analysis has concentrated. Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of a physical
system's friction, which is inevitable between or among the technological units.
In basic terms, transaction costs are those costs associated with economic
exchange that vary independently of the competitive market place of the goods or
services. They include all search and information costs, as well as the costs of
monitoring and enforcing contractual performance; the opportunity costs associated with
contracting and administrative costs; and legal action costs as a result of contracting
I

violations. (In short, transaction costs include costs incurred in consulting, completing or
\

revising inter-organization agreements (Williamson, 1975, 1985). )
�

v

J

Consider opportunity costs, an important category of transaction costs, as an
example. Opportunity costs can be defined as "the loss of the benefit the resources could
have produced had they been put to the next-best use," or "the lost opportunity to invest
in that alternative" (Thorpe, 1992). The benefits from the next-best use may be smaller or
larger than those of the current use, depending on the situation. With a hospital bed, for
example, discharging a medically stable patient could bring in more revenue if the bed is
immediately taken up by a new acute patient, or could cause a loss if no other patient is
ready to be admitted.
.�

Williamson ( 1985) gives this explanation of transaction costs: "Holding the nature

of the good and service to be delivered constant, economizing takes place with reference
to the sum of production and transaction costs." He further suggests that t�� different
organizational modes will be used to minimize two types of transaction costs -- ex ante

55

and ex post. Ex ante costs refer to those of drafting, negotiating, and safegu<;�rding a
contract, while ex post costs refer to the setup and operational costs associated with
,

i

l

governance stru<_:t_ures. These two types of costs are difficult to quantify and have to be
addressed simultaneously, as they are actually independent.
Several health care researchers have used the TCE perspective to interpret the
scope and definition of the transaction costs in health care. Mick and Conrad (1988)
interpreted transaction costs in markets and inside organizations, following Williamson
and Ouchi's definition (1981 ). They divided market transactions into two categories.
The first category consists of transaction costs incurred in the market search process:
costs associated with searching for firms that produce, supply, or distribute the product or
service of interest; the second category consists of transaction costs incurred in the
contracting process: costs associated with negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing the
provisions of a contract.
The transaction costs in the market search process can be further decomposed into

I) costs of determining what is necessary for the goods or service; 2) scouting,
environmental scanning and intelligence costs, such as costs to obtain information about
the reputation of a specific firm; 3) costs of developing requests for contract proposals;
and

4) costs associated with deciding which firms will enter into contract-related

proceedings (Conrad, Mick, Madden,

& Hoare, 1988). In sum, excessive transaction or

friction costs are incurred in the exchanges between providers and purchasers and among
providers.
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Assumptions of the Market Failure Framework
·'

,__

In proposing the market failure model, Williamson (1975) made certain paired
assumptions. One pair of assumptions concerns uncertainty/complexity and bounded
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frequently asymmetrically distributed between the parties to an exchange, that is, often
one party has more information than the other has. Bounded rationality refers to the
limitations of any individual as an information processor. Actors or parties cannot
anticipate every contingency and objectively deduce the optimal response. As the
environment becomes more complex or uncertain, these limitations are quickly reached.
Williamson's second pair of concepts -- small numbers and opportunism -- is used
to develop a different argument about the relative advantages of the market and of
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E. Williamson, 1975, New York, The Free Press.

Figure 1. The Organizational Failures Framework

In another work, Williamson ( 1985) has mentioned again the importance of
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organizations, understanding transactions that are subject to ex post opportunism can be
beneficial in that appropriate safeguards can be devised ex ante.
Three Dimensions of Efficient Governan ce
Although the degrees of integration presumably are on a continuum, it can be
classified as vertical integration (hierarchy), long-term contracting (hybrid), and spot
market trading, moving from fullest to non-integration. Williamson's early work (1975,

1985) introduced a governance form, mixed governance, in which some firms tend to buy
and others to make, yet none feel satisfied with their decisions. However, the mixed
governance form is now less emphasized. Several years later, Williamson revised his
argument, based on the transaction-cost-minimization hypothesis, and proposed that
intermediate-level transactions tend to be governed by hybrid forms including long-term
contracting, reciprocal trading, regulation and franchising (Williamson, 1991).
/

( Three major dimensions of transactions: asset specificity, uncertainty, and
'-.
frequency, are proposed by Williamson (1975, 1985) as central to selecting an exchange
mechanism from among market, hybrid, or hierarchy. In other words, the choice of
governance structure is contingent upon a) the amount of uncertainty associated with the
availability of desired resources, b) the level of interchangeability of the sought-after
good or service (asset specificity), and c) the frequency of good or service exchange.
Asset specificity, among the three, is regarded as the most influential. Buyers may find
themselves at different degrees of risk of overpaying, due to the interaction of these three
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dimensions. Such risk can be managed or even avoided by adopting alternative
transaction arrangements (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991).
Efficient boundaries are important to efficient governance. To achieve an
efficient boundary, Williamson (1985) suggests that the make-or-buy decision should be
made only after the consequences of alternative modes for production and transaction
costs have been assessed. The production cost is generally measured by the unit of
service or goods sold in the market. The more units a firm can produce, the more it can
reduce the marginal production cost at certain levels of outputs.

Transaction uncertainty, being one of the principal factors affecting the choice

I

of governance form, arises from the firm's lack of ability to predict contingencies, which

i

makes contract writing difficult. Market contracts should be adapted to changes when

I

unforeseen situations occur, because opportunistic partners may interp':_�unsQ_�cified

I
I

I

I
I
I

\

clauses to their own advantages.

\

To internalize transactions is considered a sensible response to envir��ental
_
UQCertainty,_because a vertically integrated administrative mechanism enables sequential
and adaptive decision making as well as smoother processing. Furthermore, an authority
structure can quickly resolve conflicts over differing interpretations of new
circumstances. Thus, the information flow between two entities can be enhanced and
they can react better to uncertainties (Williamson, 1975, 1985). lJ?..�dd
_ ition to
environmental uncertainty, Williamson notes behavioral uncertainty, defined as the
.
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"difficulty of ascertaining the actual performance or adherence to contractual agreement"
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(Williamson, 1985). It is different from environmental uncertainty, which is exogenously
imposed on the exchange; behavioral uncertainty rather arises within the exchange itself
because of the opportunistism of the parties involved.

Asset specificity refers to "durable investments that are undertaken in support of
particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best
alternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely
terminated" (Williamson, 1985). In other words, the significant attribute of transactions
refers to the extent to which specialized, i.e., nonredeployable, investments are needed to
support an exchange. Four types of asset specificity are suggested by Williamson-- site
specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets. The
nature of all but dedicated assets is clear in the common sense meaning of the words.
Dedicated assets refer to "general investment by a supplier that would not otherwise be
made but for the prospect of selling a significant amount of product to a particular
customer" (Williamson, 1985). In his more recent paper (Williamson, 1991), Williamson
added two types of asset specificity-- brand name capital and temporal specificity. The
latter is akin to technological nonseparability and can be thought of as a type of site
specificity in which timely responsiveness by on-site human assets is vital.
Williamson explf!ins site specificity by borrowing Thompson's ( 1967) concept of
"core technology," which suggests that some stages in the production process are the
technological core and should be consolidated in order to produce a good or service
efficiently.

In considering modes of control, site specificity should be favored for
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vertical integration (Williamson, 1985). The degree of asset specificity can range from
nonspecific, to mixed, to highly specific (idiosyncratic).
Transaction frequency also affects the choice of governance structure.
Frequency of transactions clearly has to do with scale economies. That neoclassical
concept is derived from Adam Smith's famous theorem that "the division of labor is
limited by the extent of the market." More generally, the object is to economize not only
transaction costs, but both transaction and neoclassical production costs. In other words,
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the structure to capacity is the important issue. Hi_� h frequency of t:�E� �ction.s also
permits an organization to monitor or evaluate the goods or services provided by the
suppliers, to ensure their desireci behavior and reduce the organization's own risk, since it
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accumulates knowledge from the frequent transactions.
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Additional implications arise from considering the effects of quantity (or firm
size) and organizational form. The basic proposition is that diseconomies associated with
own-production will diminish as the quantity of the component to be supplied increases.
In other words, the firm is better able to realize economies of scale as its own
requirements increase relative to the market size. Therefore, Williamson has ascertained
that, ceteris paribus, larger firms will be more likely to integrate components than smaller
firms will be (Williamson, 1985). According to Williamson's taxonomy, the frequency of
exchange can range from one-time, to occasional, to recurrent.
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The interaction between and among the three dimensions -- asset specificity,
w1certainty, and frequency of exchange -- deserves attention. The nature of institutional
arrangements tends to vary with different combinations of these three dimensions. To
minimize costs, a firm may choose from among simple anonymous market (spot market)
contracting, more complicated long-term contractual arrangements with protective
provisions, or internalizing organization. Williamson terms these three institutional
arrangements classical contracting, non-classical contracting, and relational contracting.
He further points out two types of relational contracting: I) bilateral structure, in which
the autonomy of the parties is maintained, and 2) unified structure, in which transactions
are removed from the market and integrated into the organization.
Several propositions based on Figure 2 can be derived. For nonspecific
transactions, the market is perfectly competitive. In a perfectly competitive market, many
buyers and sellers deal with an interchangeable product or service, and no one can
influence pricing. For such transactions, spot market contracting is the most appropriate
(left cell).

Long-term contracting suits transactions that are either I) occasional and of

mixed specificity, regardless of uncertainty, or 2) very specific with high uncertainty and
not frequent enough to achieve scale economies. Vertical integration is favored when
transactions are very idiosyncratic, frequent, and with high environmental uncertainty
(the upper right cell) (Williamson, 1991).
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TRANSACTION
FREQUENCY

Recurrent

Occasional

Inter-changeable

Mixed

Idiosyncratic

TRANSACTION SPECIFICITY

Low
TRANSACTION
UNCERTAINTY

Figure 2. Three Dimensions of Williamson's Framework ofTransaction Cost Economics

To internalize or vertically integrate, standardized transactions for which market
aggregation economies are greater tends to cause loss. In contrast, for highly specific
transactions, increasing degrees of uncertainty will lead to larger contractual gaps and
increasingly important and numerous sequential adaptations; under such situations,
vertical integration becomes favorable.

For the in-between transactions for which the

cost disadvantage decreases but remains positive (at intermediate degrees of asset
specificity), a firm may find itself better off with mixed or hybrid governance, such as
long-term contracting with outside suppliers. Briefly, market competition results in scale
economies when asset specificity is low; internalizing an organization is advantageous
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when asset specificity is tangible; and mixed governance is favored when transactions
have an intermediate degree of specificity.
Three examples make these notions clearer. If a buyer is interested in acquiring a
good or service which the buyer frequently needs and of which there is an abundant
supply and many suppliers, the (spot) market is the most efficient source. The buyer does
not incur substantial search costs, comparisons of suppliers are easily made, and no
supplier can monopolize or corner the market if the supply is ample. On the other hand,
if a frequently acquired product must be specifically developed by a few suppliers or a
single qualified supplier, open market exchange is compromised, and the buyer is in
many respects at risk of exploitation by an opportunistic supplier in negotiating price and
other terms. Such a situation requires more careful delineation of the exchange
framework, for example by formal contractual relationship. Sometimes, even a joint
venture or quasi-firm is needed. In the most extreme case, a crucial supplier would
become a target for acquisition by a buyer who wants both to avoid exploitation and to
maximize control over the supplier's performance.
TCE Interpretation of Vertical Integration in the Health Care Industry
Studies which examine transaction cost economics in health care are quite limited.
One article has attempted to examine vertical integration by using TCE (Mick & Conrad,
1988); but, with exceptions, they have failed to incorporate Williamson's core concepts:
market failure and the three dimensions of transactions (Hurley, 1993; Hurley & Fennel,
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1990). Only one paper uses Williamson's model to test the theory (Chiu, Hurley, &
Chen, 1993). The studies' arguments and findings are briefly described below.
Conrad and colleagues (Mick & Conrad, 1988) used the concept of transaction
cost to explain the'hospital-physician and provider-insurer relationships. They
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formulated seven propositions which relied heavily on Williamson's concepts, such as the
conditions under which vertical integration can offset uncertainty or opportunism. They
used other studies' findings to examine their propositions, even though those studies were
not designed to test the theory. Consequently, they were not able to test the three
dimensions of transactions.
Hurley and Fennell (1990) extensively used

�.��son's market ��ilur� and two
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dimensions of transactions to interpret the emergence of case-management programs.
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Case-management programs may emerge as a result of market failure, in which for many
transactions the spot market of the health service system is not cost-effective for
individual patients seeking care. Case management gives primary physicians
responsibility for arranging a certain range of medical services. The primary physicians
act as case managers as well as gatekeepers, serving as the enrollee's only starting point
of access to medical services.
Case management is intended to replace inefficient transactions with a prearranged governance structure of sustained contractual relationships. The characteristics
of case management fit into the two dimensions -- asset specificity and frequency. Asset
specificity exists in that primary physicians link patients with medical specialists, decide
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on patients' particular needs for care, and restrain patients' opportunistic behaviors, thus
minimizing transaction costs. The relatively high frequency of visits to primary
physicians helps explain why case managers, by controlling physician visits, can
minimize costs (Hurley & Fennel, 1990). The gatekeeping function of case management
is seen as the potential solution to Medicaid's problems of unnecessary care, curbed
access to primary care (Freund & Hurley, 1987), and inefficiencies and discontinuities in
care seeking (Hurley & Fennel, 1990).
Adopting Williamson's governance forms, Hurley (1993) discussed integrated
health care systems ranging from fully to least integrated: provider-sponsored integrated
systems, bilateral compact models, and network/selective contracting models. In a
provider-sponsored integrated system, the decision to integrate vertically is based
primarily on human and site specificity, and the system's facilities and resources can
provide continued care efficiently through case management and integrative mechanisms.
The bilateral compact model is characterized by the existence of a long-term bilateral
contract between the provider and an intermediary such as a product distributor, and the
product is jointly sponsored by both. The fast-growing network/selective contracting
model represents the broker-developed spot market contracting with a provider. The
bilateral compact model is exemplified by group model HMOs, and the network/selective
contracting model is exemplified by PPOs.
The growth of each of the three models suggests how distinctively providers can
be reconfigured to meet consumers' needs. The co-existence and popularity of different
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types of integrated health care systems indicates that some are superior to the others
under particular conditions. The pressure to restructure comes mainly from care
purchasers, because the "buyers-market" (Brink, 1986) has arrived, in which care
providers face tremendous challenges. The selection of vertical integration types largely
depends on the objectives of the purchasers (Hurley, 1993).
Chiu, Hurley and Chen (1993) attempted to apply transaction cost economics to
health care settings. In their pilot study, they used 507 acute hospitals in the mid-Atlantic
region (New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) as the study sample. The three
dimensions of Williamson'sTCE were used to derive hypotheses. The authors proposed
that hospital's make-or-buy decisions about discharging elderly patients would depend on
transaction uncertainty, transaction specificity and transaction frequency. Their findings
supported the model's fit in distinguishing between spot market and hybrid/hierarchy.
But in distinguishing between hybrid and hierarchy arrangements the model was less
successful.
Empirical Studies ofTCE in Fields Other than Health Care
The following review synthesizes various findings from studies usingTCE in
fields other than health care. These studies are categorized as 1) comparisons of pairs of
governance forms, that is vertical integration vs. hybrid; 2) comparisons of spot market,
hybrid arrangement, and vertical integration; and 3) theory testing by economic
simulation and case studies. Attention is directed toward type of industry, governance

68

forms (market, hybrid, and vertical integration), uncertainty, asset specificity, and
frequency (scale economies).
A pair comparison of governance forms, hybrid arrangement vs. vertical
integration, is presented in Appendix A.
To understand why GM and Ford integrated backward into selected components,
Monteverde and Teece (1982) investigated 133 component groupings that contain major
items of a vehicle. Whether or not the component was manufactured internally was
chosen as an indicator of integration. Existence of engineering effort to develop a
component, and whether the component was specific to a particular auto company or
generic to all companies indicated asset specificity. Monteverde and Teece (1982)
concluded that a company with more application engineering effort, more specific
specificity, and large size is more likely to adopt vertical integration. Their finding
supported the proposition that the higher the specificity and the volume of transactions,
the higher the possibility that a firm will choose hierarchy (vertical integration).
Decisions by firms in the electronic components industry to integrate the
marketing function were measured by Anderson and Schmittlein (1984), using the firms'
reliance on either direct sales people (employees) or independent sales agents
(manufacturer's representatives). The product lines that individual firms sold in specific
sales territories were the units of analysis. The authors focused on integrated governance
forms as affected by asset specificity and scale economies. Asset specificity was
measured by variation in service territory characteristics and difficulty in monitoring the
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performance of sales personnel. Scale economies were measured by source of
internalization costs. They found positive associations between integration and levels of
asset specificity, difficulty of performance evaluation, and the combination of these two.
Employees at larger firms were more likely to have to market their own products. The
construct of transaction uncertainty did not have a significant impact on integration.
A study by Masten (1984) analyzed an aerospace firm in its make-or-buy
decisions about components sold to the government on contract. The study compared
two governance structures, direct incorporation and market procurement. The dependent
variable was whether a certain component was produced internally or purchased in the
market. Asset specificity contained design specificity and site specificity. The degree of
specialization and the complexity of components were found to affect the make-or-buy
decision. Vertical integration became more likely as contracting became more costly,
supporting Williamson's argument.
Walker and Weber (1984) also studied automobile manufacturers, but focused on
the comparatively simple parts used in the initial assembly stage. In examining the
effects of asset specificity, uncertainty, and scale economies, they analyzed 60 decisions
and evaluations by a component division about making or buying a certain component.
Their findings showed significant effects of supplier production advantage and volume
uncertainty on the make-or-buy decision.
Palay ( 1984) studied transportation transactions between manufacturers and
railroads. Most rail shipment contracts were for standardized services, but some
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shipments created problems of special car design and handling. The study revealed that
the highly idiosyncratic nature of the rail equipment favored its ownership by the railroad.
Next, the governance forms of spot market, hybrid, and hierarchy are compared.
Four studies are reviewed-- two dealing with forward integration and two with backward.
All the studies compared governance forms by pair. Outlines of each study are presented
in Appendix B.
Rangan and colleagues

( 1993 ), interested in understanding complex channel

phenomena rather than testing the theory, interviewed managers in five industries (50 key
informants in 15 selected manufacturing firms, and 20 key informants in seven related
distribution firms) about their rationales for channel choice decisions. The authors
examined the polar modes and also studied two important but less explored aspects of
forward vertical integration-- channels in the hybrid mode (sharing of tasks between
"direct" and "indirect" channels rather than assigning them wholly to one or the other)
and channels in transition (evolving from one form to another). Taking one industry as
an example, the study noted the responses of two leading blood collection systems to
environmental uncertainty in health care. After the

PPS took effect, manufacturers

became more integrated by switching from performing only the function of product
communication, to undertaking all channel functions except inventory support and
physical delivery. The authors concluded that hybrid channels affect transactions that
require intermediate or mixed levels of asset specificity, and that channel functions are
allocated among direct and indirect channels according to gains in efficiency.
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Klein, Frazier, and Roth

( 1990) surveyed I0 Canadian companies with 925 items

in order to understand why they adopted channel integration in the international market
and how governance forms were affected by asset specificity, external uncertainty, and
production cost or channel volume. They used the extent to which durable, transaction
specific assets were found in the export market as an indicator of asset specificity;
volatility (the degree to which the environment changes and allows a company to be
caught by surprise) and diversity (the number of final customers and competitors) as
indicators of external uncertainty; and channel volume as an indicator of production cost,
a proxy for transaction frequency. Governance forms had four modes as follows:
hierarchy mode through the establishment of a foreign sales subsidiary,
mode serving the foreign market from home,
commission agents or joint ventures), and

I)

2) hierarchy

3) intermediate mode (the use of

4) market mode (the use of merchant

distributors).
Some of their results supported propositions of TCE, while others did not. The
decisions about channel structure in a foreign country depended on how well the market
could limit the opportunistic tendencies of outside intermediaries. Various forms of
forward integration emerged as alternatives when the enforcement of contractual
arrangements by relying on the market failed. Such integration in channel international
markets was influenced by channel volume, the use of shared channels, and country
destination. What did not support Williamson's theory was the finding that firms used
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intermediaries in foreign markets that had high environmental diversity, to cope with the
inherent complexity yet maintain flexibility.
Walker and Poppo

(1991) inquired about the influence of asset specificity on

transaction costs at hybrid manufacturing organizations, by examining supply
relationships of one large assembly division. They investigated how transaction costs or
governance forms are influenced by asset specificity, preselection investment in
technology, and supplier market competition. Transaction costs were measured by the
difficulty the assembly division had in reaching agreements with suppliers on the
allocation of adjustment costs (costs of material and engineering change). The three
exogenous variables-- asset specificity, preselection investment, and market competition
-- were represented, respectively, by the uniqueness of the supplier's technical labor skills
and equipment to manufacture the product delivered to the assembly division; by whether
the supplier invested in new technology to promote its chance of being selected as a
supplier; and by the degree to which there were enough potential suppliers to ensure
adequate competition to supply the product. Similarly to Klein, Frazier, and Roth's study

(1990), not all of this study's results supported Williamson's transaction cost theory. The
results confirmed that supplier specificity within the corporation is more related to lower
transaction costs than is asset specificity in the market.
Joskow

(1985) examined vertical integration and long-term contracts to supply

coal to coal-burning electric utilities. A variety of coal supply relationships existed:
of utility coal was supplied by utility subsidiaries, another

15% purchased in a spot

15%
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market, and the rest purchased under contracts with terms ranging from one year to fifty
years. Mine-mouth plants were compared with other types of electric generating plants
burning coal, to test the relationship between site specificity and the governance form. It
was found that mine-mouth plants (site specific) were more likely to vertically integrate,
and that when vertical integration was not chosen, long-term contracts were often used to
govern exchanges.
Another approach found in the literature to test the TCE is case study and
economic simulation. Stuckey's (1983) research is a case study, and Garvey's (1993) is
an economic simulation study. Stuckey (1983) explored vertical integration and joint
ventures in the aluminum industry. He found that physical asset specificity and site
specificity result in reliance on vertical integration of the bauxite and aluminum
refineries. Information asymmetries about the quality and extent of bauxite deposits are
an incentive to integrate.
Garvey (1993) investigated the problem of adaptation to information emerging
after governance structures and contracts have been established. The study compared the
efficiency of pre- and post-adaptations when the buyer and seller were independent to
those when they were integrated. In the pre-stage, aspects of technology, preferences,
distribution of uncertainty, and obligations exchanged under the alternative organization
modes were common knowledge. The buyer was assumed to have private information
regarding the potential benefits of adaptation, and the seller was assumed to have private
information as well, about the costs to be incurred by the adaptation. The results support
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the transaction cost theory in that hierarchy is favored when asset specificity increases,
and market-based models are favored when asset specificity is slight. Hierarchy tends to
be efficient under high asset specificity, when bargaining costs are likely to exceed the
costs caused by opportunism.
Conceptual Models and Hypotheses

\.lu"

Williamson's concept of transaction cost economics can be applied to the
relationship between hospitals and nursing homes.

In their two-way channel, the

hospital is a seller of hospital services as well as a buyer of nursing home services, while
the nursing home is a buyer of hospital services and a seller of nursing home services.
Dependency is critical to such relationships, according to the concepts of social exchange
and resource dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As buyers' needs can be met by
substitutes, suppliers can benefit little from acting opportunistically. Any cost increase
motivated by the seller's opportunism is likely to have a negative impact in turn on the
sellers. The uniqueness of each patient's needs for a hospital discharge
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nursing homes (Williamson, 1975, 1985).
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The transfers between hospitals and nursing homes that are tapped by
Williamson's three dimensions are essential to this study. Uncertainty is highly
associated with environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty,

�s, the demand

and supply of SNF beds and the opportunistic behaviors of nursing homes. Hospitals in
areas with an undersupply of nursing home beds and a higher percentage of indigent
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elderly rna?'�nd. it �ifficult to discharge their patients, and theref�r� ��y employ vertical
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integration (hierarchy) to overcome nursing homes�. opportunism. On the other hand, if
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located in areas with sufficient nursing home beds, hospitals may take no formal
arrangement (market). If located in areas where the supply of nursing home beds is
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between these two extremes, hospitals may use formal arrangements (hybrid) to discharge
their patients (Figure 3).

TRANSACTION
FREQUENCY
Recurrent

Occasional

Inter-changeable

Mixed

Idiosyncratic

TRANSACTION SPECIFICITY

Low
TRANSACTION
UNCERTAINTY

Figure 3. Three Dimensions of Patient Transfers: An Application of
Williamson's Framework of Transaction Cost Economics

However, the choice of governance may well depend on two other factors, as
well. Hospitals with special experience and expertise in elderly care may have higher
expectations from nursing home outlets. Such experience or expertis� al�o protects
_
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hospitals from risks in employing vertical integration. In addition, hospita.ls with a high
��---·�-·-�--·--·

use
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f t�� d��?s� ream services are more likely to vertically integrate extended care
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facilities, because doing so can reduce costs of transaction and production. More
importantly, the hospital's financial loss due to unnecessary stays may be reduced, and its
space and equipment fully utilized. In short, hospitals with a high volume of patient
exchanges have learned what is critical to the elderly's needs through constantly serving
the elderly, and that knowledge encourages a hospital to vertically integrate nursing home
care. Hospitals with low volumes of patient exchanges and thus a lack of experience will
be likely to prefer no formal arrangement (spot market). Other hospitals in between the
two extremes may use formal arrang:ments (hybrid).
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behavioral. Environmental uncertainty, here, refers to the unpredictability coming from
the environment as a hospital discharges patients.

The number of available nursing

home beds represents the degree of difficulty faced by a hospital when it intends to
discharge patients for post-acute care. Behavioral uncertainty occurs when there are only
a small number of suppliers, so the suppliers can exploit their advantage in information
asymmetry over hospitals.
Hospitals used to enjoy a steady growth in profits due to growing population,
higher incomes, mounting insurance coverage, limited competition, and retrospective cost
reimbursement, until implementation of the Medicare PPS and other third parties' cost-
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sharing reimbursement policies (Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988). Cost
consciousness replaced the laissez faire attitude toward costs that had characterized
hospitals in the 1980s. That situation will continue and become more intense in this
decade with the government's and the public's concerns about costs of health care.

f Tfie.relmbursement cha�ge�· have significantly increased the interdependencies in
'····--·-··---··-·· · · · ·

-···-

.....)

. •. . ___

the health care market The ability to arrange a patient's timely discharge to an
appropriate facility is crucial to hospital profits in a DRG-dominated or risk-sharing
market Thus hospitals are now more dependent on nursing homes to receive their
patients and to end the financial drain of patients' unnecessary stays. Furthermore, as
both acute care costs and the general public's morbidity increases, the opportunity cost a
hospital bears is high, because a bed occupied by a medically transferable patient could
have accommodated another patient and generated more revenue for the hospital.
The DRG payment system also has encouraged hospitals to discharge patients
earlier (Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 1988a; Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 1988b). In
order to avoid malpractice suits, however, hospitals try to discharge patients to the next
available health care institutions, such as nursing homes or home care agencies. Earlier
discharges increase the volume of transactions between hospitals and nursing homes
(DesHarnais, Kobrinski, & Chesney, 1987; Gornick & Hall, 1988; Kahn, Keeler,
Sherwood, et al., 1990; Lewis, Leake, Leal-Sotelo, & Clark, 1987; Long, Chesney, &
Ament, 1987; Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 1988b; Neu & Harrison, 1988; Tresch,
Simpson, & Burton, 1985).
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In addition to the impact of the DRG payment system hospital characteristics and
--- --r
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competiti�n_..a[fect hospital decision making. Hospital acute care occupancy is an
-
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indicator of the degree to which a hospital encounters uncertainty in the market,
represented by the unavailability of discharge sites for hospitals with high occupancy.
Hospital occupancy can be examined in two forms. One is an individual hospital's
occupancy and the other is average hospital occupancy in the same market area.
Hospitals with high occupancy rates have pressures to discharge their patients sooner so
that they can admit new patients and avoid costs from the late discharges. Hospitals with
high census and more patients waiting to be admitted usually deal with higher
opportunity costs than do those with low occupancy rates. Hospitals in a high occupancy
market area or neighboring area will demonstrate more urgency about relocating their
elderly patients than will those in areas with relatively low occupancy rates. In other
words, higher occupancy creates higher uncertainty in the disposition of elderly patients.
In any event, hospital occupancy is an ostensible measure of uncertainty.
Hl:
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hospital that has a relatively higher occupancy rate and/or is located in an
area with a high average occupancy rate is more likely to employ a higher
degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.

A

Since hospitals' abilities to discharge patients depend on the availability of
nursing home beds, transactions will differ with the supply and/or occupancy of nursing
homes (Gruenberg & Willemain,

1982; Nyman, 1993). Nyman's (1993) study showed a

significant problem of access to nursing homes, but those findings were not consistent
with his

1988 study, probably because of changes in nursing home occupancy rates. In
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Wisconsin,problems of the elderly in gaining access to nursing homes were present in
1983

but disappeared in 1988. The overall occupancy rate dropped by about 2%

between 1983 and 1988, from 94.5% to 92.4%. Another study found that applicants'
waiting time increased as the occupancy of nursing homes increased (Gruenberg &
Willemain,1982).
Several styg��..E�..:.��±!1_€li�!!t�d that the shortage .oLnJJrsiug.home.b.e_d.s..is_p.Q�i!i!'.�ly
associated wi�h the costs of delay�£.9 Jl;�b.a!g�,or financial lQ.�s . due to. acute_ca.n�-b�
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being occupied by medically transferable patients. Kenney et a!. (1991) found the
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elasticity of nursing home bed supply to be -0.07 in relation to inpatient length of stay. In
other words, LOS decreases by 0. 7% with a 10% increase in nursing home beds per
elderly patient. Abramowitz (1986) has indicated that the nursing home bed supply is
inadequate to meet the demand at all times, leading to costly (for the hospital) delays in
discharge.
To minimize transaction costs, Williamson ( 1985, 1991) suggests two options
with different degrees of contml. The one with more control is vertical integration
(hierarchy),and the other,with less ccw.trol, is long-term contracting or hybrid mode. In
-
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areas with ver.yJow supply of nursing home beds, vertical integration is more appropriate,
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bec
_ ause �apjt::t! !o_SS(!S _are. yery _unlikely. In areas with high nursing home occupancy,
however, special caution has to be used in assessing the sufficiency of supply in the
market. When high occupancy rates are coupled with sufficient supply, long-term
contracting is adequate to overcome environmental uncertainty. !f�..!�i. n_gb_Q!!l�-�-e?S. �!e
_
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sufficient and occupancy rates are low,_
hospitals
may use market
arrangements for
..
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discharging patients, because the probability of delayed discharges and consequent
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financial loss is low.
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A hospital that is located in an area with a relative shortage of SNF beds
and/or a high average SNF occupancy rate i.s more likely to ��pl�y -;-higher
degree of vertical iilteg;�tion in-- p�o�iding SNF services.
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� ��Q maximize profitS,}}ursing homes may preferentially select privatepay patients, since they pay as charged. This price discrimination behavior, which rejects
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first-come-first-served as a criterion, has been proved to exist by several studies (Dubay
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& Cohen, 1990; Massachusetts Hospital Association, 1979; Scanlon, 1980; Shapiro &

Roos, 1981) . :r_:�.:_ willingness ()f nursing homes to take public patients becomes less
when beds �r � in cri�i�
- aJU11��rsupply (Coburn, Fortinsky, McGuire, & McDonald, 1993;
Ettner, 1993; Nyman, 1989; Nyman, 1993; Weissert & Musliner, 1992), Qf. 'Yhen the
_

pu�lic paymen_!._i� rt:latively low �nd patients are relatively sicker (Bishop & Dubay,
1991; Dor, 1989; Dubay & Cohen, 1990; Shaughnessy, Kramer, Schlenker, &

Polesovsky, 1985).
�

\,Opportunistic discrimination against patients by nursing homes increases
\.....- -------··-·--·�--
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h()�pitals' uncertainty and the costs associated with it This_situation appears more severe
_.

����ea_s "_V�e��.t4�.lJ��
. s:tctpJ?IY is tight and many residents are p<;>9r.

Two examples

support this argument. Ettner (1993) used patient's length of delay (LOD) on a waiting
list before being admitted to a nursing home as a proxy for the access measure, in a profit
maximization model of for-profit facilities and a size maximization model of not-for-
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profit facilities. The results indicated that nursing homes have incentives to favor
admitting those patients, usually private patients, who offer more revenue and need less
expensive care. Medicaid patients are kept waiting most often in counties where the
capacity of nursing homes is limited and a high proportion of potential nursing home
residents are private payors (Ettner, 1993).
Coburn and colleagues (1993) investigated how nursing home costs and access to
care for public patients were affected by the adoption of prospective payment for nursing
homes services in Maine during the period 1979 to 1985. Responsiveness to the
efficiency incentives of the payment mechanism declined and problems arose in
achieving further cost reductions, which in turn affected public patients' access to nursing
homes. For Medicaid patients, the share of patient days declined, from 80.2% in year
three to 75.9% in year six. Moreover, Medicare's share of patient days also declined,
from 83.2% in year three to 75.9% in year six.

..,.,.� c�,
.

·v?

$.o. t. vh"

t4.· ;fl.<: .n· th

A

Transaction Asset Specificity
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Experience in geriatrj� services and/or experience in caring for elderly patients
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who ne�d su�a�ute�a�� gives_ a hospital advantages in human asset specificity as well as
managerial expertise when developing nursing home services. Experience enables a
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hospital in an area with relatively more indigent persons and a shortage of
SNF bed supply is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical
integration in providing SNF services.

H3:

'.

.

hospital to thoroughly evaluate the advantages and risks of penetrating to the next stage
of business services. Hospitals without such experience are less likely to be aware of or
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concerned about variations in quality among their suppliers, and they may also be less
demanding when selecting nursing homes, doing so mostly according to what is

i

l.

available.
A hospital's experience with the elderly health care market is essential to the
decision to make, contract, or buy.

The expertise in providing geriatric services can

represent asset specificity or hospital identity. The geriatric service areas may include
geriatric assessment units (GAUs), Alzheimer's diagnosis/assessment, geriatric clinics,
and others. Geriatric assessment, for example, is defined as a "multi-dimensional -usually interdisciplinary -- diagnostic process designed to quantify an elderly individual's
medical, psychosocial, and functional capabilities and problems with the intention of
arriving at a comprehensive plan for therapy and long-term follow-up" (Rubenstein,

1988). GAUs are acknowledged to yield improvements in patient functioning and to
facilitate appropriate use of nursing homes and hospitals (Rubenstein, 1988; Saltz, 1988).
The effects of GAUs are found to be especially on discharge efficiency, coordination and
continuity of care (Bowlyow, 1994). In addition, home care is an important proxy for a
hospital's capacity to integrate nursing homes, because home care services, which are
extended to the community as a substitute for nursing home care, represent a hospital's
expertise in caring for elderly patients.
U_s_��__!)e_£OJ1.C:luded that the more experienced and knowledgeable a hospital is in
caring for the elderly� the more discriminating it will be in selecting nursing homes for its
-
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discharged patients.
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\)H4:
HS:

A

hospital that provides a wider variety of geriatric services to elderly
patients is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in
providing SNF services.
A

hospital that provides home health services to elderly patients is more
likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF
services.

Transaction Frequency
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The dimension of tra s t� � fr quency refers simply to the number of transfers
�

t�� � �

that a hospital makes. Since most nursing home residents are elderly, the number of
Medicare patients should reflect the frequency of exchanges between hospitals and
nursing homes. !!!creased transfer rates were found after the implementation o£Medic1!r.�.
_I>PS. One study reviewed hospitalization and mortality data for Medicaid and the general
_
population in Wisconsin for 12 months after the implementation of PPS (Sager, Alaine,
Leventhal, & Easterling, 1987). The average annual hospitalization for the community
elderly fell, but for nursing home residents the rate rose sharply. Hospital length of stay
dropped for both groups, but less so for nursing home residents (Sager, Alaine,
Leventhal, & Easterling, 1987). In 1984, 72% of the Medicaid institutionalized elderly
had been hospitalized; most admissions had followed on hospital discharges (Sager,
Alaine, Leventhal, & Easterling, 1987).
The Rand Corporation's study of Medicare asserted that 2.5% to 3.2% of
Medicare hospital-discharge claims are incurred for post-hospital care in skilled nursing
facilities (Neu & Harrison, 1988). Mo�!s�ey and his � O.�!���u�s� -��-��I}-...S.._(!_2_��p) not only
·confirms what has been claimed by Neu and Harrison (1988), but also shows a substantial
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increase in patients t�<msferred from hospital to_ �tl�acute care after the i1ppl�me.ntation of..
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Medj£_a._r�_!>X��- _Ihe increase in exchanges holds true especially for hospitals with higher
proportions of elderly patients. Several studies have used channel volume as a proxy for
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-

.

.

·-

�

exchange frequency (Anderson & Coughlan, 1994; Anderson & Schrnittlein, 1984; Klein,
----- --·-------·-··
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Frazier, & Roth, 1990), and others found that volume of exchange was positively
associated with firms' decisions to make rather than buy (Anderson & Coughlan, 1994;
Klein, Frazier, & Rot_h 1 1990)._ ...

V

H6:

A hospital with a relatively higher proportion of Medicare patients is more
likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF
services.

HMOs are generally characterized by receiving a fixed and prepaid fee,

I

irrespective of service use, thereby accepting financial risk for providing or arranging a
stated range of services (Boland, 1991). PPOs, on the other hand, have contractual
agreements with defined groups of providers -- typically both hospital and physician -- to
offer discounted fee-for-service to particular groups of individuals (Rice, Lissovoy,
Gabel, & Ermann, 1985). Under risk-sharing, hospitals and physicians have an incentive
(

.

.

¥-

not to admit patients to costly acute care units, and to make subacute care ii?-sti_t�tions the
patients' next destination when they are no longer acutely ill. Physicians are known to
affect the demand for medical care and would be motivated under the risk-sharing
reimbursement to send patients home or to long-term care units more quickly in order to

_J'hat behavior, in turn, increases patient transfers to nursing

· _::educe acute care use
,

homes, raising the demand.

-4��:
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Several studies reported that �ospit<l:� utilization and management have been
changed due to contracting with managed care organizations. In a randomized study
comparing HMOs with fee-for-service sectors between 1950 and 1980, it was found that
HMO patients used 30% fewer hospital days, attributable to a lower level of spending
(Luft, 1980). Greenfield (1992) also found that patients in fee-for-service plans had about
40% more hospitalizations than did patients in HMOs. Adjusting these experimental data
for the average level of copayment in the United States, Schwartz (1987) estimated that
HMO enrollees used about 31% fewer days than did fee-for-service enrollees. To reduce
hospital days, hospitals may be willing to offer §kil1eirn-urslng services through vertical
.
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integration arrangements, to serve a larger pool of patients.
_
A hospital affiliated with managed care organizations is more likely to
employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing :�NF services.

H7:
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Hospital size largely determines the volume of patient transfers, because the more
beds a hospital owns, the more patients it can care for and the more patients it will have
to transfer. As Williamson (1985) has argued, the size of a firm affects its ability and--· .
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willingness to vertically integrate, because costs can be spread over more units of goods
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or ser�i_ce�a�?_!hu�it_f._an achieve savings on production and transactio� �osts. Firm size
_ _
_ _
has been used as a proxy for the transaction frequency or scale economies (Anderson,
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1985; Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; John & Weitz, 1988; Monteverde & Teece, 1982).
Several studies have found size to be positively and significantly associated with the
hierarchy mode of control (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Monteverde & Teece, 1982).

86

�_o-���!�e alone is not fully representative of the volume of exchanges between
hospitals and nursing homes, since with larger size there may be only a larger portion of
'----- ···---·
- --

__122!!.-elde�!f:patients. But hospitals with both larger size and higher proportions of
;
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11edi�are p��iel!.t� h_a_ve more transactions between hospitals and extended care facilities
than do those hospitals without these characteristics. The interaction of the proportion of

.

Medieare patient discharges and hospital size should well represent the frequency of
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hospital with a higher proportion of Medicare patients and a relatively
larger size is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in
providing SNF services.
- -<

H8:
\(

A

Interaction of Three Dimensions
The dynamics between and among governance structure and the three dimensions
-- uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency of exchange-- can be analyzed. The
interaction effects of each two of the three factors (i.e. first-order interaction effects) are
tested in H9. First-order interaction terms represent the interactions of uncertainty and
specificity, uncertainty and frequency, and specificity and frequency.
Several studies have analyzed interaction terms of different constructs associated
with the mode of efficient governance. Anderson (1985) compared the use of employees
and outside agents as salespersons, to test TCE. He concluded that the combination of
environmental unpredictability and transaction-specific assets is positively associated
with the likelihood of a direct sales force. Walker and Weber (1984) used the interaction
of frequency and environmental uncertainty to investigate the combined effect of those
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two dimensions. To test the interaction of each two of the three constructs, H9 is
decomposed into three sub-hypotheses (H9a, H9b and H9c).
H9:

The higher interaction effects of each two of the three constructs are (i.e.,
uncertainty

x

specificity, uncertainty

x

frequency, and specificity

x

frequency), the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of
vertical integration in providing SNF services.
H9a:

The higher the environmental uncertainty, and the more knowledge the hospital
has in elderly care, the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of
vertical integration in providing SNF services.

H9b:

The higher the environmental uncertainty, and the higher the frequency of patient
transfers, the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical
integration in providing SNF services.

H9c:

The more knowledge the hospital has in elderly care, and the higher the frequency
of patient transfers, the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of
vertical integration in providing SNF services.
Williamson ( 1985) emphasizes that the selection of vertical integration is

simultaneously determined by three dimensions of transaction. HI 0 is used to test the
interaction effect of three constructs, that is, to examine the second-order interaction
effect. The interaction effect of environmental uncertainty, hospital specificity in
providing elderly care, and frequency of patient transfers is hypothesized to affect the
hospital's make-or-buy decision.
HlO:

The higher the environmental uncertainty, the more knowledge the hospital
has in elderly care, and the higher the frequency of patient transfers, the
more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in
providing SNF services.
The main purpose of this study is to test whether transaction cost economics

theory can be applied to a hospital's make-or-buy decision in channeling their most
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important consumers (i.e., the elderly) to extended care facilities. Distributed by
dimension, three hypotheses are derived for transaction uncertainty, two for transaction
specificity, and three for transaction frequency. One further hypothesis is developed to
test the interaction of the three constructs. Hypotheses and propositions for the
corresponding constructs are summarized in the following paragraphs.
Table 1 presents a summary of the study hypotheses. HI, H2 and H3 relate to
transaction uncertainty and encompass five indicators. These hypotheses are primarily
intended to address the proposition, "The greater the uncertainty of the nursing home
market, the more likely a hospital is to use the hierarchy or hybrid mode of control."
Two hypotheses, H4 and H5, are developed from transaction specificity construct.
They are to test the proposition, "The more experience or expertise a hospital has in
caring for the elderly, the more likely is to employ the hierarchy or hybrid mode of
governance."
H6, H7, and H8 are derived for the construct of transaction frequency. They
address the proposition, "The higher the volume of exchange frequency is, the more
likely the hospital is to employ the hierarchy or hybrid mode of governance."
The last proposition of this study is: "A hospital's decision on hierarchical
arrangements depends on the degree of integration among the three constructs." H9
(H9a, H9b, and H9c) and HI 0 are derived to test this proposition.
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Table I
Summary of the Study Hypotheses

vHI:

A hospital that has a relatively higher occupancy rate and/or is located in an area with a

high average occupancy rate is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical
integration in providing SNF services.
vH2:

A hospital that is located in an area with a relative shortage of SNF beds and/or a high

average SNF occupancy rate is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical
integration in providing SNF services.
J

H3:

A hospital in an area with relatively more indigent persons and a shortage of SNF bed

supply is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF
servtces.
v'

H 4:

A hospital that provides a wider variety of geriatric services to the elderly patients is

more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
HS:

A hospital that provides home health services to elderly patients is more likely to employ

a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
,, H6:

A hospital with a relatively higher proportion of Medicare patients is more likely to

employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
.J

H7:

A hospital affiliated with managed care organizations is more likely to employ a higher

degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
v

H8:

A hospital with a higher proportion of Medicare patients and a relatively larger size is

more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
H9:

The higher interaction effects of each two of the three constructs (i.e., uncertainty
specificity, uncertainty

x

frequency, and specificity

x

frequency) are, the more likely the

hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
HI 0:

The higher the environmental uncertainty, the more knowledge the hospital has in
elderly care, and the higher the frequency of patient transfers, the more likely the
hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
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Summary
This chapter presents the concepts of organization economics through its
representative theory -- transaction cost economics.

Williamson's concept of market

failure and the three dimensions of efficient governance are described. The three
dimensions (transaction uncertainty, specificity, and frequency) are presented to build
testable hypotheses. Two figures are presented to illustrate the importance of each
dimension and the interaction of these three dimensions. The figures are also intended to
map out Williamson's TCE approach developed in the 1980s.
Even though many health care organization researchers have adopted transaction
cost economics as a theoretical framework to interpret health care phenomena, most of
the studies concentrated on the interpretation or descriptive stage with little effort to
validate the theory by empirical studies.

Fortunately, a number of organization

researchers have attempted to test transaction cost economics in many other fields, such
as transportation (aerospace, automobile, railroad) and industry (electronic components).
In terms of the direction of channels, some focus on forward vertical integration
(downstream), and some on backward vertical integration (upstream). Most of the studies
use the three-dimensional approach and employ bivariate analysis to examine a firm's
decision to make or buy. TCE has been proven to be a theory that can be used to explain
the emergence of organizations, even though some results are mixed.
The conceptual models and hypotheses in this study are derived for acute care
hospitals and nursing homes, using the three dimensions related to governance forms,
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while other demographic and hospital attributes are controlled. Since the purpose of this
study is to test TCE, all the hypotheses closely tap these basic constructs of TCE. A total
of 4 propositions and I 0 hypotheses are proposed in this study.

Chapter 4
Methods

This chapter begins with a description of the study design and sample. There
follows a description of data sources, model specification and measurement of variables.
Then the analytic plan, including model building and multivariate logistic regression
analysis, is presented. This chapter concludes with a summary of methods.
Study Design and Sample
The purpose of this study is to investigate why and how hospitals vertically
integrate into skilled nursing facilities, by using Williamson's transaction cost economics
theory. As explained by Williamson, the selection of a governance structure is contingent
on three dimensions of transactions, i.e. transaction uncertainty, asset specificity, and
frequency. A cross-sectional design is used to examine the association of different modes
of hospital governance and the three dimensions of transactions. Cross-sectional design
means that the study population is observed at a single point in time.
The study sample consists of all the non-federal, acute-care general hospitals in 50
states and the District of Columbia of the United States (excluding associated areas such
as the Virgin Islands) that responded to the American Hospital Association's (AHA) 1990
annual survey. The year 1990 is chosen because managed care networks and the
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Medicare PPS had matured by then, so that effects of those two developments can be
included. The criterion for a hospital to be selected for the sample is that the hospital
must have been in full operation for at least one year by the time of the survey. In all,
4,908 hospitals met the criterion and are included in this study.
There are two advantages of studying almost all non-federal hospitals. First, the
sample is close to the entire population of interest (i.e. non-federal, acute general
hospitals), so selection bias becomes very unlikely. Second, since the population
includes all hospitals in the United States, the generalizability of the results is more
assured.
Data Sources
In this study, data are extracted from four sources: the American Hospital
Association (AHA) 1990 Annual Survey of Hospitals Data Base, the 1993 Area Resource
File (ARF), the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) National Minimum
Data Set for Skilled Nursing Facilities (SNFs), and state stringency measures for CON
regulation. Details of each data source are described below.
The AHA annual survey data contain information on all hospitals in the U.S. that
are registered with the AHA and respond to the organization's annual survey. The
information describes organizational structure, facilities and services, utilization,
personnel, medical staff and financial status. This data source has been the most
recognized and informative of individual hospital data bases. It has been used

94

extensively by health care researchers (Alexander & Morrisey, 1989; Fennell &
Alexander, 1987).
The 1993 Area Resource File is a county-based file that includes all counties in
the U.S. The file provides data related to health facilities, health professions, utilization,
population, economics, environment, and vital statistics. It is widely recognized and used
in different disciplines (Alexander & Morrisey, 1989). The file for 1993 is chosen
because it contains information for 1990, which matches the time period of the AHA
data set.
The SNF data were obtained from the Health Care Financing Administration's
National Minimum Data Set, which covers the period of October 1990 to September
1991. The data set includes the most current cost reports and organizational
characteristics of Medicare-certified skilled nursing facilities.
The state stringency measures for CON regulation are based on 1984-1986 data
collected by the Center for Health Services and Policy Research, Northwestern
University. It has been used in several studies (Abu-Jaber, 1992; Begun, Ozcan, & Luke,
1992).
Model Specifications
Many hospitals face tremendous difficulties and financial risks in the competition
for skilled nursing beds in their market area. When market uncertainty increases to the
extent that a hospital can no longer rely on spot-market purchasing to release its burden
of delayed discharges, two options remain -- long-term contracting or leasing
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arrangements with SNFs (hybrid), or vertical integration of SNFs (hierarchy). In short,
the market, hybrid, and hierarchy modes are three types of arrangements by which
hospitals can provide skilled nursing care services. The hospital's decision about which
to use usually has two stages. In the first stage, hospitals decide between the spot market
and integration. If integration is chosen, hospitals have to decide on its degree, that is,
either hybrid or hierarchy. Extreme vertical integration is always reserved as a last resort
(Williamson, 1991 ), since capital costs are higher with hierarchy than with hybrid
governance.
There are two phases to the model specification. In phase one, five primary
models are established to examine the variations in the arrangements hospitals make to
discharge patients to skilled nursing facilities. In phase two, the model specification
focuses on interaction effects. As Williamson proposed, three dimensions of
transactions, transaction uncertainty (UNCER), transaction specificity (SPEC) and
transaction frequency (FREQ), are used as independent variables across all the study
models. In order to avoid the bias that may be caused by other variables, variables such
as CON stringency, demographic factors, and hospital characteristics are entered as
control variables (CONTRL).
Table 2 presents the five primary models as well as the interaction term models.
Model 1 differentiates whether or not a hospital decides to integrate skilled nursing
facilities (Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market). Model 2 examines why hospitals adopt the
extreme mode to manage patient discharges (Hierarchy vs. Market). Model 3 identifies
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the factors affecting a hospital's choice between the different degrees of integration
(Hierarchy vs. Hybrid). Model 4 examines whether hospitals that use the hybrid form
differ from those that use the market option (Hybrid vs. Market). Model 5 examines the
factors affecting a hospital's decision to use vertical integration rather than hybrid and
spot market (Hierarchy vs. Hybrid/Market). In phase two, Model6 examines whether
there is an interaction effect of each two of the three factors on the hospital's governance
decision. Model7 examines the interaction effect of three dimensions.

Table 2
Description of Model Specifications

Phase One
Modell

Hierarchy /Hybrid vs. Market= f (UNCER, FREQ, SPEC, CONTRL)

Model2

Hierarchy vs. Market= f (UNCER, FREQ, SPEC, CONTRL)

Model3

Hierarchy vs. Hybrid= f (UNCER, FREQ, SPEC, CONTRL)

Model4

Hybrid vs. Market= f (UNCER, FREQ, SPEC, CONTRL)

ModelS

Hierarchy vs. Hybrid/Market= f (UNCER, FREQ, SPEC, CONTRL)

Phase Two
Model6

Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market= f (UNCER
SPEC

Model7

x

x

SPEC, UNCER

x

FREQ,

FREQ, CONTRL)

Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market= f(UNCER

x

SPEC

x

FREQ, CONTRL)
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Measurement of Variables
The variables in this study can be divided into three categories. The first group is
the dependent variables, hospitals' forms of governance in discharging patients to SNFs.
The second group is theory-driven independent variables, including transaction
uncertainty, transaction frequency and transaction specificity. The last group is the
control variables to reduce bias in estimating effects of the theory-driven variables.
Dependent Varjables
The dependent variables, the three types of arrangements a hospital takes to
discharge its patients to skilled nursing facilities, are abstracted from the AHA

1990

Annual Surveys of Hospitals Data Base. The AHA survey asked two questions central to
the current study: whether a hospital offered a Medicare-certified, distinct, skilled nursing
unit, and whether it offered other skilled nursing care. Possible answers to each of these
two questions by a hospital were:

1) not provided by the hospital, 2) provided by other

providers through a formal contractual arrangement (including joint ventures), and 3)
provided by the hospital (AHA,

1991).

These responses represent three levels of vertical integration, the dependent
variable of interest, such that

1 spot market (hospital providing no SNF services); 2
=

=

hybrid or long-term contracting (hospital not maintaining SNF services, but providing
them through long-term contracting); and 3 =hierarchy (hospital providing in-house SNF
services). The three levels of distribution channels for goods or services have been
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adopted in many studies testing transaction cost economics (Klien, Frazier, & Roth, 1990;
John & Weitz, 1988; Rangan, Corey, & Cespedes, 1993).
Independent Variables
The independent variables are chosen to represent three transaction constructs.
Table 3 presents the variables for measuring transaction uncertainty. The transaction
uncertainty dimension has two subcomponents: environmental or market uncertainty (i.e.,
market competition for nursing home beds), and behavioral uncertainty. The county is
used as the hospital market area in this study, because it is widely recognized and used by
researchers as a health care market or environment boundary (Alexander & Morrisey,
1989).
Table 3
Operational Definitions of Transaction Uncertainty Variables

AH OPY

Hospitals' occupancy rate in a hospital market area (HI)

H OPY

Individual hospital occupancy rate (H 1)

SNF OLD

Skilled-nursing-bed-to-elderly-population ratio in a hospital market
area (H2)

SNF OPY

Skilled nursing facility occupancy rate in a hospital market area
(H2)

BEH UNC

cross-product term of the SNF beds to elderly population ratio and
persons-below-the-poverty-level percentage in the hospital market
area (H3)
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The W1Certainty of the nursing home market measures the degree of hospital
competition for SNFs. In this study, competition for skilled nursing beds is measured by
four continuous variables. The first variable is the average occupancy rate of all acute
care hospitals in the market area (AH OPY). It is used as a proxy that measures the
_

degree to which hospitals are competing for limited nursing home beds. The second is
the occupancy rate of an individual hospital (H_ OPY). Hospital occupancy indicates the
urgency that a hospital experiences in discharging patients. Area hospital occupancy rate
and individual hospital occupancy rate are used to test HI. The third variable is the ratio
of skilled nursing beds to the elderly population in the hospital market area (SNF O L D ) ;
_

the fourth variable is the average skilled nursing facility occupancy rate in the hospital
market area (SNF OPY). These last two variables, representing the availability of SNF
_

beds to which hospitals can discharge patients, are used to test H2.
Behavioral uncertainty (BEH UN C) is measured by the cross-product term of the
_

SNF -beds-to-elderly-population ratio and the persons-below-the-poverty-level percentage
in the hospital market area. The rationale is that the relatively low reimbursement for
Medicaid patients motivates SNFs to preferentially admit private-pay patients, especially
in areas where an undersupply of beds exists. The cross-product term represents the
interaction of opportunism and small numbers and is used to test H3.
The second construct is asset specificity. Presumably, a hospital evaluates the
discharge sites more critically if the hospital has considerable experience or expertise in
providing geriatric services. It is hypothesized that a hospital's geriatric experience or
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expertise enhances the likelihood of using vertical integration. Table 4 presents the two
variables that are chosen to represent experience and knowledge: the number of geriatric
services that a hospital provides (GI_INDX), and the availability of home care
(HOME_!). Each of the two variables is used to test H4 and H5, respectively.
Table 4
Operational Definitions of Transaction Specificity Variables

GI INDX

The number of geriatric services provided by the hospital,
including adult day care program, Alzheimer's
diagnostic/assessment services, comprehensive geriatric
assessment, emergency response for the elderly, geriatric acute
care unit, geriatric clinics, respite care, senior membership. It is
coded as "1" if provided in-house or through contracts, and as "0"
otherwise (H4).

HOME I

Whether a hospital provides agency home health care, through
either the hospital or a long-term contract. It is coded as" 1" if
provided in-house or through contracts, and as "0" if otherwise
(H5).

The geriatric service item is a continuous variable with few integer values,
ranging from

0 to 8. The eight services include: I) adult day care program, 2)

Alzheimer's diagnostic and assessment services,

3) comprehensive geriatric assessment,

4) emergency response for the elderly, 5) geriatric acute-care unit,

6) geriatric clinics, 7)
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respite care, and 8) senior membership program. Each service item is coded as "1" if a
hospital provides this service, either hospital-based or through long-term contract;
otherwise it is coded as "0." The availability of home health care is coded as

"

1

"

if

provided in-house or through contract, and as "0" if provided otherwise.
Table 5 presents four variables that represent transaction frequency between
hospitals and skilled nursing facilities. Three hypotheses for this construct posit that the
volume of exchange is positively associated with a hospital's use of hierarchy or hybrid as
a management strategy.
The first indicator is the proportion of Medicare discharged patients to total
discharges (MCR_D). The rationale for selecting this indicator is that skilled nursing
services are used primarily by elderly patients, and the majority of Medicare
beneficiaries are over 65. A hospital with more Medicare patient days is likely to have
more transactions between skilled nursing facilities. A relatively higher proportion of
Medicare patient days imposes more pressure on a hospital's discharge-planning
activities. Hospital-owned long-term care has been shown to be associated with shorter
LOS and lower cost (Welch & Dubay, 1989). The proportion of Medicare patients may
represent the extent to which a hospital is exposed to risk from an inadequate patient
discharge process. This indicator is used to test H6. Furthermore, a hospital's affiliation
with a managed care organization (HMO/PPO) is used to test H7. The cross-term of
Medicare discharges and hospital size is employed to test H8.
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Table 5
Operational Definitions of Transaction Frequency Variables

MCR D

Proportion of Medicare discharges to total discharges of the
hospital, continuous variable (H6).

HMOs

Whether a hospital has a formal written contract with any HMOs:
1 =yes, 0 =no

(H7).

Whether a hospital has formal written contracts with any PPOs:

PPOs

1 =yes, 0 =no

MCR SIZE

(H7).

Cross-product term of hospital size and the proportion of Medicare
discharges, continuous variable

(H8)

It is important to evaluate Williamson's postulate that as uncertainty, asset
specificity, and the volume of transactions increase simultaneously, the probability of
vertical integration increases. To examine the

interaction effects of the three dimensions

of transactions on hospital SNF integration, and interaction between or among transaction
specificity, transaction uncertainty and transaction frequency, first-order and second
order interaction terms are tested in

H9 and HI 0. First-order interaction terms represent

the interaction of uncertainty and specificity, uncertainty and frequency, and specificity
and frequency. The second-order interaction term represents the interaction of
uncertainty, specificity, and frequency. Mathematically, the model with first-order
interaction terms can be expressed as:

Y =f(UNCER

x

SPEC, UNCER

x

FREQ, SPEC

x

FREQ); and
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the model with the second-order interaction term can be expressed as:
y

=

f(UNCER

X

SPEC

X

FREQ).

Control Variables
Environmental and hospital characteristics were included as control variables
(Table

6). Two environmental variables that may covary with hospitals' managerial

decisions are controlled in this study. One of the most important control variables is the
state regulatory stringency of CON, which is controlled because of its impact on the
supply of nursing home beds. The CON stringency for each state is a summated score
based on the following five stringency indicators: I)
for capital expenditures,

2) threshold levels for major medical equipment, 3) threshold

levels for new institutional services,
federal hospital, and 5)

1986 CON review threshold levels

4) 1984 state planning agency budget size per non

1984 CON application approval rates. Each of the five indicators

is given an ordinal value from

0 to 3, depending on the breakpoints. These values are

then summated to obtain overall stringency scores that range from

0 to 15. The other

environmental control variable is locality (LOCAL), whether a hospital is located in an
urbanized or a rural area. The criterion defining an urbanized or a rural area is whether
the population is over or below I00,000.
The controlled hospital characteristics include hospital bed size (SIZE), the
availability of swing beds at a hospital (SWING), membership in a multihospital system
(MEMBER), and two dummy variables representing three types of ownership
(OWN_PUB; OWN_NPRO). It is a common practice to control for hospital size. Swing
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beds are a unique form of providing long-term care in that only certain hospitals, for
example, those located in rural areas and those with less than 100 beds, are eligible to
switch their acute beds to chronic care beds. In terms of memberships, hospitals are
For ownership,

grouped as either belonging to a multi-health-care system or not.
hospitals are categorized into 1) public or government hospitals,
hospitals, and

2) private not-for-profit

3) private for-profit hospitals. All four variables are dummy variables

except for bed size, which is a continuous variable.

Table

6

Operational Definitions of Control Variables

CON

CON stringency in the area where a hospital is located - summated
score ranging from 0 to 15

LOCAL

Whether a hospital is located in

an

urbanized area:

1 =rural, 0 =urban.
SIZE

Hospital staffed beds; continuous variable

SWING

Whether a hospital operates swing beds: I =yes, 0 =no.

MEMBER

Whether a hospital is in any multi-hospital system: 1 =yes, 0 =no.

OWN PUB

Measured as dummy variable for public hospitals (1 =yes), with
profit hospitals as reference

OWN NPRO

Measured as dummy variable for private non-profit hospitals
(I =yes), with profit hospitals as reference
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Analysis Plan
The unit of analysis for this study is the individual hospital. A series of analyses
are performed, beginning with univariate analysis, which examines the distribution of the
study variables. The second segment of the analysis is model building to assess the
proposed variables. Finally, multivariate logistic regression analysis is performed to
examine the relative impact of each dimension on a hospital's governance form.
Univariate Analysis
Study variables are examined first in terms of distribution and normality, through
univariate analysis. The observations that have unreasonable or extreme values or are
incorrectly coded are considered for deletion. Nominal or ordinal variables are examined
through frequency tables and bar charts.
Model Building
Model building includes factor analysis, univariate logit analysis, contingency
table analysis, bivariate analysis, and collinearity diagnostic analysis to assess the
proposed variables.
Factor analysis.

Factor analysis is performed to simplify complex and diverse

relationships that exist among the selected independent variables. The purpose is to
uncover common dimensions or factors that link together the seemingly unrelated
variables (Dillon & Goldstein, 1995).
Univariate logistic regression.

Univariate logistic regression is applied to each of

the proposed variables to evaluate whether a variable is statistically sufficient to be
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included in the multivariate models. The coefficient estimate, standard error, p-value,
odds ratio, and the likelihood ratio test for the significance of the coefficient obtained
from univariate logit regression for each variable are evaluated.
Contin!iency table analysis.

Contingency table analysis is employed to evaluate

nominal, ordinal, and continuous variables with integer values. This method entails an
analysis of a two-way contingency table. The purpose of analyzing contingency tables is
to determine whether or not the two variables, such as number of geriatric services and
SNF integration, can be regarded as independent of each other, that is, to examine the
association between two variables.
Bivariate analysis.

A correlation matrix is obtained to examine the two-way

relationships between selected pairs of variables. The purpose is to detect possible
collinearity problems. lf the correlation coefficient of any two variables reaches 0.95,
one of the variables conveys essentially all of the information contained in the other
(Afifi & Clark, 1990), and the variables are considered collinear.
Collinearity diagnostic analysis.

The inclusion of a variable with high

collinearity may hinder the revelation of the true relationship between variables, by
disturbing the directions or estimated regression coefficients of variables. Therefore,
deleting hjghly collinear variables is necessary. Since correlation matrices detect only the
possibility of collinearity problems, collinearity diagnostic analysis is used
simultaneously to confirm their existence.
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Multivariate Logit Analysis
Hospitals' arrangements to discharge patients to nursing homes are predicted by
using multivariate logistic regression. A logistic regression model is used when the
dependent variable is measured by a binary or discrete variable, and the independent
variables are continuous and discrete variables. Since the dependent variable is a discrete
variable, the predicted probability lies in the unity boundary. Logistic regression is
preferable to ordinary least squares (OLS), because OLS estimates are biased and yield
predicted values that are not between

0 and

I.

Several studies of hospitals involving logistic response models have addressed
hospital strategy formulation. Alexander and Morrisey

(1989) used logistic models to

examine the determinants of hospitals' entry into management contracts with
multihospital systems. Logistic models have also been used by Fennell and Alexander

(1987) to examine why hospitals employ buffering or bridging as boundary spanning
strategies to overcome regulatory stringency. Many researchers outside the health care
field have used binary and logistic regression to test Williamson's transaction cost
economics (Anderson,
Walker

1985; John & Weitz, 1988; Rangan, Corey, & Cespedes, 1993;

& Poppo, 1991). Logistic regression is an appropriate tool because here analysis

of the transaction cost economics theory mainly involves comparing discrete institutional
alternatives -- of which classical market contracting is located at one extreme; centralized,
hierarchical organization at the other; and mixed modes of firm and market arrangements
in between.
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Logistic regression estimates the probability of the occurrence of an event. In a
binary response model, an outcome is either an event (coded as
as

1) or a non-event (coded

0). The event in this study is a hospital providing SNF services through either the

hierarchy or hybrid mode. Each factor affecting the outcome is entered as the vector of
explanatory variables. The probability function is specified as:

where

P

=

probability of hospital's SNF integration;

B; =coefficient estimated from the data;
Xj

=

e =

vector of explanatory variable; and
the base of natural logarithms, or approximately

2. 718.

In order to interpret logistic coefficients (B;), the model can be expressed in terms
of an odds ratio. Let P represent the probability of an event; the logit (P)

=

P/(1-P) is a

linear function of the predictor variables. The log of the odds ratio (also termed the logodds ratio or log-odds) is defined as:
Odds ratio=

Pz/ (1-pz ).

The concept of an odds ratio is used extensively in predicting the occurrence of a
given event. For a dichotomous or polynomous variable, the odds ratio is a measure of
association of a binary variable (predictor) with the occurrence of an event (in this study,
SNF integration). For a continuous variable, it is necessary to develop a method for point
and interval estimation for an arbitrary change of"X" units in the covariate. Certainly,
any reasonable value can be used as an interval. Generally, changes in multiples of

5 or
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I 0 may be most meaningful and easiest to understand (Hosmer

& Lemeshow, 1989). In

this study, the interval for area hospital occupancy rate as well as for the proportion of
Medicare discharges is I 0%.
To examine how well the logistic regression model predicts outcomes, two
measures of goodness-of-fit are employed: Pearson chi-squares and correct classification
rates (Afifi

& Clark, 1990). The chi-square values based on the difference between the

observed and fitted values reveal how well the logit equation fits the data. These
differences between observed and fitted values are summated to form a chi-square value

(x2) (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989). Large values of the test statistic indicate a poor fit of
the model, and conversely, low values indicate a good fit. Equivalently, small p-values
indicate poor fit.
An intuitively appealing way to summarize the results of a fitted logistic model is
with a classification table, in which estimated probabilities predict group membership.
Presumably, if the model predicts group membership accurately according to some
criteria, that is evidence that the model fits. Accurate vs. inaccurate classification does
not address our criteria for goodness-of-fit: that the distance between observed and
expected values may be unsystematic, and within the variation of the model.
Nonetheless, the classification table may be a useful adjunct to other measures based
more directly on residuals.

In summary, the classification table is most appropriate when

classification is a stated goal of the analysis; otherwise it should only supplement more
rigorous methods for assessing fit.
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Summary
This chapter delineates the methods for this research. A cross-sectional design is
used, and the hospital is the unit of analysis. Data sources are the 1990 AHA annual
survey, the Area Resource File, and the SNF data set from HCFA. The definitions and
measurements of the dependent as well as the independent variables for all the models
are specified. The selected variables are validated and finalized in model building.

Five

primary models and one interaction-term model are used to test the likelihood of three
forms of governance (hierarchy, hybrid, and market) by using multivariate logistic
regression analysis. The results of the series of analyses are reported in the next chapter.

Chapter 5
Results

This chapter presents the results of data management and statistical analysis,
including descriptive statistics, model building, and multivariate logistic regression
analysis. Data management is reported in terms of data sources and the process of data
merging. Descriptive statistics of the study population are presented to illustrate the
distribution of study variables.

In the section on model building, the results of

exploratory factor analysis are provided for construct validation. The results of univariate
logit regression, contingency table analysis, and collinearity diagnostics, are presented to
justify the modifications of final models. The findings of two-phase multivariate logit
regression analysis are then delineated. This chapter concludes with a summary of
statistical findings.
Descriptive Statistics
In this section, the data sources, the study population, and the distribution of study
variables are described.
Data Management and the Study Population
The unit of analysis was the individual hospital. Four data files: the AHA File
data, the ARF dataset, the HCFA SNF Minimum Data Set, and the state CON stringency

Ill
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The unit of analysis was the individual hospital. Four data files: the AHA File
data, the ARF Dataset, the HCFA SNF Minimum Data Set, and the state CON stringency
data file, were examined before they were merged. The unit of data collection varied by
data set -- it was "hospital" in the AHA File (county code was available); "county" in the
ARF Dataset; "skilled nursing facility" in the HCFA Minimum SNF Data Set (county
code was available); and "state" in the state CON stringency data. All variables in the
HCFA Minimum SNF Data Set were converted to county-based so that the first three
detests could be merged by county code. The merged dataset was then further merged
with the state CON stringency data by state.
Nationwide, 4,908 hospitals met the selection criteria -- being a general, acute,
non-federal hospital that had operated for at least one full year by the time of study. The
normality of continuous variables was examined through univariate analysis. Extreme
outliers were carefully investigated before being deleted. Nominal or ordinal variables
were examined through the frequency tables and bar charts. A hospital was deleted if any
of its key variables, namely Medicare discharges, affiliation with HMOs and PPOs,
locality, or swing bed status, were missing, because those variables were crucial to the
proposed multivariate regression models.
In total, 4, 703 hospitals in the 50 states and the District of Columbia were retained
for study. The geographic distribution of hospitals varied from region to region and state
to state. For example, there were 211 hospitals in the New England region, and 722
hospitals in the Southern Atlantic region. There was only one qualified hospital located
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in Alaska, but

351 hospitals and 400 hospitals in California and Texas, respectively.

About the same percentages of hospitals were located in rural
areas

(47.4%) and in urbanized

(52.6%). The average hospital size was 168 beds, with a standard deviation of 173

beds.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable was the arrangement that a hospital chose to provide
skilled nursing services to its medically ready discharged patients. Table

7 presents the

distribution of the three types of arrangements, namely, hierarchy, hybrid, and market.
For ease of identification, the hospitals that owned or operated at least one skilled nursing
facility were considered the

hierarchy group, representing the highest degree of vertical

integration; the hospitals that provided skilled nursing services through long-term
contracts or joint venture were considered the

hybrid group; and the hospitals that relied

solely on the spot market to provide skilled nursing services to discharged patients were
considered the

market group.

As shown in Table

7, there were 1,098 hospitals (23.3% of all study hospitals)

integrated with Medicare-certified SNFs, and

936 hospitals (19.9%) integrated with non

Medicare SNFs. Since the interest of the study was focused on the occurrence of an
event, namely, SNF integration, hospitals were considered as vertically integrating a SNF
regardless of the SNF's certification status.
In Table

7, the total number of hospitals that used the hierarchy arrangement was

the sum of the cells with darker shading, totaling

1,681 (35.7% of all hospitals). The

114

lighter shaded cells represent hospitals that used the hybrid arrangement, a total of 394
(8.4% of all hospitals). The last, white cell represents the majority of the study hospitals
(2,628 hospitals, 55.9% of all hospitals). These hospitals did not provide any
arrangement for skilled nursing services, but relied on the spot market.
There were five primary multivariate logistic regression models. Each of the five
models compared different contrasting groups. Model I compared the hierarchy/hybrid
group and the market group; Model 2 compared the hierarchy group and the market
group; Model 3 compared the hierarchy group and the hybrid group; Model 4 compared
the hybrid group and the market group; and Model 5 compared the hierarchy group and
the hybrid/market group.
Table 7
The Distribution of the Types of Medicare and Non-Medicare SNFs

Medicare-Certified SNF
Non-Medicare SNF

Hierarchy

Hybrid

Market

936 (19.9%)

Hierarchy
Hybrid

266

Market

30

Total

Total

1098 (23.3%)

320 (6.8%)

Likelihood ratio 1370.68; SIG: .0000
Hierarchy group

= (1098 + 936 ) -353 =1681

Hybrid group

= 266 + 98 +30 =394

Market group

= 2628

98

400 (8.5%)

3367 (71.6)

3285 (69.8%)

4703 (100%)
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Independent Variables
The descriptive statistics of independent and control variables are presented in
Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 describes means and standard deviations for continuous
variables, for the three subgroups as well as for the entire population. Table 9 presents
the distribution of polynomous and dichotomous variables in the same manner.
Selection of the hierarchical arrangement was hypothesized to be determined by
the uncertainty, specificity, and frequency of transactions. Transaction uncertainty was
measured by area average hospital occupancy rate, individual hospital occupancy rate,
SNF beds to elderly population ratio, SNF occupancy rate, and the percentage of
population below the poverty level. The means and standard deviations are shown in
Table 8. Overall, the average hospital occupancy rate in the county market area was
59.6%, with a standard deviation of 16.3%. The hybrid group had the highest area
average hospital occupancy rate (65.6%), as compared to the hierarchy group (58.9%)
and market group (59.3%). On average, there were 27 beds available per 1,000 older
adults. The average bed availability in the areas where hospitals used hierarchy
arrangements was 21 beds per 1,000 elderly persons. Availability was 34 and 29 beds per
1,000 elderly persons where hospitals took hybrid and market forms, respectively. The
ratio of SNF beds to the elderly population was transformed by taking the natural
logarithm to correct skewed distributions. Since the natural logarithm could be calculated
only on positive values, .0001 was added to the values of the relevant variables before
calculating the logarithm.
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The indicators of transaction specificity included the number of available geriatric
services and the availability of home health services. The two ordinal variables were
recoded as dummy variables. It should be noted that the recoding differed among the five
models. Models I and 4 differentiated two forms of providing geriatric services and
home services -- the market form vs. either the hierarchy or hybrid form. In Models I
and 4 the availability of a service was coded as "I" if provided in-house or through
contract, and as "0" if otherwise. In Models 2, 3, and 5, which differentiate differently
between the contracting forms -- the hierarchy form vs. the hybrid or market form, the
availability of a service was coded as "I" if provided in-house and as "0" if otherwise.
On average, all hospitals provided at least one geriatric service. In three groups,
the hybrid group offered more geriatric service items (3.09 in Models I and 4; 1.53 in
Models 2, 3, and 5) than the other two groups did. The market group provided the fewest
geriatric services (1.04 in Models I and 4; 0.99 in Models 2, 3, and 5).
For home services, substantial differences existed among the models. In Models
I and 4, home services were provided by 91.6% of the hospitals (36I out of 394) in the
hybrid group, by 68.I% of the hospitals (I,I4I out of I ,68I) in the hierarchy group, and
by 59.I% of the hospitals (I,555 out of 2,628) in the market group. In Models 2, 3 and
5, only 42.9% of the hierarchy group, 35.8% of the hybrid group, and 32.9% of the
market group provided home services. In general, fewer hospitals in the market group
provided home services.
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Table 8
M�ans and SD for ContinuQJJS Ind�p�nd�nt Variabl�s. b::t Arrang�ments Qf SNF Services

Arrangement of Skilled Nursing Services

ConstructsN ariables

Hierarchy

Hybrid

Market

Overall

(n=1681)

(n=394)

occupancy rate

.589(.167)

.656(.140)

.593(.163)

.596(.163)

Hospital occupancy rate

.483(.189)

.632(.176)

.556(.191)

.536(.195)

population ratio

.021(.024)

.034(.023)

.029(.022)

.027(.023)

SNF occupancy rate

.642(.200)

.766(.146)

.760(.168)

.727(.184)

.16(.06)

.14(.07)

.15(.07)

.15(.07)

3.09(2.55)

1.04(1.27)

1.34(1.66)

1.53(1.48)

.99(1.15)

1.08(1.28)

.44(.13)

.37(.12)

.39(.12)

.40(.13)

Hospital bedsize

123(!57)

252(194)

184(183)

168(173)

CON stringency score

6.97(3.55)

8.15(3.58)

7.71(3.69)

7.48(3.65)

(n=2628)

(N=4703)

Transaction Uncertainty
Area average hospital

SNF beds to elderly

Percentage of persons
below poverty level

Transaction Specificity
Number of geriatric services 1.41(1.69)
(for models I & 4)
Number of geriatric services 1.39(1.37)
(for models 2, 3 & 5)

Transaction Frequency
Proportion of Medicare
discharges to total

Control Variables

Note. ( )

=

Standard Deviation.
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The proportion of Medicare discharges (Table 8) and the affiliations with HMOs
and PPOs (Table 9) were used to measure transaction frequency. Overall, more than 40%
of discharged patients of all hospitals were Medicare beneficiaries. The percentage of
Medicare discharges was highest for the hierarchy group (44%), followed by the market
group (39%) and the hybrid group (37%). As for HMO and PPO affiliations, 47.3% of
all hospitals had formal contracts with HMOs, and 53.2% with PPOs. More hospitals in
the hybrid group were affiliated with HMOs (64.5%) and PPOs (60.2%) than in the
hierarchy group (HMO affiliation: 50.9%; PPO affiliation: 57.5%) or in the market group
(HMO affiliation: 37.5%; PPO affiliation: 45.0%). About 75% of hospitals in the hybrid
group were affiliated with either HMOs or PPOs.
To investigate the pure effect of the three theoretical constructs on hospitals'
decisions about providing SNF services, other hospital characteristics that might cause
variations in hospitals' decisions were included in the models as control variables, as
described in Table 9. More than half of the hospitals in the hierarchy group were certified
by HCF A to switch their acute beds to subacute beds. Many fewer hospitals in the hybrid
group (8.9%) and the market group (12.8%) were allowed to do so. The hybrid group
had the highest percentage of hospitals that were members of health systems. A majority
of hospitals in the hierarchy group (65.6%) were located in rural areas; much lower
percentages of the hybrid group (24.9%) and the market group (39.1 %) were. Overall,
about 60% of hospitals were non-profit hospitals, as compared to 28% of hospitals were
public hospitals.
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Table 9
Distribution Qf Pol;rnomous and DichotQmQl.!S Variables b;r Arrangements of SNF
Services
Arrangements of SNF Services

Constructs/Variables

Hierarchy

Hybrid

Market

Overall

(n=l681)

(n=394)

(n=2628)

(N=4703)

Transaction specificity

Availability of home health

1144

361

1555

3060

service (for models I & 4)

(68.1%)

(91.6%)

(59.2%)

(65.1%)

Availability of home health

721

141

865

1727

(35.8%)

(32.9%)

(36.7%)

633

254

1338

2225

(37.5%)

(64.5%)

(50.9%)

(47.3%)

757

237

1510

2504

(45.0%)

(60.2%)

(57.5%)

(53.2%)

909

294

1727

2930

(54.1%)

(74.6%)

(65.7%)

(62.3%)

798

35

337

1170

(52.5%)

(8.9%)

(12.8%)

(24.9%)

513

184

989

1686

(30.5%)

(46.7%)

(37.6%)

(35.9%)

1103

98

1028

2229

(65.6%)

(24.9%)

(39.1%)

(47.4%)

964

311

1520

2795

(57.3%)

(78.9%)

(57.8%)

(59.4%)

591

54

676

1321

(35.2%)

(13.7%)

(25.7%)

(28.1%)

service (for Models 2, 3 & 5) (42.9%)
Transaction frequency

Affiliation with HMO

Affiliation with PPO

Affiliation with HMO/PPO
Hospital characteristics

With swing beds

Member of health system

Rural location

Non-profit ownership

Governmental ownership
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Model Buildinji
This section first describes the grouping and validation of the proposed variables
by using exploratory factor analysis. Then findings of univariate logit regression
analysis, cross-tabular analysis, and bivariate analysis are presented. Correlation analysis
as well as collinearity diagnostics to detect possible collinearity problems are presented
next. The dimensionalities of the finalized variables are identified by another factor
analysis.
Grouping the Proposed Variables by Exploratory Factor Analysis
The major purpose of the study is to test the application of the three-construct
theoretical model developed from Williamson's transaction cost economics to the linkage
between hospitals and nursing homes. Whether the proposed variables tap the intended
construct is critical to the assessment. Factor analysis is an appropriate statistical tool for
testing the extent to which the multiple indicators measure the intended constructs. The
theoretically-derived dimensionality is strongly supported if the variables proposed for a
construct are grouped into one factor.
Table 10 presents the results of orthogonal varimax rotated principal component
factor analysis on all the proposed independent variables. Overall, the factor patterns
concur with the proposed taxonomy. The nine variables were loaded on four
unobservable common factors. Four factors explained 71.4% of the total variance, and
the sum of eigenvalues was 6.424. The details follow.
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Factor I accounted for 32.9% of the total variance, with an eigenvalue of 2.96.
The area average hospital occupancy rate and individual hospital occupancy rate, which
were proposed to measure transaction uncertainty and were grouped into Factor I, had
factor loadings of 0.875 and 0.854, respectively. The high loadings indicated a strong
relationship between the two indicators and the intended factor. Factor 2 accounted for
14.2%, with an eigenvalue of 1.275.

The ratio ofSNF beds to elderly population and the

SNF occupancy rate, which were also proposed to measure transaction uncertainty,
comprised Factor 2. Given the nature of the variables grouped together, Factor 1 could
be labeled as "demand uncertainty" and Factor 2 as "supply uncertainty."
Factor 3 accounted for 12.8% of total variances, with an eigenvalue of 1.152.
Two of the three variables proposed to measure transaction frequency on Factor 3 had
high factor loadings (HMO affiliation: 0.788; PPO affiliation: 0.875). The proportion of
Medicare discharges had a moderate loading (-0.337) on Factor 3. Therefore, Factor 3
can represent transaction frequency. Finally, Factor 4 accounted for 11.5% of total
variances, with an eigenvalue of 1.036. Two variables, the number of geriatric services
and the home health service availability, were grouped together (factor loadings 0.733
and 0.809, respectively.) Factor 4 represented transaction specificity.
In summary, the results of factor analysis supported the variables proposed to
measure their related constructs. The proposed variables appropriately measure the three
dimensions of transactions suggested by Williamson.
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Table 10
Factor Analysis for Proposed Independent Variables

Factor Loadings
F,

ConstructsN ariables

*

Communalities
h2

F

F3

F4

0.083

0.035

0.138

0.153

0.090

0.205

0.803

0.072

0.078

0.880

0.194

0.032

0.848

2

Transaction Uncertainty

1

Area hospital occupancy rate

0.875

Hospital occupancy rate

0.854

SNF-beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio

0.041

0.931

SNF occupancy rate

0.251

0.864

Availability of home health service

0.165

0.047

0.096

0.733

Number of geriatric services

0.018

0.047

0.075

0.809

1

0.794

Transaction Specificity

1

0.577
0.662

Transaction Frequency
-0.472

-0.094

-0.337

0.121

Affiliation with HMO

0.233

0.141

0.788

0.146

0.716

Affiliation with PPO

0.010

0.097

0.875

0.099

0.785

Factor contribution (eigenvalue)

2.961

1.275

1.152

1.036

6.424

32.9%

14.2%

12.8%

11.5%

71.4%

Proportion of Medicare discharges

Variance explained(%)

*

0.360

Vertical lines indicate large loadings.

Validation of Proposed Variables
Each variable was examined before being retained for the final multivariate logit
regression models. In order to validate the nominal, ordinal, polynomous, and continuous
variables with integer values, univariate logistic regression and a contingency table of
outcome variables (y

=

0, 1) versus the levels of the independent variables are provided.
.

'

•

.

'•.

i

'\
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Univariate logistic regression was performed upon each of the independent
variables except for cross-product terms. For nominal, ordinal, and continuous variables
with fewer integer values, a contingency table with the chi-square test was generated
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989). The predicted probability of SNF integration by selected
variables was plotted as supplemental to the contingency table. Bivariate analysis and
collinearity diagnostics were performed to examine the relationships between individual
variables as well as to detect potential collinearity problems. The dependent and
independent variables of Model I (hierarchy/hybrid vs. market) were used to perform the
validation procedure in preliminary analyses.
Univariate logit regression analysis.

Table II presents the results of univariate

logit regression analysis of all proposed independent variables except two within
construct interaction terms. The constant for each univariate regression model is not
presented, since this information is unnecessary for the analysis. All proposed variables
except the area average hospital occupancy rate had p-values at the .000 level, which was
much smaller than the recommended .25 cutpoint of p-value (Bendel & Afifi, 1977). It is
ascertained that all the proposed variables are associated with hospitals' make-or-buy
decisions about SNF to some extent. Therefore, all proposed variables should be
considered as candidates for predictor variables.
The results of univariate logistic regression are further demonstrated by the
probability plot. The probability scatterplot, done on the logit scale, is helpful in
illustrating not only the potential importance but also the appropriate scale of a variable
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(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989; Pindyck & Robinfeld, 1976). Examples are given of a
continuous variable (Figure 4) and a polynomous variable (Figure 5).
Table 11
Univariate Lo2it Regression for Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market Groups

ConstructsN ariables

Expected

Beta

P-value

Odds

s1gn

Ratio

Transaction Uncertainty
Area average hospital occupancy rate

+

0.333

0.065

1.395

Hospital occupancy rate

+

-1.191

0.000

0.304

SNF-beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio

-11.922

0.000

0.000

+

-1.514

0.000

0.220

Availability of home health service

+

0.600

0.000

1.822

Number of geriatric services

+

0.261

0.000

1.298

SNF occupancy rate
Transaction Specificity

Transaction Frequency
Proportion of Medicare discharges

+

2.654

0.000

14.215

Affiliation with HMO

+

-0.329

0.000

0.720

Affiliation with PPO

+

-0.385

0.000

0.681

Figure 4 shows the effect of Medicare discharges on the probability of SNF
integration. The probability rose with the increase of Medicare patients. Hospitals
without any Medicare patients were associated with .2 probability of vertical integration.
When more then 50% of hospitals' discharged patients were Medicare beneficiaries, the
probability rose to .50, an odds ratio equal to 1. The intercept indicates that hospitals
with 50% or more Medicare patients were more likely to vertically integrate skilled
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nursing facilities than were those with fewer than 50% Medicare patients. The
probability of vertical integration for hospitals with the highest proportion of Medicare
patients was .785, or an odds ratio of 3.65.
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Figure 4. The Effect of Proportion of Medicare Discharges on Probability of
Vertical Integration

Contingency table analysis.

Contingency table analysis was employed to

evaluate nominal, ordinal, and continuous variables with integer values. Taking the
variable, number of geriatric services, as an example, Table 12 portrays a 16-cell table
with the number of geriatric services ranging from 0 to 7. The far left of the table shows
that 682 of the 1,836 hospitals (37.1%) that provided no geriatric services chose
hierarchy/hybrid arrangements of SNF. Among the hospitals that offered three items of
geriatric services, more than half (180 out of 340) were in the hierarchy or hybrid group.
A majority (131 out of 135, or 97%) of hospitals that offered 7 items of geriatric services
were in the hierarchy/hybrid group.

126

Table 12
Contingency Table by Arran�ement of SNF and Number of Geriatric Services

Arran�ement of SNF

Number of Geriatric Services
2

0
Market
Hierarchy

3

4

5

6

1154

767

397

85

40

21

682

559

327

98

66

32

1836

1326

724

183

106

53

7

/Hybrid
Total

340

135

Likelihood Ratio 259.04; P-value =.000

Obviously, hospitals that offered more than three geriatric services tended to
employ hybrid or hierarchical arrangements. The association becomes stronger as the
number of available geriatric services increases. The chi-square test also supports an
association between the SNF arrangement and the number of geriatric services (not
reported). It can be concluded that the probability of taking vertical integration grows
with an increasing number of geriatric services.
Figure 5 illustrates a better picture of a probability plot, on a 0-to-7 scale, as
compared to Figure 4, on a 0-to-1 00 scale. The probability for a hospital to integrate
SNF services was .357 if it provided no geriatric service. The probability increased to
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.549 (OR> 1) if a hospital offered three geriatric services items. If a hospital provided
seven items of geriatric services, it was very likely to adopt the hierarchy arrangement
(probability= .775, OR= 3.44).
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Figure 5. The Effect ofNumber of Geriatric Services on Probability of
Vertical Integration

Table 13 depicts how the probability of a hospital's integration with a SNF
increased along with an increase in the number of geriatric services at the hospital. For
example, the probability increased from .357 to .419 between a hospital that provided no
geriatric services and a hospital that provided one item of geriatric services.
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Table

13

Probability of SNF Integration by Change in Number of Geriatric Services
Geriatric

Probability

Odds Ratio

Number of Hospitals

0.357
0.419
0.484
0.549
0.612
0.672
0.727
0.775

0.556
0.721
0.936
1.216
1.578
2.048
1.946
3.460

1836
1326
724
340
183
106
53
135

services

0
2
3
4
5
6
7

Bivariate analysis.

Correlation analysis was performed to detect potential

collinearity problems. Table

14 presents the correlation matrix of the proposed

independent variables. The relationship between each two proposed variables was
examined without controlling for other variables.
Overall, all variables were moderately and positively correlated except the
proportion of Medicare discharges (MCR_D). The availability of home health services
(HOME I ) had the least correlated relationship with other variables. It should be noted
_

that the within-construct variables were more highly correlated than the betweenconstruct variables. For example, the four variables representing transaction uncertainty
were highly interrelated: individual hospital occupancy rate (H OPY) and area average
_

hospital occupancy rate (AH OPY) had a correlation coefficient of
_

another high correlation coefficient,

0.6887 (p = .00 I);

0.6965, was found between the ratio of skilled
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nursing beds to elderly population (SNF_OLD) and the area SNF beds occupancy rate
(SNF_OPY).
Table 14
Correlation Matrix for Proposed Independent Variables
AH OPY

H OPY

SNF OLD SNF OPY GI INDX
-

-

HOME MCR D

HMO

PPO

AH OPY
H OPY

0.6887

P=.OOO
SNF OLD

SNF OPY

Gl INDX

HOME

MCR D

HMO

PPO

0.1478

0.1942

P= .000

P= .000

0.291

0.3657

0.6965

P=.OOO

P=.OOO

P=.OOO

0.2074

0.2413

0.121

0.1273

P=.OOO

P=.OOO

P=.OOO

P= .000

0.1259

0.2002

0.1026

0.0907

0.2633

P=.OOO

P=.OOO

P=.OOO

P= .000

P=.OOO

-0.2288

-0.2912

-0.1495

-0.2275

-0.104 -0.0691

P=.OOO

P= .000

P=.OOO

P= .000

P=.OOO P=.OOO

0.2861

0.3071

0.2156

0.325

P=.OOO

P=.OOO

P=.OOO

P= .000

0.1222

0.1795

0.1655

0.2613

P=.OOO

P=.OOO

P=.OOO

P= .000

0.1566

-0.2351

P=.OOO P= .000

P=.OOO

0.2095

0.1375

-0.1798

0.5244

P=.OOO P= .000

P= .000

P= .000

0.1402

Note. 4,703 observations in all cells.

HMO affiliation and PPO affiliation, likewise, were highly correlated. The high
correlation coefficients only imply rather than confirm the existence of collinearity. Two
variables are considered collinear with each other only when their correlation coefficient
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reaches 0.95, which means one of the variables can convey essentially all of the
information contained in the other (Afifi & Clark, 1990).
Collinearity dia!inostic analysis.

The results of collinearity diagnostic are shown

in Table 15. Two rules were followed to determine whether collinearity existed among
variables. The first section of Table 15 shows, for certain variables, the amounts of
variance that are explained by each group. Across a group, any pair of variables that have
similar amounts of variance are considered collinear (Andrew, 1992). The second rule
states that the variable with the smallest tolerance, or the largest values of variance
inflation factor (VIF), may have collinearity problems (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner,
1990).
Applying the first rule, three pairs of variables might be collinear -- area average
hospital occupancy rate (.407) and individual hospital occupancy rate (.760) in group 6;
ratio ofSNF-bed-to-elderly-population (.538) andSNF occupancy rate (.828) in group 8;
and HMO affiliation (.587) and PPO affiliation (.720) in group 9. Applying the second
rule, SNF occupancy rate has the smallest tolerance (0.437), and the largest VIF (2.290),
and hospital occupancy rate has the second smallest tolerance (0.466) and the second
largest VIF (2.144).
The results of the correlation matrix and collinearity diagnostics were taken into
account in deciding which variables were highly collinear with others. Individual
hospital occupancy rate andSNF occupancy rate were both highly correlated with other
variables, and had small tolerances and large VIF. In order to stabilize the estimated
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regression coefficients, hospital occupancy rate and skilled nursing bed occupancy rate
were removed from the original models (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990). Since the
nature of HMO affiliation and of PPO affiliation were different and their VIF values were
not higher than those of other variables, both were retained.

Table 15
MultiQollinearit� Diagnostic for PropQsed lndepend�nt Variables

Group

AH-OPY H-OPY

SNF

SNF

OLD

OPY

GI

HOME 1 MCR D HMO

PPO

INDX

1

0.001

0.001

0.003

0.002

0.005

0.004

0.001

0.004

0.004

2

0.002

0.002

0.000

0.000

0.003

0.015

0.018

0.243

0.166

.)"

0.000

0.000

0.041

0.017

0.711

0.028

0.001

0.000

0.005

4

0.002

0.001

0.217

0.045

0.143

0.026

0.014

0.014

0.063

5

0.005

0.004

0.019

0.000

0.091

0.897

0.016

0.002

0.000

6

0.002

0.005

0.009

0.000

0.024

0.004

0.002

0.587

0.720
0.008

7

0.023

0.109

0.168

0.104

0.011

0.000

0.198

0.142

8

0.027

0.068

0.538

0.828

0.010

0.012

0.058

0.002

0.011

9

0.407

0.760

0.003

0.002

0.000

0.001

0.295

0.002

0.001

10

0.532

0.050

0.003

0.002

0.001

0.013

0.396

0.004

0.021

Tolerance

0.514

0.466

0.506

0.437

0.874

0.899

0.879

0.639

0.706

VIF

1.946

2.144

1.978

2.290

1.145

1.113

1.137

1.564

1.416

Note. Large values are in bold type.
Horizontal lines indicate large variance in those horizontal groups.

Dimensionalization of modified variables.

Factor analysis was performed again

with two variables -- individual hospital occupancy rate and area SNF occupancy rate -deleted because of their collinearity. The seven remaining variables were grouped into
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three factors as shown in Table 16. Two variables, HMO affiliation and PPO affiliation,
were identified as Factor I, accounting for 30.9% of the total variance. Three variables,
area hospital occupancy rate, the ratio of SNF beds to elderly population, and the
proportion of Medicare discharges, comprised Factor 2, explaining 15.3% of the total
variance. The number of geriatric services and the availability of home health services
were grouped into Factor 3, accounting for 13.7% of the total variance. Compared to the
results of factor analysis in Table I 0, less of the total variance was explained.
Nevertheless, three factor patterns tapped the proposed constructs fairly well.

Table 16
Factor Anal�sis for Modified Independent Variables
Communalities
h2

Factor Loadings*
ConstructsN ariables

Fl

Transaction Uncertainty

F

F3

2

Area hospital occupancy rate

0.005

0.729

SNF-beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio

0.246

0.421

1

0.236

0.588

0.090

0.246

Transaction Specificity
Number of geriatric services

0.063

0.200

0.746

Availability of home health service

0.116

-0.031

0.799

1

0.601
0.652

Transaction Frequency
Proportion of Medicare discharges

1

-0.135

-0.743

0.094

0.579

Affiliation with HMO

0.784

0.289

0.141

0.718

Affiliation with PPO

0.896

0.043

0.062

0.809

Factor contribution (eigenvalue)
Variance explained (%)
*Vertical lines indicate large loadings.

2.161

1.071

.961

30.9%

15.3%

13.7%

4.193
59.6%
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Multivariate Logistic Regression Analyses
Two-phase multivariate logistic regression was performed to examine the
simultaneous influences of the three constructs on the likelihood of SNF integration.
Five primary models were analyzed at the first stage; analysis of the two models that
included only the first-order and the second-order interaction effects followed at the
second stage. This section first briefly introduces the model refinement. The results of
the five primary models and the two interaction models are then reported.
Refinement of Models
In the initial run, the seven variables surviving the validation procedure were
entered into the multivariate logistic regression model. The expected signs and
significance levels for all variables and a statistical summary of each model were
examined. Among all independent and control variables across all the five primary
models, variables of the frequency construct had the smallest effects on hospitals' vertical
integration. Of the three variables, only Medicare discharge proportion was influential on
hospitals' integration decisions. Almost every variable in the constructs of transaction
uncertainty and transaction specificity was significantly associated with SNF integration.
However, the chi-square goodness-of-fit was not satisfactory. To improve the model fit,
two dummy variables, HMO affiliation and PPO affiliation, were combined into one
variable, HMO/PPO, to represent a hospital's involvement with managed care.
HMO/PPO was coded as I if a hospital was affiliated with either HMOs or PPOs.
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Although HMOs and PPOs differ in nature, they are both likely to pressure hospitals to
discharge patients as soon as their stay is no longer medically necessary.
Phase One: Five Primary Multivariate Lo�istic Re2ression Models
Tables 17-21 present the results of the five primary multivariate logistic
regression models, and show the likelihood of vertical integration of a skilled nursing
facility to be contingent on transaction uncertainty, transaction specificity, and transaction
frequency while controlling for seven hospital characteristics. The results of Model 1,
which compared the hierarchy/hybrid and market groups, are presented in Table 17; the
results of Model 2, which compared the hierarchy with market groups, are in Table 18;
the results of Model 3, which compared the hierarchy and hybrid groups, are in
Table 19; the results of Model 4, which compared the hybrid and market groups, are in
Table 20; the results of Model 5, which compared the hierarchy and hybrid/market
groups, are in Table 21. Finally, Table 24 summarizes the results of the five primary
models.
Model I: Hierarchy and hybrid vs. market.

All of the variables that measured

transaction uncertainty were statistically significantly associated with a higher likelihood
of vertical integration (Table 17). Area average hospital occupancy was statistically
significant and positively associated with the event (p

=

.000). Hospitals located in

market areas with higher hospital occupancy were about 37% more likely to employ the
hierarchy or hybrid arrangement for every 10% increase in average occupancy rate, as
compared to those located in areas with relatively lower hospital occupancy (OR= 1.37;
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95% CIE: 1.30, 1.44 ). The ratio of SNF beds to elderly population was negatively

associated with the probability of vertical integration (p = .000; OR= 0.81; 95% CIE:
0.76, 0.86), meaning a hospital was less likely to integrate a SNF in a market area that

had a higher ratio of SNF beds to elderly population. The interaction of the below
poverty-level-population and SNF bed supply was positively related to SNF integration
(p=.OOI, OR= 1.00; 95% CIE: 1.00, 1.00).
Two variables measuring transaction specificity both had significant and positive
relationships with the likelihood of vertical integration. For every additional item of
geriatric service a hospital offered, there was about 41% greater likelihood that it would
use a hierarchy or hybrid arrangement (p = .000; OR= 1.41; 95% CIE: 1.34, 1.47).
Hospitals offering home care services (either in-house or through contract/joint venture)
were almost 1.8 times as likely to vertically integrate a SNF as were hospitals that did not
offer home care services (p = .000; OR= 1.81; 95% CIE: 1.55, 2.10).
Only one out of the three variables that measured transaction frequency was
significantly and positively associated with the probability of vertical integration. For
every 10% increase in elderly patients served, hospitals were about 13% more likely to
take control over the SNF services, as compared to hospitals with relatively smaller
proportions of Medicare patients (p = .00 I; OR= 1.13; 95% CIE: 1.05, 1.23). Neither
affiliation with managed care organizations nor the cross-term of Medicare discharges
and hospital size had significant impact on SNF integration.
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Table

17

Model I: Likelihood of SNF Integration : Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market Groups

ili=4,7Q3)
Expected

ConstructsN ariables

Beta

P-Value

Odds

Sign

95% CIE

Ratio

Transaction Uncertainty
+

3.125
-0.213
0.000

0.000
0.000
0.001

1.37*
0.81
1.00

1.30, 1.44
0.76, 0.86
1.00, 1.00

0.341
0.591

0.000
0.000

1.41
1.82

1.34, 1.47
1.55, 2.10

1.258
0.067
0.001

0.001
0.400
0.696

1.13*
1.07
1.00

1.05, 1.23
0.91, 1.25
1.00, 1.00

Not-for-profit ownership

-0.064
-0.001
1.439
0.054
0.597
0.400
0.433

0.000
0.074
0.000
0.488
0.000
0.003
0.000

0.94
1.00**
4.22
1.06
1.82
1.49
1.54

0.92, 0.96
0.89, 1.00
3.49,5.10
0.91,1.23
1.51,2.19
1.14,1.94
1.22, 1.95

Constant

-4.308

0.000

Area hospital occupancy rate
SNF-beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio

+

Cross term of% of poor persons
and ratio of beds to elderly popu.
Transaction Specificity
Number of geriatric services

+

Availability of home care service

+

Transaction Frequency
Proportion of Medicare discharges

+

Affiliation with HMO/PPO

+

Cross term of Medicare discharges and

+

hospital size
Control Variables
State CON stringency score
Beds set up and staffed
Availability of swing beds
Member of health system
Located in rural area
Governmental ownership

Goodness of Fit Statistic
Chi-Square

(15 dt)

Correct Classification Rate

1154.1 (p
70.23%

=

.000)

* Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= I 0%.
** Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= 50 beds.
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Overall, Model I was successful in testing the theory, according to goodness of fit
statistics. The correct classification rate as shown in the classification table, which
indicates the number of correctly predicted ("concordant") cases, is one of the goodness
of fit indices. A total of 70.23% of the observations in Model I were classified correctly.
The model chi-square value was 1154.1 with 16 degrees of freedom. The inclusion of
continuous variables in this study created numerous covariate patterns, which may cause
the extremely high chi-square value. The dependent and independent variables of Model
1 (hierarchy/hybrid vs. market) were used to evaluate first-order and second-order
interaction effects in Model 6 and Model 7.
Model 2: Hierarchy vs. market.

Table 18 presents the likelihood of integrating a

SNF for the hierarchy and market groups. The results were very similar to those for the
previous model. All of the variables that measured transaction uncertainty had significant
and independent relationships with the likelihood of integration. Hospitals located in
market areas with higher hospital occupancy were about 41% more likely to employ the
hierarchy arrangement for every 10% increase in average occupancy rate, as compared to
those located in areas with relatively lower hospital occupancy (p = .000; OR= 1.41;
95% CIE: 1.33, 1.49). The ratio of SNF beds to elderly population, which measured the
supply of SNF beds, had a significant and negative association with SNF integration (p =
.000; OR= .79; 95% CIE: 0.74, 0.84). The variable measuring nursing homes' behaviors
had a significantly positive, but light impact on SNF integration (p = .000; OR= 1.00;
95% CIE: 1.00, 1.00).

138

Two variables (the number of geriatric services and the availability of home care
services) that represented transaction specificity had significant and positive effects on
SNF integration. For every additional item of geriatric services that hospitals offered, a
hospital was 36% more likely to adopt a hierarchical arrangement for SNF services
(p = .000; OR= 1.36; 95% CIE: 1.28, 1.44). The availability of home care service,
another transaction specificity variable, also had a significant and positive association
with SNF integration. Hospitals with home care services were 37% more likely to have
hospital-owned SNFs than were those without home services (p = .000; OR= 1.37; 95%
CIE: 1.18, 1.60).
Of the three variables measuring transaction frequency, only the Medicare
discharge proportion was positively associated with SNF integration. For every I 0%
increase in elderly patients served, hospitals were about 14% more likely to have
hierarchical arrangements for SNF services, as compared to hospitals with relatively
smaller proportions of Medicare patients (p = .000; OR= 1.14; 95% CIE: 1.05, 1.23).
Neither affiliation with managed care organizations nor the cross-product term of
Medicare discharges and hospital size had any impact on the probability of SNF
integration.
2
The higher chi-square value (X = 1,138.7, p = .000) indicates an unsatisfactory
model fit. The high chi-square may be due to the inclusion of many continuous variables
in the model. Nonetheless, comparing the predicted probabilities and observed responses,
the 72.69% correct classification rate indicates a high prediction accuracy.
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Table 18
Model 2: Likelihood of SNF Inte�ration: Hierarchy vs. Market Groups (N=4.703)

Expected

ConstructsN ariables

Beta

P-Value

Odds

Sign

95% CIE

Ratio

Transaction Uncertainty
+

3.411

0.000

1.41*

-0.239

0.000

0.79

0.74, 0.84

+

0.001

0.000

1.00

1.00, 1.00

Number of geriatric services

+

0.305

0.000

1.36

1.28, 1.44

Availability of home care service

+

0.317

0.000

1.37

1.18, 1.60

1.05, 1.23

Area hospital occupancy rate
SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio
Cross term of % of poor persons

1.33, 1.49

and ratio of beds to elderly popu.

Transaction Specificity

Transaction Frequency
Proportion of Medicare discharges

+

1.270

0.003

1.14*

Affiliation with HMO/PPO

+

0.123

0.149

1.13

0.96, 1.34

Cross term of Medicare discharges and

+

0.003

0.227

1.00

1.00, 1.0 I

State CON stringency score

-0.079

0.000

0.92

0.90, 0.94

Beds set up and staffed

-0.002

0.021

0.99**

0.85, 0.99

Availability of swing beds

1.516

0.000

4.55

3.75, 5.53

Member of health system

0.033

0.699

1.03

0.87, 1.22

Located in rural area

0.700

0.000

2.01

1.65, 2.46

Governmental ownership

0.358

0.013

1.43

1.08, 1.90

1.46

1.14, 1.88

hospital size

Control Variables

Not-for-profit ownership
Constant

0.380

0.003

-4.385

0.000

Goodness of Fit Statistic
Chi-Square (15 dt)

1138.7 (p= .000)

Correct Classification Rate

72.69%

* Odds ratio and 95% C. I.E. based on continuous interval= I 0%.
** Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= 50 beds.
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Model 3: Hierarchy vs. hybrid.

The comparison of hierarchy and hybrid was

focused on two groups with different degrees of SNF integration. Table 19 presents how
the three transaction constructs influenced hospitals' forms of SNF services. All of the
three variables measuring transaction uncertainty were significantly associated with a
higher likelihood of SNF integration. Hospitals located in market areas with higher
hospital occupancy were about 21% more likely to employ fully owned SNF services for
every I0% increase in average occupancy rate, as compared to those located in areas with
relatively lower hospital occupancy (p

=

.00 I; OR= 1.21; 95% CIE: 1.08, 1.35). The

ratio of SNF beds to elderly population was negatively associated with the probability of
integration, meaning that a hospital was less likely to integrate SNF in a market area with
a higher ratio of SNF beds to elderly population (p

=

.000; OR= .69; 95% CIE: 0.60,

0.80). The last variable, the cross-product term of below-poverty-level population and
the availability of SNF beds, was significantly associated with the likelihood of
integration (p

=

.00 I; OR= 1.00; 95% CIE: 1.00, 1.00).

With respect to the two variables measuring asset specificity, hospitals that
provided home health care services were about 55% more likely to own SNFs than were
those that contracted out for home health care services (p = .001; OR= 1.55; 95% CIE:

1.19, 2.02). The number of geriatric services a hospital offered was marginally
significantly associated with the likelihood of SNF integration (p = .080; OR= 1.09; 95%

CIE: 0.99, 1.19).
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Table 19
Model3: Likelihood of SNF Inte[iration: Hierarchy vs. Hybrid Groups (N=2.075)

Expected

ConstructsNariables

Beta

P-Value

Odds

Sign

95% CIE

Ratio

Transaction Uncertainty
+

I .888

0.001

I .21*

I .08, I .35

-0.371

0.000

0.69

0.60, 0.80

+

0.001

0.001

1.00

I .00, I .00

Number of geriatric services

+

0.082

0.080

1.09

0.99, 1.19

Availability of home care service

+

0.437

0.001

I .55

1.19, 2.02

Proportion of Medicare discharges

+

1.474

0.066

I. 16*

0.99, I .36

Affiliation with HMO/PPO

+

0.115

0.473

1.12

0.82, I .53

Cross term of Medicare discharges and

+

0.003

0.351

1.00

1.00, 1.0 I

State CON stringency score

-0.101

0.000

0.90

0.87, 0.94

Beds set up and staffed

-0.002

0.099

0.99**

0.80. 1.02

Availability of swing bed

1.401

0.000

4.06

2.60, 6.34

Member of health system

0.63, I .09

Area hospital occupancy rate
SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio
Cross term of % of poor persons
and ratio of beds to elderly
Transaction Specificity

Transaction Frequency

hospital size
Control Variables

-0.185

0.181

0.83

Located in rural area

0.869

0.000

2.38

I .65. 3.44

Governmental ownership

0.164

0.569

1.18

0.67, 2.07

Not-for-profit ownership

-0.347

0. !55

0.71

0.44, 1.14

Constant

-0.748

0.171

Goodness of Fit Statistic

Chi-Square (15 df)

416.0 (p= .000)

Correct Classification Rate

81.40%

* Odds ratio and 95% C. I.E. based on continuous interval= I 0%.
** Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= 50 beds.
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None of the transaction frequency variables had a significant association with the
likelihood of SNF integration. However, the proportion of Medicare discharges tended to
be positively associated with SNF integration (p = .066). In other words, hospitals that
served more Medicare beneficiaries tended to seek more control over the SNF.
The chi-square of 416.0 was much smaller than that in the previous two models.
The substantial drop of the chi-square value may be due to the reduced number of cases.
Comparing the predicted probabilities and observed responses, overall, 81.40% were
correct.
Model 4: Hybrid vs. market.

This model examined the likelihood of vertical

integration in the hybrid and market groups (Table 20). Two out of the three variables
measuring transaction uncertainty and both variables measuring transaction specificity
were significantly associated with the event of integration. None of the variables from
the transaction frequency construct had any association with SNF integration.
Area hospital occupancy rate, which measured transaction uncertainty, was, as
expected, positively associated with the probability of integration. Hospitals located in
market areas with higher hospital occupancy were about 15% more likely to employ
vertical integration arrangements for SNF services for every 10% increase in average
occupancy rate, as compared to those located in areas with relatively lower hospital
occupancy (p

=

.022; OR= 1.15; 95% CIE: 1.02, 1.29). The cross-product term of the

below-poverty-level-population and the ratio of SNF beds to elderly population was
significantly but negatively (i.e., opposite to the expected sign) associated with
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integration. This finding indicates that hospitals were less likely to employ SNF
integration if confronting SNF providers' behavioral uncertainty. Nonetheless, the
probabilities of selecting either option (hybrid or market form) were very close (p

.021;

=

OR= 1.00; 95% CIE: 1.00, 1.00).
Both variables that represented transaction specificity had a significant and
positive association with SNF integration. For every additional item of geriatric service
hospitals offered their patients, hospitals were 68% more likely to use a hierarchical
arrangement for SNF services (p = .000; OR= 1.68; 95% CIE: 1.57, 1.79). Home care
service, another transaction specificity variable, also had a significant and positive impact
on SNF integration. Hospitals with hospital-based or contracted home services were
almost 4.16 times as likely to own a SNF as were those without home services (p

=

.000;

OR= 4.16; 95% CIE: 2.81, 6.14).
Model 4 had a relatively lower chi-square of 516.5 as compared with the previous
models. The correct prediction percentage was much higher than for the previous three
models. In total, 89% of observations were correctly classified.
Model 5: Hierarchy vs. hybrid and market.

Model 5 tested the probability of

using vertical integration for the hierarchy group and for the hybrid/market group (Table
21). All transaction uncertainty variables were significantly associated with SNF
integration. Hospitals located in market areas with higher hospital occupancy were about
39% more likely to vertically integrate SNF services for every I 0% increase in average
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Table 20
Model 4: Likelihood of SNF Inte2ration: Hybrid vs. Market Groups (N=3.022)

Expected

ConstructsN ariables

Beta

P-Value

Odds

Sign

95% CIE

Ratio

Transaction Uncertainty
1.374

0.022

1.15*

0.146

0.082

1.16

0.98, 1.36

+

-0.001

0.021

1.00

1.00, 1.00

Number of geriatric services

+

0.516

0.000

1.68

1.57, 1.79

Availability of home care service

+

1.425

0.000

4.16

2.81, 6.14

Area hospital occupancy rate

+

SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio
Cross term of % of poor persons

1.02, 1.29

and ratio of beds to elderly popu.
Transaction Specificity

Transaction Frequency
Proportion of Medicare discharges

+

0.058

0.946

1.01*

0.85, 1.19

Affiliation with HMO/PPO

+

-0.114

0.468

0.89

0.66, 1.21

Cross term of Medicare discharges and

+

-0.002

0.578

1.00

0.99, 1.00

hospital size
Control Variables
0.024

0.217

1.03

0.99, 1.06

-0.001

0.517

0.99**

0.88, 1.07

Availability of swing beds

0.148

0.526

1.16

0.73, 1.83

Member of health system

0.278

0.035

1.32

1.02, 1.71
0.66, 1.41

State CON stringency score
Beds set up and staffed

-0.035

0.857

0.97

Governmental ownership

0.185

0.512

1.20

0.69, 2.09

Not-for-profit ownership

0.477

0.041

1.61

1.02, 2.54

-5.137

0.000

Located in rural area

Constant
Goodness of Fit Statistic
Chi-Square (15 df)

516.5 (p

Correct Classification Rate

89.48%

=

.000)

* Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= 10%.
** Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval = 50 beds.
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occupancy rate, as compared to those located in areas with relatively lower hospital
occupancy (p = .000; OR= 1.39; 95% CIE: 1.13, 1.47). The ratio of SNF beds to elderly
population had a negative influence on hospitals' decisions to use hierarchical
arrangements (p = .000; OR= 0.78; 95% CIE: 0.73, 0.82). The cross-product term of the
percentage of population below the poverty level and the ratio of SNF beds to elderly
population had a positive impact on the event. This finding indicates that hospitals facing
·higher behavioral uncertainty of nursing home providers were almost equally as likely to
take control of SNF services as were those that did not confront such uncertainty (p =
.000; OR= 1.00; 95% CIE: 1.00, 1.00). Nonetheless, the behavioral uncertainty of
nursing home providers still contributed to the likelihood of SNF integration.
Two variables measuring transaction specificity both had significant and positive
relationships with the likelihood of vertical integration. For every additional item of
geriatric service a hospital offered, it was 31% more likely to use the hierarchical form of
SNF services (p = .000, OR= 1.31; 95% CIE: 1.24, 1.39). Hospitals offering home care
services were almost 40% more likely to vertically integrate a SNF than were hospitals
that did not offer home care services (p = .000; OR= 1.40; 95% CIE: 1.21, 1.62).
Only one transaction frequency variable turned out to be significant. For every
I0% increase in elderly patients served, hospitals were about 14% more likely to take
control over the SNF services, as compared to hospitals with relatively smaller
proportions of Medicare patients (p = .00 I; OR= 1.14; 95% CIE: 1.05, 1.24). Neither
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Table 21

MQds:l 5; Liks:lihQQd Qf SNF Ints:gratiQn; His:rar�h:Y vs. H:Ybrid/Market GrQups (N=4,703)

Expected

Constructs/Variables

Beta

P-Value

Odds

Sign

95% CIE

Ratio

Transaction Uncertainty
+

3.283

0.000

1.39*

1.31, 1.47

-0.254

0.000

0.78

0.73, 0.82

+

0.001

0.000

1.00

1.00, 1.00

Number of geriatric services

+

0.272

0.000

1.31

1.24, 1.39

Availability of home care service

+

0.339

0.000

1.40

1.21' 1.62

Proportion of Medicare discharges

+

1.332

0.001

1.14*

1.05, 1.24

Affiliation with HMO/PPO

+

0.128

0.124

1.14

0.97, 1.34

Cross term of Medicare discharges and

+

0.002

0.298

1.00

1.00, 1.01

State CON stringency score

-0.079

0.000

0.92

0.90, 0.94

Beds set up and staffed

-0.002

0.016

0.99**

0.85, 0.99

1.491

0.000

4.44

3.68, 5.36
0.84, 1.16

Area hospital occupancy rate
SNF-beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio
Cross term of % of poor persons
and ratio of beds to elderly popu.

Transaction Specificity

Transaction Frequency

hospital size

Control Variables

Availability of swing beds

-0.011

0.899

0.99

Located in rural area

0.713

0.000

2.04

1.68, 2.48

Governmental ownership

0.316

0.026

1.37

1.05, 1.79

0.295

0.020

1.34

1.05, I. 72

-4.345

0.000

Member of health system

Not-for-profit ownership
Constant

Goodness of Fit Statistic
Chi-Square (15 df)
Correct Classification Rate

1209.6 (p= .000)
74.17%

* Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval

=

10%.

** Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= 50 beds.
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HMO/PPO affiliation nor the interaction of Medicare discharges and hospital size had
any impact.
Overall, Model 5 was successful in testing the theory, according to goodness of fit
statistics. The model chi-square was I ,209.6 with 15 degrees of freedom (p

=

.000).

About 74.17% of cases were correctly predicted.
Phase Two: Models with Inter-Construct Interaction Effects
Tables 22 and 23 present the results for the second stage of multivariate logistic
regression analysis, which examined the inter-construct interaction effects on the
likelihood of SNF integration. For each construct in Model I, the variable with the
highest odds ratio and/or the greatest partial

2
R was selected for the second stage of

multivariate logistic regression models. The rationale behind this selection was that a
variable with the greater predictive power (as judged by high odds ratios and partial

2
R )

was assumed to be the most representative of a construct. These variables, named as
"Interactors," were used to test the conceptual model.
For the first-order interaction model, three interactors were created. For each
interactor, the most representing variable was selected from each of two of the three
constructs; these three pairs were each multiplied, to create the Interactors. For the
second-order interaction model, variables from each of three constructs were multiplied
to form one interactor. Using the selection rules, the variables of area average hospital
occupancy rate, home care service, and proportion of Medicare discharges were chosen to
represent the respective constructs.
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Hierarchy/hybrid vs. market arrangements were the two forms compared.
Because the interaction terms were the focal interest, they were considered as
"independent predictors" instead of confounders, and the variables that had been
hypothesized to have main effects (e.g., area average hospital occupancy) were removed
from the models. The applicability of keeping only the interaction terms in a logistic
regression model has been confirmed by other studies (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990;
Pindyck & Robinfeld, 1976).
Model 6: First-order interaction. Table 22 presents the likelihood of SNF
integration, using the first-order interaction term without measuring main effects while
controlling for seven hospital characteristic variables. Two out of the three interactors
had significant associations with SNF integration. InteractorAH_orv

x

GI_INDX• the

interaction term of the area hospital occupancy rate and the ratio of SNF beds to elderly
population, was significantly and positively associated with the hospital's decision to
integrate (p

=

.000; OR= 1.65; 95% CIE: 1.43, 1.89). InteractorGI_INDX MCR_D• the
x

interaction of the number of geriatric services and the proportion of Medicare discharges,
also had a significant impact on SNF integration (p

=

.000; OR= 39.05; 95% CIE: 17.84,

85.50). A hospital was more likely to use vertical integration if it provided more geriatric
services and had more Medicare discharges.
Overall, Model 6 was successful in testing the theory, according to goodness of fit
statistics. The model chi-square was 978.7 with I 0 degrees of freedom (p= .000). About

70% of cases were correctly predicted.
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Table 22
Model 6: Likelihood of SNF lnte�ration with the First-Order Interaction Terms
(Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market. N=4.703)

Expected

Variables

Beta

P-Value

Sign

Odds

95% CIE

Ratio

Interaction Effects
InteractorAH_orv
InteractorAH_OPY
InteractorGI INDX

x

x

x

GI_INDX

+

0.499

0.000

1.65

MCR_D

+

0.104

0.361

1.11

MCR_D

+

3.665

0.000

39.05

1.43, 1.89
0.89, 1.39
17.84, 85.50

Control Variables
State CON stringency score

-0.064

0.000

0.94

0.92, 0.96

Beds set up and staffed

-0.001

0.032

1.00

0.95, 1.00

Availability of swing beds

1.392

0.000

4.02

3.38, 4.79

Member of health system

0.101

0.190

I. II

0.95, 1.29

Located in rural area

0.564

0.000

1.76

1.49, 2.08

Governmental ownership

0.501

0.000

1.65

1.28, 2.13

Not-for-profit ownership

0.581

0.000

1.79

1.43, 2.24

-2.167

0.000

Constant
Goodness of fit Statistic
Chi-Square (I 0 df)

978.7 (p=.000)

Correct Classification Rate

69.85%

Model 7: Second-order interaction. The interaction effect of the same three
variables selected for the first-order interaction model was tested in the second-order
interaction model. Table 23 presents results of the hypothesis testing. The interaction
effect was significantly and positively associated with SNF integration (p= .000; OR=

ISO

4.40; 95% CIE: 3.67, 5.27). Hospitals located in areas with high average hospital
occupancy and having more geriatric services and a higher proportion of Medicare
discharges were more likely to vertically integrate SNF services. In other words,
hospitals with high levels of all three variables are the most likely candidates for
hierarchy or hybrid groups.

Table 23
Model 7: Likelihood of SNF Intefiration with the Second Order Interaction Term
(Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market. N=4.703)

Expected

Variables

Beta

P-Value

Odds

95% CIE

Ratio

Sign

Interaction Effects
InteractorAH_OPY

x

Gl INDX

x

MCR o

+

1.481

0.000

4.40

3.67, 5.27

0.94, 0.97

Control Variables
-0.047

0.000

0.95

Beds set up and staffed

0.000

0.070

1.00

0.96, 1.00

Availability of swing beds

1.395

0.000

4.04

3.40, 4.79

Member of health system

0.099

0.191

1.10

0.95, 1.28

State CON stringency score

Located in rural area

0.466

0.000

1.59

1.35, 1.88

Governmental ownership

0.485

0.000

1.63

1.26, 2.09

Not-for-profit ownership

0.634

0.000

1.89

1.51, 2.36

-1.420

0.000

Constant

Goodness of fit Statistic
Chi-Square

(I 0 df)

Correct Classification Rate

880.8 (p =.000)
69.53%
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Control Variables
Finally, several control variables were consistently positively and significantly
associated withSNF integration; they include state CON stringency, the availability of
swing beds, and hospital location. State certificate-of-need stringency scores, indicative
of restrictions on the construction or expansion of health care facilities, had a negative
and significant association withSNF integration. In other words, hospitals located in the
states with stringent restrictions on health care facilities were less likely to take on
ownership ofSNFs. On the other hand, a hospital's swing bed status and location were
positively related withSNF integration. Hospitals that were allowed to mobilize the use
of beds or that were located in rural areas were more likely to integrateSNF services.
Summary of Findings
The results of univariate analysis, bivariate analysis, factor analysis, and
multivariate logistic regression analysis are summarized in this section.
Univariate Analysis
According to the descriptive statistics of the study variables, the hybrid group
seemed to have a greater likelihood than the hierarchy group of using hierarchical
arrangements. The hybrid group had higher transaction uncertainty (area average hospital
occupancy, hospital occupancy, SNF-beds-to-elderly-population ratio, SNF occupancy
rate), higher transaction specificity (number of geriatric services, availability of home
care services), and higher transaction frequency (HMO/PPO affiliation) than did the
hierarchy group. After controlling for hospital characteristics, however, the contrast was
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reversed. This supports the importance of controlling for hospital characteristics when
conducting hospital-related studies.
Bivariate Analysis and Factor Analysis
Through correlation analysis and collinearity diagnostics, two variables
(individual hospital occupancy rate and SNF occupancy rate) were diagnosed to have
collinearity problems and were deleted from further analysis. The results of factor
analysis helped to validate the theoretically derived, three-construct model, because all
the variables were loaded at least moderately on their intended constructs.
Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis
Model fit was assessed at a micro level -- individual variables, as well as at a
macro level -- summary statistics. For the micro level, the expected sign, beta coefficient,
odd ratio, and statistical significance level of each variable were evaluated. For the
macro level, the assessment emphasized the residual or chi-square and correct prediction
of the classification table. Table 24 shows a comparison of odd ratio and summary
statistics for five primary models. Individual variables in each construct are summarized
across all models first, and then the number of significant variables and overall goodness
of fit statistic of each model are compared.
Micro-level analysis.

At least one variable representing each dimension had a

statistically significant influence on SNF integration, with one exception -- the
transaction frequency construct in Model 4. Area hospital occupancy, which measured
transaction uncertainty, was significantly and positively associated with the event of
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integration across all five variables. This indicates that hospitals located in market areas
with a relatively higher hospital occupancy rate were likely to take more control over

SNF services. The ratio of SNF beds to elderly population, another transaction
uncertainty variable, had a significant and negative impact (as expected) on the action of
vertical integration, except in Model 4. This finding implies that hospitals located in
areas with more

SNF beds were less likely to use a hierarchy or hybrid arrangement for

SNF service. As reported earlier in the factor analysis, one transaction uncertainty
variable, area hospital occupancy, was identified as demand uncertainty, and another, the
ratio of

SNF beds to elderly population, as supply uncertainty. Therefore, demand and

supply for

SNF beds affected a hospital's make-or-buy decision.

The interaction term of the below-poverty-level population and the ratio of
beds to elderly population, representing
significant association with

SNF

SNF behavioral uncertainty, also had a

SNF integration across the five models. Compared with

previous variables, this cross-term had relatively weaker predictive power, because the
probability of using
integration

SNF integration was about the same as that of not using SNF

(OR= 1.00).

The number of geriatric services and the availability of home services were used
to measure transaction specificity. Both independent variables were positively and
significantly associated with

SNF integration in all models but Model 3. The findings

indicate that geriatric services and home services were associated with the likelihood of

SNF integration. The odds ratio ranged from 1.09 to

4.16.
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Table 24
CQmpari:mn QfQdds RatiQs and Sl.!mmar;i Statisti!;;S Qf Primar;i MQd�ls
ConstructsN ariables

Model I

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Transaction Uncertainty
1.147 t

Area hospital occupancy rate

1.367§

1.406§

SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio

0.809§

0.788 §

0.690§

1.157

0.776§

Cross term of % of the poor and

1.00 I §

1.00 I §

1.001§

0.999 t

1.001 i

Number of geriatric services

1.407§

1.357 §

1.086

1.675 §

1.312§

Availability of home care

1.805§

1.373 §

1.549§

4.158 §

1.403§

1.134§

1.135 §

1.159

1.006

1.142§

Affiliation with HMO/PPO

1.070

1.131

1.121

0.089

1.136

Cross term of Medicare

1.001

1.003

1.003

0.998

1.002

0.938§

0.924 §

0.904§

1.025

0.924 §

1.208§

1.389§

ratio of beds to elderly popu.

Transaction Specificity

service

Transaction Frequency
Proportion of Medicare
discharges

discharges and hospital size

Control Variables
State CON stringency score
Beds set up and staffed

0.999

0.998 t

0.998

0.999

0.998 i

Availability of swing beds

4.218§

4.554 §

4.059§

1.160

4.441§

Member of health system

1.056

1.034

0.831

1.320 t

0.990

Located in rural area

1.817§

2.013§

2.384§

0.966

2.401§

Governmental ownership

1.491§

1.430 i

1.178

1.203

1.372 "!"

Not-for-profit ownership

1.541§

1.463§

0.707

1.611

1.343 t

Goodness of Fit Statistic
Chi-Square

1154.1

1138.7

416

516.5

1209.6

Concordant

70.2%

72.7%

81.4%

89.5%

74.2%

4703

4703

2075

3022

4703

Number of cases

t Significant at .05 level, two-tailed test
i Significant at .0 I level, two-tailed test
§ Significant at .00 I level, two-tailed test
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Of the two variables measuring transaction frequency, only the proportion of
Medicare discharges had a positive association in Models I, 2 and 3. Neither HMO/PPO
affiliation nor the cross-product term of Medicare discharges and hospital size had a
significant relationship with SNF integration. The predictive power of this construct was
much weaker than that of the other constructs when judged by the number of significant
variables. However, the odds ratios of the proportion of Medicare discharges were much
greater than those of most variables from the other two constructs. To wit, a hospital's
commitment to Medicare patient care influenced its form of providing SNF services.
Macro-level analysis.

This section summarizes comparisons of significant

variables in five primary models. In Models I, 2 and 5, a hospital's decision about SNF
integration was contingent on six out of the eight study variables. The three models,
which essentially compared two more extreme forms of SNF integration, had similar
significant variables. The consistent results show that hospitals were more likely to take
hierarchical or hybrid control if they confronted environmental uncertainty, had more
experience with related services, and had higher volumes of transactions. Models 3 and
4, which compared two less extreme forms (i.e., hierarchy vs. hybrid and hybrid vs.
market), had relatively fewer variables that reached statistical significance.
The goodness of fit statistics and the correct prediction percentages of the five
primary models were compared. Chi-square values of Models 3 and 4 were much lower
than those of the other models, probably because these two models had many fewer
observations. Since the p-values were less than 0.001 in all models, the differences in the
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chi-squares were not as discernible. As for the predicted probabilities and observed
responses, Models 3 and 4 had higher percentages of correct prediction. (81.4% for
Model 3; 89.5% for Model 4). Although Models 3 and 4 seem to have better summary
statistics, this may be due to the fact that they included fewer cases, so the results were
not disturbed by covariate patterns.
Overall, individual variables demonstrated fair predictive power in terms of odds
ratios and the number of significant variables. While the chi-squares show unsatisfactory
model fits, the high chi-squares may be caused by the inclusion of continuous variables.
2
Other articles address the limitation of using either R or chi-square to measure the
overall model fit without considering individual components (Hosmer & Lemeshow,
1989; Rossiter, Chiu, & Chen, 1994). Nevertheless, the correct prediction is satisfactory.
In sum, these models did fairly well in general, especially in predicting the event of SNF
integration across all models.
In the five primary logistic regression models, the effects of all the three
transaction constructs were tested simultaneously. In the two interaction models, the
interaction of each two constructs and that of the three constructs were found to have
significant effects on hospitals' decisions about SNF integration. The interpretation of
these results for testing the proposed hypotheses are discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 6
Discussion

The purpose of this study is to investigate why and how hospitals vertically
integrate into skilled nursing care facilities, by using Williamson's transaction cost
economics theory. Previous studies have rarely applied transaction cost theory to health
care.

Little theory-based research has been offered to explain why hospitals act to

integrate into skilled nursing services. Thus, the focal interest of this study is to examine
why hospitals expand their boundary to sub-acute care, which they have not traditionally
provided. Understanding the organization of sub-acute care is essential to hospital
management and health care policy planning.
The analysis focuses on the determinants of vertical integration, with the objective
of identifying the factors associated with a hospital's make-or-buy decision about
providing sub-acute care. The general assumption, based on transaction cost economics,
is that uncertainty, specificity, and frequency of transactions have a positive effect on
SNF integration.
This chapter first presents the results of individual hypothesis testing of the effects
of the three constructs. Both the supported and the unsupported hypotheses are
interpreted in terms of the theory. A discussion of whether the study has answered the
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research questions successfully is presented. The application of the transaction cost
theory to the health care field is then assessed by using Bacharach's

(1989) criteria.

Finally, the limitations of the study are addressed.
Hypothesis Testinf,! and Interpretation
This study offered four propositions and tested ten corresponding hypotheses.
The propositions and hypotheses are laid out in the order of the three transaction
constructs--

transaction uncertainty, transaction specificity, and transaction frequency.

Under each proposition, the derived testable hypotheses are restated. Interpretations are
presented as to why some of the propositions and hypotheses are supported, whereas
others are not. Table 25 summarizes the results of hypothesis testing for the five primary
models; Table 26 presents the results of the two interaction models.
Transaction Uncertainty on SNF Intef,!ration

Proposition One addresses the transaction uncertainty dimension. It states that
the more uncertain the SNF market is, the more likely a hospital is to undertake a higher
degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. In essence, transaction
uncertainty embraces environmental and behavioral uncertainty, which are both important
to a hospital's decision about SNF integration. Environmental uncertainty (market
uncertainty) includes both supply and demand factors. Behavioral uncertainty refers to
factors that emerge from humans' bounded rationality and opportunism.

HI and H2 are

used to test environmental uncertainty; H3 is used to test behavioral uncertainty.
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Table 25
Results of Hypothesis Testing for Five Primary Models
Hypo-

ConstructN ariables

Model

Model

Model

Model

I

2

3

4

5

Hierarchy

Hierarchy

Hierarchy

Hybrid

Hierarchy

thesis

Model

/Hybrid

vs.

VS.

vs.

VS.

vs.

Market

Hybrid

Market

Hybrid/

Market

Market

Transaction Uncertainty
Hl

Area hospital occupancy

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

-

s

s

s

s

-

s

s

s

-

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

-

-

s

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

rate
H2

SNF-beds-to-elderly-popu.
ratio

H3

Cross-product term of% of
the poor and ratio of beds
to elderly popu.
Transaction Specificity

H4

Number of geriatric
services

HS

Availability of home health
services
Transaction Frequency

H6

Proportion of Medicare
discharges

H7

Affiliation with

H8

HMOs/PPOs
Cross-product term of
Medicare discharges and
hospital size

Note.

S

=

=

Hypothesis was supported.
Hypothesis was not supported.
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HI:

A hospital that has a relatively higher occupancy rate and/or is located in an
area with a high average occupancy rate is more likely to employ a higher
degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
HI is supported across all five models. The results indicate that the demand

factor is influential on a hospital's decision about providing SNF services. This holds
true regardless of whether the decision is between hierarchy and market, between
hierarchy and hybrid, or between any other combinations.
Due to the nature of the DRG prospective payment system, hospitals are under
pressure to discharge patients quickly, if not prematurely. If hospitals cannot discharge
patients to other institutions that will provide appropriate post-acute care, they incur
opportunity costs and absorb the costs associated with delayed discharges. Therefore,
utilization of hospital acute beds reflects the competition for discharge sites and the
degree of demand uncertainty. For hospitals that are located in areas with higher average
occupancy rates, the competition for nursing home beds becomes more severe. In order
to overcome such demand uncertainty, hospitals are more likely to reduce their
dependency on the environment by providing SNF services internally.
H2:

A hospital that is located in an area with a relative shortage of SNF beds
and/or a high average SNF occupancy rate is more likely to employ a higher
degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
As opposed to H 1, which addresses uncertainty associated with the demand side,

H2 focuses on the supply factor. The supply of SNF beds is hypothesized to have a

direct and negative association with SNF integration. H2 is supported in all but Model 4.
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The supply factor is shown to be a key determinant of hospitals' SNF integration. It is
specially influential for hospitals located in areas with relatively fewer SNF beds.
That the supply of SNF beds is constrained by Certificate of Need (CON) has
been shown by the long waiting lists for nursing home replacements and by other access
problems (Ettner, 1993; Harrigan, 1984; Nyman, 1993). States use CON to limit the
nursing home supply, reasoning that if there are fewer nursing home beds, there will be
fewer Medicaid patients to pay for. The stringency of CON varies by state. After
controlling for CON, SNF bed availability still affects hospitals' forms of SNF services.
This finding implies that, regardless of CON stringency, hospitals are apt to employ a
higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services if the market supply of
SNF beds is not assured.
Model 4 is intended to differentiate hybrid from market arrangements. The
results, however, fail to support H2. In other words, the supply of SNF beds does not
affect a hospital's decision between hybrid and market arrangements. Three explanations
are possible for this result. First, it may be due to the fact that in areas where the nursing
home occupancy rate is high, few SNFs are available for hospitals to contract with them.
Second, nursing homes probably are disinclined to be constrained by contracting. Once
long-term contracts have been signed with hospitals, nursing homes may lose the ability
to maximize their profits. Yet another explanation is information impactedness. Not
every hospital has information on the availability of SNF beds in the market area. An
uninformed hospital may not undertake any action even if it is located in an area with an
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undersupply of SNF beds. In other words, those hospitals in the hybrid and market
groups may not be aware of the degree of uncertainty about SNF bed supply. In this
regard, the supply factor has no significant influence on the mode of SNF integration.
H3:

A hospital in an area with relatively more indigent persons and a shortage of
SNF bed supply is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical
integration in providing SNF services.

To address the uncertainty of nursing home behavior, the cross-product term of
the SNF beds to elderly population ratio and the persons-below-the-poverty-level
percentage is used in testing H3. This hypothesis is supported in all primary models with
the exception of Model 4. It indicates that hospitals are more likely to use SNF
integration if they perceive a threat from nursing home providers' price discrimination.
Nursing homes are known for a tendency to discriminate against prospective patients on
the basis of price (Dubay & Cohen, 1990; Scanlon, 1980; Shapiro & Roos, 1980). In
order to maximize profit, nursing homes may select those patients from whom optimal
revenue can be generated, and may be reluctant to accept patients who need heavy subacute care. Such a situation becomes more obvious where the nursing home supply is
tight and many patients are indigent, as shown by the delays in admission endured by
Medicaid patients in counties where nursing home beds are limited (Ettner, 1993).
Provided all other conditions are equal, however, nursing homes' behavioral uncertainty
has no influence on whether a hospital chooses a hybrid or a market arrangement (Model
4).
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Thus for Proposition One, the three hypotheses derived for the construct of
transaction uncertainty are sufficiently supported across the five primary models, except
that H2 and H3 are not supported in Model 4. What makes Model 4 different from the
other models may be that the difference between hybrid and market arrangements is
minimal. The demand factor outweighs the supply factor only when a hospital has to
choose between hybrid and market arrangements. Several studies also have shown that
environmental uncertainty (Anderson, 1985; John & Weitz, 1988; Walker & Weber,
1984) and behavioral uncertainty (John & Weitz, 1988) contribute to the firm's
integration decision.
Transaction Asset Specificity on SNF Integration
Proposition Two is intended to measure the transaction specificity dimension.
Where asset specificity is high, an internal organization is preferred because bilateral
dependency is great. Where asset specificity is low because suppliers are
interchangeable, the market mode is favored because of the bureaucratic disabilities of
internal organization in controlling production cost (Williamson, 1985). This study
assumes that the more experience or expertise a hospital has in caring for the elderly, the
more likely the hospital is to pursue more vertical integration in providing SNF services.
The number of geriatric services (H4) and the availability of home care services (H5) are
used to measure asset specificity.
H4:

A hospital that provides a wider variety of geriatric services to elderly

patients is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in
providing SNF services.
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HS:

A hospital that provides home health services to elderly patients is more
likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF
services.

According to Williamson (1985), asset specificity includes site specificity,
physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets. Knowledge
about providing specific geriatric services is regarded as human asset specificity as well
as physical asset specificity. A hospital's experience with providing elderly care is
hypothesized to be crucial to the hospital's decision on SNF integration. H4 and H5 are
supported across different degrees of vertical integration. A hospital is able to develop
expertise through providing geriatric services and home health services. Consequently, a
hospital should have specific personnel arrangements to provide specific geriatric
services for the elderly. Such expertise and knowledge equip a hospital to manage
nursing-home services and enable a hospital to accurately assess associated advantages
and risks. All other things being equal, a hospital that is comparatively more prepared
and experienced in elderly care (asset specificity) has the propensity to choose SNF
integration and will be more selective in its placement of nursing home patients. It
should be noticed that H4 in Model 3 is supported only at a marginally significant level
(p

=

.080).
The strong support of the two hypotheses confirms Williamson's (1985) assertion

that specificity is the most important factor in decisions about vertical integration.
Eastaugh (1992) has recently shown significant cost savings accompanying hospital
service specialization. Several studies in other fields also have shown that asset
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specificity is predictive of vertical integration (Anderson, 1985; Anderson & Coughlan,
1994; Masten, 1984; Rangan, Corey, & Cespedes, 1993)
Transaction Frequency on SNF Integration
The objective of a governance structure is to economize not only transaction costs
but also production costs. Whether transaction cost economies are reached at the expense
of scale economies needs to be assessed. Transaction volume is used as a proxy for
exchange frequency in several studies (Anderson & Coughlan, 1994; Anderson &
Schmittlein, 1984; Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). It is also suggested that volume may
represent the production costs factor in the application of transaction cost theory (Klein,
Frazier, & Roth, 1990). In this study, scale economy assumes that the higher transaction
frequency a hospital has, the more likely the hospital is to use more vertical integration in
providing SNF services.
Proposition Three is intended to address the transaction frequency dimension.

Three hypotheses are derived for this construct. H6 is tested by using the proportion of
Medicare patients; H7 is tested by affiliation with managed care organization as a
surrogate for private purchaser pressure. H8 is tested through a cross-term product of the
proportion of Medicare patients and hospital size.
H6:

A hospital with a relatively higher proportion of Medicare patients is more
likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF
services.

H6 is supported in the three models that compare two relatively extreme
governance modes (Model I: hierarchy/hybrid vs. market; Model 2: hierarchy vs. market;
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Model 5: hierarchy vs. hybrid/market). Only when a hospital has to decide between two
extreme arrangements for providing SNF services does the proportion of Medicare
discharges appear influential. That is probably one reason why H6 is not supported in
Models 3 and 4. In terms of scale economies, only the hospitals with extremely high
transaction volume will employ SNF integration to minimize production/transaction
costs. It can be concluded that transaction frequency does not distinguish the use of
intermediate exchanges from the use of either market exchanges or hierarchical
exchanges, suggesting that high volume of transactions is a prerequisite only for the
choice of either extreme.

H7:

A hospital affiliated with managed care organizations is more likely to

employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
A hospital's affiliation with a managed care organization was selected to measure

transaction frequency, because managed care organizations are known for reducing
patients' length of stay. The affiliated hospitals and affiliated physicians have to
discharge patients to sub-acute care sites more frequently. Such frequent transactions, in
turn, might lead hospitals to favor vertical integration. However, H7 is not supported in
any model.
Several explanations can be postulated for why HMO/PPO affiliation has no
influence on a hospital's mode of SNF services. The most likely reason is that the
measure did not capture the frequency of managed care discharges. Second, the
suppressed use of inpatient services might balance out the volume of induced SNF
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services even though managed care organizations tend to reduce enrollees' length of
stay. Third, managed care organizations prefer to insure younger persons, who are not
the major consumers ofSNF services.
H8:

A hospital with a higher proportion of Medicare patients and a relatively
larger size is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in
providing SNF services.

The cross-product term of Medicare discharges and hospital size is hypothesized
to represent the absolute volume of patients transferred from an acute hospital to a skilled
nursing facility. Theoretically, transactions are likely to be more frequent at a large
hospital caring for a greater proportion of Medicare patients than at a large hospital with a
smaller proportion of Medicare patients, or at a small hospital, regardless of its patient
mix. However, H8 is not supported in any model. There is no interaction effect of
Medicare discharges and hospital bed size on the mode ofSNF integration. The lack of
interaction effect may be due to the shared variances between the proportion of Medicare
discharges and bed size.
In summary, for Proposition Three, the hypothesis testing results indicate that the
volume of patient transactions has less significant influence on a hospital's mode ofSNF
integration than do uncertainty and frequency factors. Indeed, the influence of
transaction frequency on a firm's integration decision presents a mixed picture. In some
studies, frequency has been found to be significantly associated with the decision about
integration (Anderson & Coughlan, 1994; Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990), while other
studies have not concurred (John & Weitz, 1988; Masten, 1984).
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Interaction Effects on SNF Inteljration
Proposition Four is intended to address the interaction effects of the three

dimensions on SNF integration. It assumes that the more uncertainty, specificity, and
frequency are associated with the transactions of elderly patients at a hospital, the more
likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF
services. The interaction effects of the three transaction factors are tested in H9 and H 10.
H9 is decomposed into three sub-hypotheses to address the interaction of each two of the
three factors. Table 26 presents the results of the two interaction effect models.

H9:

The higher interaction effects of each two of the three constructs are (i.e.,
uncertainty

x

specificity, uncertainty

x

frequency, and specificity

x

frequency), the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of
vertical integration in providing SNF services.

H9a:

The higher the area average hospital occupancy associated with a hospital and the
more geriatric services provided by the hospital, the more likely the hospital is to
employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.

H9b:

The higher the area average hospital occupancy and the higher the proportion of
Medicare discharges associated with a hospital, the more likely the hospital is to
employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.

H9c:

The more geriatric services provided by a hospital and the higher the proportion
of Medicare discharges at a hospital, the more likely the hospital is to employ a
higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services.
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Table 26
Results of Hypothesis Testing for Interaction Effects Models

Hypothesis

ConstructsN ariables

H9a

Uncertainty

x

Specificity

<AH_orv , GI_!NDXJ

H9b

Uncertainty

x

Frequency

(AH_orv, MCR_Dl

H9c

Specificity

H lO

Uncertainty

x

F requency

x

Model6

x

NA
NA

cG1_1Nox, MCR_Dl

Specificity

s

Model7

Frequency

s

NA

NA

s

AH OPY' Gl INDX' MCR D

Notes. S:

Hypothesis was supported;
Hypothesis was not supported.

NA:

Not applicable

Williamson asserted that transaction specificity is the most important factor in the
vertical integration decision. Both interaction terms tested in H9a (AH_OPYxGI_INDX) and
H9c (GI_ INDXxMCR_D) support this argument. Table 27 presents the interaction effect of
transaction specificity and transaction frequency. The two-by-two table shows that a
hospital prefers the hierarchy mode under high specificity and frequency. With low
transaction specificity and frequency, a hospital tends to choose the market arrangement.
Interestingly, transaction frequency, a relatively weak factor in primary models, becomes
more influential when it interacts with transaction specificity. On the other hand, the
interaction effect between environmental uncertainty and transaction frequency is not
discernible as tested in H9b (AH_OPYxMCR_D) (Table 26).

In other words, SNF integration
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is not preferred for a hospital that is located in a competitive market area and that cares
for a higher proportion of elderly patients.

Table 27
Hospital SNF Integration Based on Interaction of Two Dimensions

High Asset Specificity

Low Asset specificity

I···········

�

·····

::<:..

Low Frequency

HYBRID

:

I····

.

High Frequency

......

{''

;

{

:::::c

''

i,

HYBRID

The first-order interaction models strongly support the absolute importance of
asset specificity and the conditional importance of transaction uncertainty and transaction
frequency when it comes to deciding on the degree of SNF integration for a hospital. An
increase in uncertainty and frequency is of slight consequence for transactions that are not
specific. This is not true, however, for transactions carried out by idiosyncratic providers.
When suppliers are interchangeable so that new trading relations can be easily arranged,
frequency matters little, and environmental uncertainty is not necessarily relevant.
Conversely, when exchange is highly specific, increased transaction frequency and
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environmental uncertainty make contractual gaps larger and the subsequent necessary
adaptations more important. Therefore, it becomes essential for a hospital to set up a
particular mechanism to provide SNF services (i.e., an integrated SNF) if exchange is
highly specific.
HlO:

The higher the area average hospital occupancy, the more geriatric services
are provided, and the higher the proportion of Medicare discharges is at a
hospital, the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical
integration in providing SNF services.

The second-order interaction effect of three dimensions is tested in HIO. The
importance of interaction effects is proven in this study. The results confirm
Williamson's emphasis that the selection of vertical integration is simultaneously
determined by three dimensions of transaction. SNF integration is a plausible choice for
a hospital if the following conditions co-exist: its environment is more uncertain, it is
more experienced in caring for the elderly patients, and it accommodates more Medicare
patients.
Summary of Hypothesis Testing
The hypothesis testing results provide support for most of the fundamental
predictions of transaction cost economics theory. The importance of transaction
uncertainty (HI, H2 and H3) and transaction specificity (H4 and H5) are strongly
supported. Transaction frequency (H6, H7 and H8) receives less support. Compared to
the other two factors, transaction frequency has far less influence on a hospital's decision
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about SNF integration. As Williamson (1985) suggests, economies of scale are less
relevant to a decision about forward integration.
The emergence of SNF integration is assumed to occur due to the failure of the
nursing home market. In this case, market failure is considered to be the result of
environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. The hypothesized influence of
uncertainty is strongly supported. The sustained H 1 and H2 indicate that environmental
uncertainty affects hospitals' choice of a governance form to provide SNF services. H3
supports the assertion that nursing homes' opportunistic behaviors also affect the decision
about SNF integration. Coase (193 7) concluded that opportunistic behavior motivates
vertical integration. The results of this study show that hospitals may select the hierarchy
or hybrid form to solve their hold-up problems with nursing homes.
The results of testing H4 and H5 confirm that transaction specificity is the most
important and distinguishing construct for make-or-buy decisions, as Williamson (1975,
1985) suggested. A hospital's experience and knowledge of elderly care is crucial in its
choice of a form for providing SNF services. As compared to the number of geriatric
services, furthermore, the availability of home health services is a more significant
determinant of SNF integration.
Transaction frequency is shown to be the least significant factor in a hospital's
decision among different degrees of SNF integration, since H6 is supported in only three
models, and H7 and H8 are not supported in any model. The results, which support
Williamson's assertion (1985), indicate that scale economies are not as important to the
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transaction cost paradigm as are the other two factors (i.e., uncertainty and specificity).
Transaction frequency does not distinguish the use of hybrid exchanges from the use of
either market exchanges or hierarchical exchanges, suggesting that only extreme
transaction volume (very high or very low) has an impact on a hospital's form for
providing SNF services. Similar findings have been reported for other industries
(Rangan, Corey, & Cespedes, 1993; Walker & Poppo, 1991).
Two out of the three first-order interaction terms are successfully tested in H9a
and H9c. These results confirm that transaction specificity is the most important factor in
vertical integration decisions. The second-order interaction effect of three dimensions is
also successfully tested in HI 0.
Responses to Research Questions
This study is guided by three fundamental research questions, raised in Chapter I.
The first question inquires about the degree to which hospitals choose vertical integration
in response to delayed discharge problems; the second inquires about the determinants of
hospitals' decisions about SNF integration. The analysis results presented in Chapter 5
and the testing of the hypotheses summarized in the previous section have answered the
first and the second questions.
Assessment ofTCE by Using Bacharach's Criteria
The third question, which focuses on the applicability of Williamson's transaction
cost economics theory to the health care sector, is a more global question and so cannot
be answered by hypothesis testing. To address the third question, Bacharach's (1989)
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criteria of theory assessment are adopted. Bacharach's criteria propose that a theory can
be assessed in terms of variables, constructs, and relationships. The falsifiability and
utility of each of the three elements are evaluated. The following assessment discusses
the value and usefulness of transaction cost economics as a research tool in the study of
health services organizations.
Variable falsifiability.

Variable falsifiability is evaluated by whether the selected

variables are operationally defined, valid, and reliable. It is obvious that transaction
uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency require more operational configuration if
they are considered as variables. The selected variables in this study are all defined well.
Measurement reliability is verified by the stable beta coefficients of each variable across
all five primary models.
Construct validity.

There are three parts to construct validation:

I) suggesting

what constructs may account for test performance, 2) deriving hypotheses from the theory
involving the construct, and

3) testing the hypotheses empirically (Kerlinger, 1986).

Transaction cost economics proposes three discriminant constructs that determine
the selection of governance structure -- uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency. This
study makes a particular effort to measure uncertainty, although most economic theories
consider uncertainty as given. Environmental uncertainty is decomposed into demand
and supply factors. The demand factor is represented by the average area hospital
occupancy rate, and the supply factor by SNF-beds-to-elderly-population ratio. On the
other hand, behavioral uncertainty of nursing homes is measured by a cross-product term

175

of the SNF-beds-to-elderly-population ratio and the persons-below-the-poverty-level
percentage. The availability of home health services and the number of geriatric services
are well representative of transaction specificity. The proportion of Medicare discharges
and the affiliation with HMOs or PPOs are indicators of transaction frequency. From the
results of factor analysis, all variables are found to be appropriate indicators of their
respective constructs. In other words, the constructs are proven to have discriminant
validity.
Logical adequacy. Economic methodology has the capacity to develop falsifiable
theories that precisely specify both constructs and their relationships. Two criteria must
be met to achieve logical adequacy. First, the proposition must be nontautological.
Second, the nature of the relationship between antecedent and consequent must be
specified. Robins (1987) claimed that transaction cost analysis can "escape this sort of
tautology by making the leap to causal explanation." In this study, all propositions and
hypotheses are developed to specify the causal relationship between a hospital's mode of
SNF integration and the characteristics of transactions. For example, a hospital located in
the market with higher uncertainty is more likely to employ SNF integration. This
application of transaction cost theory is logically adequate, because the relationship is
specified clearly in the non-tautological proposition statements.
Empirical adequacy.

A principal reason for using transaction cost economics as a

tool for health organizations research is that, to date, empirical work within TCE has been
for the most part confirmatory. Research on vertical integration has been used to
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examine how consistent the empirical evidence is with the hypothesis that organizations
are likely to internalize exchanges involving high asset specificity and uncertainty. In
this study, the results also confirm that a hospital's decision about SNF integration is
associated with asset specificity and environmental and behavior uncertainty rather than
with transaction frequency. This empirical adequacy may be due to a good model
composed of valid and stable variables (Bacharach, 1989).
Explanatory potential.

Transaction cost theory not only provides an answer to a

fundamental question: "why do organizations exist?", but also reframes our
understanding of many issues through a novel approach to understanding organizations.
Williamson (1975, 1985) provided an explicit statement that the emergence of
organizations is due to the failure of a free market system. Because of supply restriction
and price discriminating behavior, there can be little confidence that the nursing home
market will achieve a competitive market ideal. SNF integration can be considered the
result of failure of the nursing home market.
In addition to providing a basis for identifying the forces that shape organization
structures, the application of transaction cost theory also explains the diversity of
governance structures in response to changing economic conditions. The findings explain
what governance structures hospitals choose when confronting different degrees of
uncertainty, asset specificity, and transaction frequency. In other words, this study's
application of the theory explains how the selection of hierarchy, hybrid, or market
arrangement is contingent on the three dimensions of transactions.
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Predictive adequacy. The predictive adequacy of a theoretical system is judged
by its ability to make predictions within specific spaces and times. With respect to
organizational-level topics of vertical integration, evidence in the literature from different
fields such as marketing, manufacture, and transportation, is relevant to the propositions
and hypotheses of transaction cost economics. Similarly, the results of this study support
what is predicted by transaction cost economics theory at the time specified by the cross
sectional study design.
To summarize the answer to the third research question, TCE is appropriate for
application to analyze health services organizations, for the following reasons: First, it is
possible for this scientific theory to be refuted by empirical experience. Based on the
falsifiability of variables, construct validity, logical adequacy, and empirical consistency,
the value ofTCE is confirmed. Second, TCE is appropriate in terms of its capacity for
explanation and prediction. As Bierstedt (1959) pointed out, utility may be viewed as
"the bridge that connects theory and research." The utility ofTCE is demonstrated by its
explanatory and predictive value in this study.
Limitations of the Study
This study is limited in several respects. The limitations due to limited data
availability, measurement problems, and study design are addressed in this section.
The dependent variables were abstracted from the AHA Data File, which records
the form a hospital uses to provide SNF services -- in-house, long-term contracting, or no
arrangements. Long-term contracting, by the definition in the AHA Data File, includes
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two arrangements -- formal contracting and joint venture. These two arrangements differ
in several ways. Formal contracting is a contractual relationship, whereas joint venture
refers to co-ownership. Compared to formal contracting, a joint venture is associated
with higher risks, since the involved parties are more closely affiliated. Such distinct
natures are not differentiated in the AHA Data File. If they were, more variation might
have been detected in the hybrid group.
A hospital's affiliation with managed care organizations was chosen to represent
the transaction frequency construct, but it turned out to be a statistically insignificant
variable in the testing of Hypothesis 7 across all models. Such insignificance may reveal
either I) that transaction frequency is less important than the other two factors in
predicting the make-or-buy decision; or 2) that this indicator is not a good measure of
transaction volume. As a remedy, other variables may be used, for example, the
proportion of discharged hospital patients by destination (available in the MEDPAR
Dataset) and by payment status.
The goodness-of-fit of the models tested was not satisfactory. This may be due to
the inclusion of continuous variables in the models, which may generate excessive
covariate patterns. Moreover, if continuous variables are used, the more cases that are
included in the models, the higher the chi-square obtained. The chi-square value dropped
sharply when 5% or I 0% of random samples were extracted for analysis (not reported).
Nevertheless, this limitation could be removed by recoding the continuous variables into
dummy variables.
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This study adopts cross-sectional analysis, which can establish association but not
causality. In other words, this study cannot infer the cause-effect relationship, in which
the emergence of a new governance structure is caused by the economic factors.
The two-way contrasts serve to address the hypotheses across all models, but do
not address the full-scale test of the models' adequacy to predict the range and ordinality
of hospital response. Additional analyses using multi-nominal logit regressions are
needed.

Chapter 7
Implications and Conclusions

This chapter first presents several important implications of the findings from this
study that are useful for hospital administrators, policy makers, and researchers in the
areas of health services organizations and long term care. Suggestions for future research
are presented. The chapter concludes with a statement of the significance of this study.
Implications of the Study
The results have implications from different perspectives-- theoretical,
methodological, managerial, and health policy.
Theoretical Implications
The transaction cost perspective has not been much subjected to empirical testing
in health care organizations. This study, an extension of an earlier study by Chiu and
associates (1993), is the first empirical study of downstream integration in the health care
field. Using transaction cost economics theory, this application explains well how the
selection of hierarchy, hybrid, or market arrangement is contingent on the three
dimensions of transactions. Thus, the applicability of transaction cost economics in
health services organizations is supported.
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The major assumption of transaction cost economics is that the emergence of an
organization is due to market failure that is caused by environmental and human factors.
The findings of this study imply that hospitals' vertical integration of skilled nursing
facilities may be considered to be the result of the failure of nursing home markets. In
this study, the environmental factors are represented by demand and supply factors
instead of by uncertainty and small-number as Williamson (1975, 1985) proposes. From
the perspective of economics, the dynamics of demand and supply can well represent
market uncertainty.
As the environment becomes more uncertain, the probability of opportunism
increases. As Williamson argues (1975), vertical integration is preferred to long-term
contracting or the spot market mode in circumstances where small numbers and
opportunism conditions are joined. That argument is supported in this study by testing a
cross-term of SNF beds to elderly population ratio and the percentage of persons-below
the-poverty-level. In other words, the framework of market failure proposed by
Williamson (1975) is empirically demonstrated in this study.
The second dimension of transactions, asset specificity, has been operationalized
in many ways. This study measures asset specificity in terms of hospitals' expertise or
experience in providing geriatric services. The result is consistent with Williamson's
(1985, 1991) emphasis on the importance of asset specificity in make-or-buy decisions.
The third dimension, transaction frequency, is proven in this study to be the least
significant factor in determining vertical integration, as Williamson argues.
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Interestingly, among the three modes of SNF integration, the hybrid group is
found to the smallest. This finding supports Williamson's argument that the contract
arrangement is more difficult to monitor and control. For hospitals, the transaction costs
of employing the hybrid form may be higher than those for market or vertical integration
arrangements. Nursing homes, on the other hand, once they sign long-term contracts with
hospitals, may lose the opportunity for profit maximization.
Methodological Implications
This empirical study, which applies transaction cost economics to the health care
industry, is aimed at disclosing the reasons why certain institutional forms are selected by
organizations. Several methodological implications should be noted. First, the results
indicate that the semi-microanalytic level is appropriate for transaction cost analysis.
Williamson (1975, 1985) suggests that research at this level is best served by using
organizational and economic factors rather than accounting data. The well-established
and confirmed models of this study imply that empirical studies of transaction cost
economics are best conducted at a semi-microanalytic level of analysis.
The necessity of controlling variables that covary with the dependent variables is
another methodological implication. The variance in the dependent variables due to
control variables should be teased out, to reveal the pure influence that the focal
independent variables have on a hospital's form of SNF integration. In the pilot study by
Chiu, Hurley, and Chen (1993), fewer control variables were used, and the hypotheses
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received less support. Hypotheses in the present study are more strongly supported after
controlling for CON and swing bed status.
A persistent concern is the question of whether a sample is representative of its
population. Hypotheses were comparatively less supported when 5% and I 0% of the
population were tested (not reported in this study). The difference also appears when the
current study is compared with the pilot study. More hypotheses are supported in the
present study, which uses the entire population (all hospitals in the U.S.), than are
supported in the pilot study, which uses a sample (hospitals in the Mid-Atlantic region).
This comparison makes a strong case that researchers should study the entire population
whenever possible.
The last methodological implication concerns testing interaction effects.
Williamson argues that the three dimensions simultaneously affect make-or-buy
decisions, but this argument has not previously been empirically verified. In this study,
the significance of second-order interaction effects has proven Williamson's argument.
Managerial Implications
In addition to theoretical and methodological implications, the findings capture
several managerial implications for hospital administrators. More and more hospitals are
expanding their service forward or backward into a diversity of services. As Robinson
(1994) describes the trend, hospitals are becoming health care centers without boundaries.
This study suggests that hospitals choose the most appropriate boundaries according to
economic conditions. A hospital administrator has to be sensitive to the existence of
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uncertainty in order to choose the most efficient boundary. Transaction specificity and
frequency also should be taken into account in deciding on a governance structure. The
study findings indicate that hospitals with more experience in geriatric care are more
likely to use SNF integration if the nursing home market is relatively competitive. When
a hospital considers integrating into long-term care services, the administrator has to
assess organizational strengths in providing geriatric care and the proportion of patients
needing long-term care, in order to arrive at scale economies.
If a hospital selects a "wrong" mode of governance structure, it probably incurs
higher transaction costs and production costs. If the"right" mode is selected, on the
other hand, a hospital can minimize transaction costs and possibly production costs as
well. If a hospital plans to provide a new service through either forward or backward
integration, for example, by establishing an outreach cancer center or a satellite clinic, the
hospital should fully assess the three dimensions of transactions as the first step.
It is noteworthy that the mode of vertical integration should be selective. A
higher degree of integration is not always the best choice for a hospital. As Coase (1937)
first posited, the type of organizational arrangement used to govern any particular
exchange depends on the cost effectiveness of the arrangement compared with that of any
alternative arrangement.
Health Policy Implications
Calls for the development of"seamless" or"boundaryless" health care delivery
systems have been increasingly voiced as a goal of health care reform in the United States
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(Conrad & Jeppson, 1993; Gauthier, Rogal, Barrand, & Cohen, 1992; Hurley, 1993;
Johnsson, 1992). This preference for seamless delivery implies that inattention to
reducing the friction associated with imperfect linkages along the care continuum has
impeded the efficiency of health care delivery. According to this study, in 1990 almost
50% of all hospitals in the United States employed hierarchy or hybrid arrangements in
providing skilled nursing care, and the other 50% chose spot markets. Since the findings
show that the selection of governance mode for hospitals is determined by the three
dimensions of transactions, all hospitals can be considered to be selecting the most cost
efficient arrangements. In these terms, a seamless health care delivery system does not
always guarantee reduced costs.
This study has implications for CON policy. The results indicate that the
probability of SNF integration is constrained by the stringency of CON. Hospitals
located in a state with more stringent CON criteria are less likely to undertake SNF
integration. In this regard, the CON regulations introduce barriers to a seamless health
care delivery system.
Suggestions for Future Research
Based on this empirical study, several suggestions for future studies are provided.
The first suggestion concerns efficiency measurement, which is the important construct of
transaction cost economics suggested by Williamson. The next section on measurement
issues suggests to include new variables or alternative variables of transaction frequency.
Finally, a lagged panel design is recommended.
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Efficiency Measurement
The goal of a governance structure is to achieve efficiency, i.e., to reduce
transaction costs (Willian1son,

1985). Although the concept of efficiency is critical to the

transaction cost theory, the relevant literature does not elaborate on it. It has been
maintained that transaction cost considerations are essential in defining the efficient
boundaries. Organizations are assumed to choose governance structures through which
efficiency goals may be realized. If this argument is sustained, hospitals that choose
either hierarchy, hybrid, or market arrangement should be considered as equally efficient.
In other words, the hospitals in each group should be considered to have selected the most
efficient governance. However, there is no information to confirm whether the three
groups are in fact equally efficient. Further research should derive valid indicators to
compare the efficiency of hospitals with different modes of SNF integration. Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) may serve as a good evaluative tool for this purpose.
Measurement Issues
Transaction cost theory has been criticized for neglecting the social aspects of
economic transactions (Granovetter,

1985). Transaction cost theory concerns itself solely

with efficiency, neglecting other important factors that may contribute to organizations'
decisions. For example, a community hospital's board composition may affect decisions
about vertical integration. The following variables also may be considered for future
research. First, patient characteristics may be good indicators of transaction frequency.
For example, if hospitals care for more patients with functional disabilities, the hospitals

187

are probably more prone to undertake SNF integration. Therefore the proportion of
functionally disabled patients may be used as a frequency indicator. By the same token,
a hospital with a higher proportion of patients diagnosed in the top ten Drags requires
more transfers for subacute care.

Second, even though Williamson asserts that

accounting data are unlikely to suit the needs of transaction cost studies, consideration
can be given to including financial data (e.g., production costs). The HCFA Discharge
Data is a source of hospitals' financial performance.
Study Design
Using a cross-sectional design, a study can show only an association, not
causality, between economic factors and a hospital's decision about SNF integration. It
would enhance the understanding of patient transactions if causality could be disclosed.
Causality can be established better if the dependent variable is measured at a later time
than are the independent variables. This can be achieved by adopting a lagged panel
design.
Conclusions
According to the findings, this study has successfully explained, by using
Williamson's transaction cost economics, why and how hospitals vertically integrate
skilled nursing care facilities. Nationwide, over one third of hospitals expand their
boundaries by providing skilled nursing care; over half of hospitals still rely on the spot
market when discharging patients to nursing care; and fewer than I 0% of hospitals
choose hybrid arrangements. The selection of SNF integration mode is found to be
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contingent on three dimensions of transaction, as claimed by Williamson. In the presence
of perceived uncertainty in the nursing home market, of specific investment in SNF
services, and of the expected volume of transactions, hospitals have to decide among
levels of vertical integration to minimize transaction costs as well as production costs in
providing skilled nursing services. As assessed by Bacharach's (1989) criteria,
transaction cost economics can be applied to the health care sector to explain and predict
hospitals' make-or-buy decisions. This study has made a unique contribution to
validating the applicability of transaction cost economics to the health care field. The
results of this study not only enrich the body of theoretical knowledge, but also shed light
on practical management and policy making.
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Appendix A
Literature: Pair Comparison of Governance Forms
Authors

Type of Industry

Governance

Uncertainty

Asset specificity

NA

- engineer efforts +

Forms
Monteverde &

Ford and GM, transactions

Hierarchy vs.

Teece (1982)

across different firms

Hybrid

Frequency/
Scale economies
-firm size+

-specific/generic+

(backward)
Anderson &

Electronic products

Hierarchy vs.

Schmittlein

(forward)

Hybrid

NA

-the evaluation of

-firm size+

sale performance+

(1984)
Masten

Aerospace industry

Hierarchy vs.

(1984)

a single firm (backward)

Hybrid

Walker & Weber

Automobile industry,

(1984)

a single firm

- complexity+

-design spec.

NA

-site spec. +

Hierarchy vs.

-volume

-changes in

-production

Hybrid

uncertainty+

specifications

costs savings+

(backward)

- technological
improvements

Palay (1 981)

Railroad industry

Hierarchy vs.

shipper and its carried cars

Hybrid

(backward)
Note. + = significant in positively direction; NA =not applicable

NA

-design and
handling+

NA
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Appendix B
Literature: Three T;tpes of Governance Forms
Authors

Type of Industry

Governance

Uncertainty

Asset Specificity

Forms

Frequency/
Scale
Economies

Rangan et al.

Survey of 5 industries

Hierarchy vs.

-demand

(1993)

(forward)

Hybrid vs.

uncertainty+

-sales expertise+

NA

-volume +

Market
Klein et al.

(1990)

Survey of

6 industries

(forward)

Walker

& Poppo

(1991)

Hierarchy vs.

-diversity

- human spec. +

Hybrid vs.

-volatility

-physical spec.

Market

(Hybrid +)

(durable products)

the assembly division of

Hierarchy vs.

-supplier market

-equipment+

a firm

Hybrid vs.

competition

-labor uniqueness+

(backward)

Market

(Hybrid +)

NA

-investment in
technology

Joskow

(1985)

Electric firm and coal

Hierarchy vs.

mining

Hybrid vs.

(backward)

Market

Note. +: significant in positively direction; NA: not applicable

NA

- site/location+

NA
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